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Research examining juror perceptions of juveniles tried as adults has provided 
mixed results, with some studies providing evidence of bias against juveniles tried as 
adults, and others finding no evidence of this bias.  The present research aimed to clarify 
this issue by examining the roles of generic prejudice and emotion in jurors’ judgments of 
juveniles tried as adults.  Study 1 assessed which stereotypes people associate with 
juveniles tried as adults compared to juveniles tried in juvenile court and adults tried in 
criminal court.  Study 2 examined to what extent angry, fearful, sad, and neutral mock 
jurors used these stereotypes to make judgments of guilt when presented with a juvenile 
tried as an adult, or an adult charged with the same crime.  Results of Study 1 showed 
that men endorsed some stereotypes to a greater extent for the juvenile tried as an adult 
compared to the other defendants, while women did not.  In Study 2, mock jurors judged 
the adult defendant more harshly than they did the juvenile defendant, but only when they 
experienced anger and sadness, and in some cases fear.  Implications of these results and 
possible future studies are discussed.  
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was increasing concern about the rising 
number of violent juvenile offenders in the United States.  There was a 50% increase in 
total juvenile arrests for violent crimes between 1988 and 1994, and the number of 
juveniles arrested for murder increased 158% between 1985 and 1994 (Penney & 
Moretti, 2005).  Simultaneously, there were media reports of an increase in juvenile 
“superpredators,” juveniles who were thought to be more dangerous and violent than 
generations of youth before them, and who began committing violent acts at younger 
ages (Jordan & Myers, 2008).  Researchers also projected that an increase in the juvenile 
population would create an even larger group of violent juvenile predators in the near 
future (Zimring, 1998; Shook, 2005).  Both the increase in juvenile crime and the 
public’s fears about a growing generation of dangerous superpredators led to a number of 
legislative reforms facilitating the transfer of juveniles to adult criminal court in the early 
1990s (Jordan & Myers, 2008).   
Although the juvenile population did increase as expected, violent crime rates 
among juveniles actually decreased significantly from 1994 to 2000, reaching a rate 
nearly as low as it had been in 1980, before the rise in crime (Butts & Travis, 2002).  In 
recent years, juvenile arrests for violent crimes have been at their lowest level since 1988 
(Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).  Despite this, many of the punitive reforms from the 1990s 
remain in place.  Currently, approximately 200,000 juveniles are tried, sentenced, or 
incarcerated as adults every year (Campaign for Youth Justice, 2009).  This is a 
substantial increase compared to the approximately 12,000 juveniles transferred to 
criminal court in 1978 (Hamparian, 1982, as cited in Krisberg, 2005) (note however, that 
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the population of juveniles has also grown substantially between 1978 and 2009, so 
increases in the number of juveniles transferred should be interpreted in this context).   
There is some evidence showing that when a juvenile is tried as an adult, the mere 
fact that the juvenile was transferred to criminal court may lead jurors to judge the 
juvenile more harshly than they would an adult accused of a similar crime (Levine, 
Williams, Sixt, & Valenti, 2001; Tang & Nunez, 2003; Tang, Nunez, & Bourgeois, 
2009).  This bias may occur because of generic prejudice against all juveniles who have 
been transferred to criminal court (Vidmar, 1997; Vidmar, 2002; Vidmar, 2003; Wiener, 
Arnot, Winter, & Redmond, 2006).  Generic prejudice is prejudice that is not specific to 
the defendant or other parties associated with the trial.  It is prejudice that involves the 
“transfer of pre-existing prejudicial attitudes, beliefs, or stereotypes about categories of 
persons, entities, or events to the trial setting in a legally inappropriate manner” (Vidmar, 
2003).   
Although some research has demonstrated juror bias against juveniles tried as 
adults, other research has found that jurors are no more likely to find a juvenile in 
criminal court guilty than an adult charged with the same crime (Warling & Peterson-
Badali, 2003; Woody & Walker, in press).  If jurors do experience generic prejudice 
against juveniles tried as adults, why do only some individuals and only some studies 
show evidence of bias against juvenile defendants in criminal court?  A possible 
explanation for the inconsistent results in this area of research is the emotions that 
individuals experience when presented with a juvenile being tried as an adult.  It may be 
that specific emotions facilitate generic prejudice against juveniles tried as adults.  
According to cognitive appraisal theory and the Appraisal-Tendency Framework (Lerner 
3 
& Keltner, 2000, 2001), specific emotions have distinct effects on judgment and decision 
making as a function of the cognitive appraisals associated with each emotion.  
Participants in studies who did display harsher judgment of a juvenile tried as an adult 
compared to an adult defendant may have been experiencing different emotions than 
participants who did not demonstrate this bias (i.e., anger compared to fear or sadness).   
The research described in this dissertation attempts to explain the inconsistent 
results of research examining perceptions of juveniles tried as adults by examining the 
roles of generic prejudice and emotion in mock jurors’ judgments of guilt.  This 
dissertation first provides a legal background for juvenile transfer to criminal court by 
discussing the history and purpose of the juvenile court, and then current law and 
processes pertaining to juvenile transfer (also called waiver).  Next, it introduces generic 
prejudice as a factor that can influence jurors’ decisions about juvenile defendants in 
criminal court.  This dissertation then provides a summary of the current research 
examining juror perceptions of juveniles tried as adults, and draws on research examining 
how specific emotions influence decision making to propose that the experience of 
certain emotions facilitates generic prejudice toward juveniles tried as adults.  Two 
separate studies tested this proposal.  Study 1 examined whether individuals endorse 
negative stereotypes about criminals to a greater extent for juveniles tried as adults, 
compared to adult defendants.  Study 2 used the results of study 1 to construct a 
stereotyping measure to examine whether mock jurors would use stereotypes about 
juveniles tried as adults to make verdict decisions.  Study 2 also manipulated emotion and 
measured pretrial bias to examine whether the experience of certain emotions influenced 
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participants’ use of stereotypes and pre-existing biases to make verdict decisions for a 
juvenile tried as an adult and an adult defendant.  
CHAPTER 2: History of the Juvenile Court 
 The Juvenile Court Act of 1899 established the United States’ first juvenile court 
in Cook County, Illinois.  By 1925, all but two states had established specialized courts 
for children (Snyder & Sickmund, 2005).  The focus of the juvenile court was on the 
welfare of the child, and its main goal was rehabilitation; there was an emphasis on 
assessment and reform rather than the determination of guilt and punishment as in 
criminal courts (Snyder & Sickmund, 2005).  The juvenile court system was 
individualistic, with social workers conducting investigations of the child’s background, 
and assisting judges by making recommendations for individual rehabilitative treatment 
plans (Ullman, 2000).  Juvenile offenders were not subject to the formalities of criminal 
court, including the protections of due process.  Instead, juvenile court proceedings were 
informal and flexible (Slaten, 2003).  Despite this orientation toward rehabilitation, the 
juvenile court was still able to transfer serious juvenile offenders to adult criminal court 
(Slaten, 2003).  At first this rarely occurred, but by the end of the 1920s an increasing 
number of judges were waiving older and especially violent juveniles to criminal court 
(Slaten, 2003).   
 When the juvenile court system began, the presumption was that constitutional 
rights such as due process were not applicable to juveniles.  Critics soon began to argue 
however, that the juvenile court system was unconstitutional as it became more apparent 
that the adjudication of juveniles often resulted in outcomes very similar to criminal 
sentences, and as juveniles began to claim that the informal nature of the proceedings 
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violated their constitutional rights (Ullman, 2000).  Kent v. United States (1966) was one 
of several cases in the 1960s that addressed these constitutional challenges.  In Kent, the 
Supreme Court ruled that the juvenile court must conduct a formal hearing with 
representation on the motion of waiver before transferring a juvenile to criminal court, 
and that a juvenile’s attorney should have access to all records involved in the waiver.  
The ruling also stated that the juvenile court must provide a written statement of the 
reasons for waiver (Kent, 1966, pp. 561-563). 
In an appendix to the opinion, the Court listed eight specific factors for a juvenile 
court judge to consider when making the waiver decision: 1) The seriousness of the 
alleged offense to the community and whether the protection of the community requires 
waiver; 2) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, 
premeditated, or willful manner; 3) Whether the alleged offense was against persons or 
against property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons, especially if 
personal injury resulted; 4) The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is 
evidence upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment; 5) The 
desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the juvenile’s 
associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a crime in criminal 
court; 6) The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration 
of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude, and pattern of living; 7) The 
record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contact with law 
enforcement agencies, juvenile courts, prior commitments to juvenile institutions, etc.; 
and 8) The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of 
reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (Kent, 1966, pp. 566-567).  Following Kent, the 
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majority of states modified their transfer statutes to comply with the Supreme Court’s 
decision, calling for a hearing and a statement of reasons for a decision to transfer a 
juvenile to criminal court (Frost Clausel & Bonnie, 2000).   
Though Kent pronounced that juvenile transfer proceedings required due process, 
the Court did not elaborate on whether those protections also applied to other juvenile 
proceedings (Slaten, 2003).  Several Supreme Court decisions in the late 1960s and early 
1970s addressed the issue of how far due process extended in juvenile proceedings, and 
in turn changed the face of the juvenile justice system.  Shortly after the Kent decision, 
the Supreme Court ruled that in juvenile proceedings that may lead to incarceration, 
juveniles have the right to representation by counsel, notice of charges, opportunity for 
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and protection against self-
incrimination (In re Gault, 1967, pp. 33-57).  Adding to the growing similarity between 
juvenile court and criminal court, in In re Winship (1970, p. 368) the Court held that that 
the “reasonable doubt” standard should be required in all delinquency adjudications (as 
opposed to the “preponderance of evidence” standard the juvenile court had been using).  
Five years later, the Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to prosecute a juvenile as an 
adult in criminal court for the same conduct that has already resulted in adjudication in 
juvenile court, citing violation of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment 
(Breed v. Jones, 1975, p. 541).  The determination of whether the juvenile court should 
transfer a juvenile to criminal court must occur before the adjudicatory stage of juvenile 
court proceedings (Breed, 1975, p. 537-538).  Although the intention of these decisions 
was to provide juveniles with the same procedural rights afforded to adults, the result was 
the deterioration of the rehabilitative goal of the juvenile court that differentiated it from 
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the criminal court.  Following these pivotal decisions, juvenile courts began to place a 
new emphasis on deterrence and punishment.  Starting in 1976 more than half of the state 
legislatures began to make changes to their laws so that it would be easier to transfer 
youth to criminal court (Krisberg, 2005).   
CHAPTER 3: Current Transfer Law and Procedures 
Though Kent (1966) required juvenile court judges to hold hearings before 
transferring juveniles to criminal court, many states created automatic transfer statutes to 
overcome this, and in some states district attorneys were given the power to make 
transfer decisions without providing juveniles any procedural safeguards (Pagnanelli, 
2007).  Consequently, there are three basic types of waiver to criminal court: judicial 
waiver, prosecutorial waiver, and statutory waiver.  All states allow for juvenile 
prosecution in criminal court by one or more types of transfer mechanism. 
Judicial Waiver 
Statutes that permit judicial waiver give authority to the juvenile court judge to 
transfer a juvenile to criminal court.  There are three types of judicial waiver: 
discretionary, presumptive, and mandatory (Dawson, 2000).  Some states allow more 
than one type of judicial waiver. 
Discretionary judicial waiver.  Discretionary judicial waiver involves a case-by-
case analysis of each juvenile by a judge.  Currently 45 states have enacted discretionary 
judicial waiver statutes (Griffin, 2008).  These statutes specify what factors a juvenile 
court judge must consider in making the transfer decision.  Most states base these factors 
on the eight factors listed in the appendix to the Kent (1966) opinion.  Kent did not make 
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the use of these factors mandatory; however, many states have incorporated them into 
their statutes, either verbatim, or with minor modifications (Slaten, 2003).   
Presumptive judicial waiver.  Fifteen states currently have provisions for 
presumptive judicial waiver, which deems certain types of cases or specific combinations 
of factors as inappropriate for juvenile court, presuming criminal prosecution to be 
appropriate (Griffin, 2008).  This places the burden on the juvenile and defense counsel 
to show that the case does belong in juvenile court.  If they fail to meet this burden of 
proof then the judge is required to transfer the case to criminal court (Pagnanelli, 2007).   
Mandatory judicial waiver.  Mandatory judicial waiver requires the automatic 
transfer of juvenile offenders who meet certain criteria to criminal court (Mears, 2003).  
The statutory requirements usually include (but are not limited to) age, offense type, and 
prior convictions.  Fifteen states currently have mandatory judicial waiver statutes in 
place (Griffin, 2008).   
Prosecutorial Waiver 
Prosecutorial waiver statutes (also called concurrent jurisdiction or direct file) 
place certain cases in the jurisdiction of both the juvenile court and the criminal court 
(Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).  Prosecutors then have the power to decide whether to file 
these cases in either court.  The types of cases that are subject to prosecutorial waiver are 
usually limited to those involving violent or repeat crimes, or offenses involving weapons 
(Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).  Very few states have set procedures or guidelines for this 
decision, and a prosecutor’s decision is not subject to appellate review (Pagnanelli, 
2007).  Fifteen states currently have provisions for prosecutorial waiver (Griffin, 2008).   
Statutory Waiver 
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Statutory waiver occurs when legislatures enact statutes that exclude certain cases 
from juvenile court jurisdiction, automatically placing them in the jurisdiction of the 
criminal court (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).  These statutes define the types of cases over 
which juvenile and criminal courts have jurisdiction, and they define the age at which the 
court can try juveniles as adults.  Regarding offenses, those most often excluded from 
juvenile court jurisdiction are murder, capital crimes, and other serious offenses against 
persons.  Regarding age limits, there is variation from state to state regarding minimum 
ages for transfer.  In states where laws set age limits for all transfer provisions, the most 
commonly used minimum age is 14 (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).  Twenty-three states do 
not set a minimum age in at least one statutory exclusion provision (Griffin, 2008).  For 
instance, in Pennsylvania there is no minimum age for the murder exclusion (Snyder & 
Sickmund, 2006).  Therefore, if a juvenile commits murder in the state of Pennsylvania, 
no matter how old they are, they are eligible for transfer to criminal court.  If a juvenile 
commits other offenses against the person in Pennsylvania, then the minimum age for 
transfer is set at 15 (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).  In the remaining states, minimum ages 
for transfer can range from 10- to 15-years-old (Griffin, 2008).  In a statutory waiver 
situation, the juvenile court judge may still exercise some limited control over the process 
(Dawson, 2000).  The juvenile court judge must find that the circumstances of the case 
fall within the scope of the mandatory waiver statute, and he or she must find probable 
cause to believe that the juvenile committed an offense that the statute covers before 
transferring the juvenile to criminal court (Dawson, 2000).  Twenty-nine states currently 
have statutes excluding certain cases from juvenile court jurisdiction (Griffin, 2008).   
Other Transfer-Related Laws 
10 
 Several other types of laws affect the handling of juveniles in the legal system.  
“Once an adult always an adult” laws provide that a juvenile who has been transferred to 
criminal court once must automatically be tried as an adult for all subsequent offenses, 
regardless of their severity (Griffin, 2008; Slaten, 2003).  Thirty-four states currently 
have “once an adult always an adult” provisions in their transfer laws (Griffin, 2008).   
In contrast to “once an adult always an adult” laws, which lead to increased 
prosecution of juveniles in criminal court, other laws are intended to reduce the number 
of juveniles tried in criminal court, and to provide judges with more flexible sentencing 
options for juveniles.  Reverse waiver and blended sentencing laws are both “fail safe” 
mechanisms that act to offset possible abuse of judicial discretion, over-inclusive 
legislation, and excessive prosecution (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).  Reverse waiver 
allows the criminal court to hold a hearing to address whether it should transfer a juvenile 
back to juvenile court.  In some states, a juvenile must petition for a hearing, and he bears 
the burden of demonstrating why the criminal court judge should transfer him back to 
juvenile court (Feld, 2000).  In other jurisdictions, the criminal court automatically grants 
this type of hearing (Slaten, 2003).  Currently 25 states have some sort of provision for 
waiving a juvenile in criminal court back to juvenile court (Griffin, 2008).   
 Blended sentencing allows for greater flexibility in jurisdiction and sentencing 
decisions of the juvenile court.  Blended sentencing laws increase the sentencing options 
available to juvenile court judges, and to criminal court judges dealing with transferred 
juveniles (Slaten, 2003).  The most common juvenile court blended sentencing provision, 
currently used in 15 states, permits juvenile court judges to keep a juvenile in the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court while imposing a suspended criminal sentence (Griffin, 
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2008; Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).  The suspended criminal sentence functions to 
guarantee that the juvenile successfully completes the terms of juvenile disposition and 
does not re-offend.  If the juvenile does not cooperate, they may have to fulfill the 
criminal sentence (Griffin, 2008).  Another type of blended sentencing statute requires 
juvenile courts to impose a combination of juvenile and adult penalties (Snyder & 
Sickmund, 2006).  Finally, in several states there are contiguous blended sentencing 
statutes, in which juvenile court judges can hand down a sentence that would extend past 
the state’s age of extended jurisdiction.  This means that a juvenile is initially committed 
to a juvenile facility, but then a judge may transfer the offender to an adult facility when 
he or she ages out of the juvenile system (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).  Blended 
sentencing laws for criminal court allow criminal court judges who are sentencing 
transferred juveniles to impose sanctions that are usually only available in juvenile 
courts.  This provides a means for returning juveniles to the juvenile court for sanctioning 
after prosecution in criminal court (Griffin, 2008).  Seventeen states have criminal 
blended sentencing laws (Griffin, 2008).   
CHAPTER 4: Research Examining the Transfer Process 
Researchers have examined a number of different aspects of juvenile transfer to 
criminal court.  For example, there is a fair amount of research examining the decision-
making process involved in transferring juveniles to criminal court (Salekin, Rogers, & 
Ustad, 2001; Salekin, 2002; Salekin, Yff, Neumann, Leistico, & Zalot, 2002; Brannen et 
al., 2006; D’Angelo, 2007; Nunez, Dahl, Tang, & Jensen, 2007).  Although in Kent v. 
United States (1966) the Supreme Court laid out eight factors for judges to consider when 
making transfer decisions, it is recommended, not required, that judges consider each 
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factor.  Thus, there is variation from state to state as to which factors legislation outlines 
for judges to consider (Salekin et al., 2002), leading some researchers to inquire which of 
the eight Kent factors judges use most in making the transfer decision.  Based on a survey 
of juvenile transfer statutes throughout the United States (Heilbrun, Leheny, Thomas, & 
Huneycutt, 1997), Salekin and colleagues identified three constructs that juvenile court 
judges reported most useful for the transfer decision: 1) dangerousness, 2) sophistication-
maturity, and 3) treatment amenability (Salekin et al., 2001; Salekin, 2002; Salekin et al., 
2002).  There are, however, no set guidelines for how to determine whether a juvenile is 
high or low on these factors (Salekin et al., 2001).  Therefore, the researchers went on to 
examine specifically what core criteria constitute these broad factors.   
In two studies, clinical psychologists and juvenile court judges rated the 
prototypicality of a number of characteristics representative of dangerousness, 
sophistication-maturity, and treatment amenability (Salekin et al., 2001; Salekin et al., 
2002).  Clinical psychologists were included in this research because they often conduct 
psychological evaluations of juveniles who are under consideration for transfer to 
criminal court to aid judges in their decisions (Salekin et al., 2001).  The results of both 
studies were highly similar, with both groups of participants indicating that the core 
criteria composing dangerousness included extreme unprovoked violence; severe, 
aggressive, antisocial personality; lack of remorse/guilt and empathy; and a leadership 
role in the crime.  The criteria constituting sophistication-maturity were criminal 
sophistication; ability to plan and premeditate crimes; understanding of behavioral norms; 
and ability to identify alternative actions.  The criteria representative of the third factor, 
amenability to treatment, were motivation for treatment and expectation to benefit from 
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treatment; knowledge of right from wrong; demonstration of remorse or guilt and 
empathy; and a stable and supportive family (Salekin et al., 2001; Salekin et al., 2002). 
Salekin and colleagues’ research revealed what criteria judges consider when 
determining a juvenile’s dangerousness, sophistication-maturity, and amenability to 
treatment, however, it did not examine how judges balance these three factors to make an 
actual transfer decision.  To answer this question, Brannen et al. (2006) conducted a 
study in which judges from the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges 
examined a hypothetical transfer case that varied the levels of the three transfer factors 
(dangerousness, sophistication-maturity, and amenability to treatment).  Judges read 
about a 16-year-old male who had committed a serious violent offense.  They also read 
an excerpt from a psychological report that described the juvenile’s characteristics as they 
related to the three transfer factors.  The report addressed the characteristics identified in 
Salekin et al.’s research in three sections.  The dangerousness section discussed items 
such as whether the crime was unprovoked, types of past illegal activities, and whether 
the juvenile expressed empathy or remorse.  The section on sophistication-maturity 
addressed the juvenile’s ability to regulate emotions and understand behavioral norms, 
and the amount of planning and premeditation in the crimes committed.  The treatment 
amenability section discussed the juvenile’s motivation to engage in treatment, his 
awareness of his difficulties, and the amount of stability and support in his family 
environment (Brannen et al., 2006).  In addition to describing these characteristics, the 
reports also explicitly stated whether the juvenile was high or low on each of the three 
constructs.  There were eight different vignettes, each with a different combination of 
either high or low levels of each of the three constructs. 
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Judges rated how useful it was for psychological reports to address each of the 
three constructs, and rated on a five-point scale how likely they would be to transfer the 
juvenile in the scenario to criminal court.  In addition to this question, judges also had to 
make a final “yes or no” decision about whether they would transfer the juvenile.  
Brannen et al. (2006) found that judges were most likely to transfer a juvenile to criminal 
court when he was high in dangerousness and sophistication-maturity but low in 
treatment amenability.  Judges were least likely to transfer a juvenile to criminal court 
when he was low in dangerousness and sophistication-maturity but high in treatment 
amenability.  In addition, although all three factors were significant in informing judges’ 
decisions, judges gave the most weight to dangerousness, followed by sophistication-
maturity, and lastly treatment amenability (Brannen et al., 2006).   
In addition to studying the transfer decision-making process itself, a few 
researchers have begun to examine how jurors perceive juveniles once they have been 
transferred to criminal court (Levine et al., 2001; Tang & Nunez, 2003; Tang et al., 2009; 
Warling & Peterson-Badali, 2003; Woody & Walker, in press).  Some theorize that jurors 
will perceive juveniles tried as adults as being guiltier than adults charged with the same 
crime.  Jurors may believe that because a juvenile was transferred from juvenile court to 
criminal court, he must be guilty of the crime with which he is charged.  In cases of 
judicial waiver, it is likely that the transferred juvenile will have a previous record or will 
be charged with a very serious crime (Levine et al., 2001), or will have been determined 
to be a dangerous and criminally sophisticated individual (Salekin et al., 2002; Brannen 
et al., 2006).  However, it is important to note that a juvenile without any previous record 
could be transferred to criminal court through statutory waiver or prosecutorial waiver 
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(Tang et al., 2009).  Additionally, under “once an adult always an adult” clauses, 
juveniles who have previously been tried in criminal court will be tried as adults for any 
subsequent offenses, regardless of the severity of the new charge (Pagnanelli, 2007).  The 
public, however, may not be aware of the different transfer mechanisms available, and 
may believe that the transfer of any juvenile to criminal court is the result of a juvenile 
court judge’s evaluation.  Therefore, the mere fact that a juvenile was transferred may 
evoke negative stereotypes about the juvenile.  Jurors may assume that a transferred 
juvenile must be a violent, dangerous criminal, or that he must have a previous criminal 
record.  The use of these stereotypes to make decisions about juveniles in criminal court 
is a type of generic prejudice.   
CHAPTER 5: Generic Prejudice 
Generic prejudice is not specific to one defendant; rather, it is a prejudice about a 
category of defendants or crimes (Vidmar, 1997; Vidmar, 2002; Vidmar, 2003; Wiener et 
al., 2006).  The nature of the charged offense or the type of parties involved cause the 
juror to categorize the case as one within a class of cases in which he or she is more 
likely to evaluate the evidence in a biased manner, or lower the burden of proof (Vidmar, 
1997).  Generic prejudice is a genre of prejudice that is specific to legal settings.  It 
involves the use of extralegal information that is not relevant to the facts of the case for 
the purpose of making verdict or sentencing decisions (Wiener et al., 2006).  It is the use 
of stereotypes about a category of defendants or crimes to make verdict or sentencing 
decisions. 
For example, Vidmar (1997) found that 36% of prospective jurors in 25 Canadian 
criminal trials involving sexual abuse charges reported that they could not be impartial 
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due to the nature of the charges.  Merely hearing that a case involved a charge of sexual 
abuse evoked stereotypes and attitudes that made it impossible for these jurors to treat the 
defendant fairly.  In two studies, Wiener et al. (2006) tested generic prejudice effects in 
sexual assault and homicide cases.  They found evidence of two types of generic 
prejudice: charge bias and crime category bias.  When participants evaluated multiple 
sexual assault and homicide cases, the researchers were able to predict defendant guilt 
ratings from one case to another (crime category bias).  This was true regardless of case 
similarity and case charge, and this effect was much stronger for sexual assault cases 
compared to homicide cases.  Wiener et al. (2006) also found that they could predict guilt 
ratings from one sexual assault case to another for cases that shared the same specific 
charge (charge bias).   
Generic prejudice can be based on offense type and charge type, as Wiener et al. 
(2006) demonstrated, but it can also be based on the type of defendant involved in a case.  
Vidmar (2002) noted that racial prejudice is the most common form of generic prejudice.  
For example, the knowledge that a defendant is African-American can lead some 
individuals to assume that the defendant is guilty, more so than if the defendant was 
White (Vidmar, 2002).  Similarly, jurors may judge a juvenile tried as an adult more 
harshly than they would an adult charged with the same crime because of generic 
prejudice toward all juveniles transferred to adult criminal court.  The simple incidence of 
transfer may activate negative stereotypes that in turn lead jurors to assume that the 
juvenile must be guilty.  For example, jurors may assume that to have warranted a 
transfer the juvenile has a criminal history (Levine et al., 2001), is a danger to society 
(Tang et al., 2009), or must be a violent, callous predator.  Several studies have 
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experimentally examined mock jurors’ perceptions of juveniles tried in criminal court, 
with mixed results. 
CHAPTER 6: Trying Juveniles as Adults: Perceptions of Juveniles in Criminal 
Court 
Levine et al. (2001) conducted some of the first research examining how jurors 
perceive juveniles who are tried as adults.  The researchers attempted to determine 
whether mock jurors would form negative impressions of a juvenile offender simply 
because he was being tried as an adult.  Participants received minimal information about 
a defendant; specifically that the defendant was 11-years-old at the time of the crime, that 
he was accused of committing murder, and that he could have been tried as a juvenile or 
an adult, but was being tried as an adult.  The researchers asked participants to make 
inferences about the defendant’s personality and history, and then asked them how 
relevant those characteristics were to their verdict.  A large percentage of participants 
indicated that it was very likely that the defendant had a criminal history, and that 
knowledge of that criminal history would influence their decision to find the defendant 
guilty.  The researchers concluded that jurors who hear cases in which juveniles are tried 
as adults are likely to infer a previous criminal history and are likely to be prejudiced by 
that inference toward voting guilty.   
There are several problems with this conclusion.  Participants may have been 
endorsing characteristics like “has a criminal history” simply because the juvenile was 
charged with murder, which is a serious violent crime.  It is quite possible that they 
would have made the same inferences about an adult defendant charged with murder; 
however, in no condition did participants make judgments about an adult defendant.  In 
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addition, participants formed an impression about the juvenile defendant based on very 
little information, and in an actual trial jurors would receive far more information, which 
may lead to different judgments.   
Tang and Nunez (2003) extended this research by including an adult comparison 
group in their study, and by examining differences between prosecution- and defense-
biased mock jurors.  Participants read a trial summary describing a case in which the 
defendant was charged with first-degree murder.  The researchers manipulated defendant 
age (13-years-old vs.16-years-old vs. 19-years-old) and measured participants’ pretrial 
bias with the Juror Bias Scale (JBS) (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983) to determine whether 
they were prosecution-biased or defense-biased.  For the conditions involving a 13- or 
16-year-old defendant, participants read that the juvenile defendant was being tried as an 
adult.  Participants then gave a verdict of guilty or not guilty, and rated their confidence 
in the correctness of that verdict.  They also answered a question assessing what standard 
of proof they used to find the defendant guilty.   
The results indicated that prosecution-biased participants were more likely to find 
the 16-year-old guilty, were more confident about his guilt, and were more likely to set a 
lower standard of proof for him compared to defense-biased participants (Tang & Nunez, 
2003).  In addition, prosecution-biased participants found the 13-year-old defendant 
guilty less often than they did the 16-year-old defendant, they were less confident that the 
13-year-old was guilty compared to the 16-year-old, and prosecution-biased participants 
set a lower standard of proof for the 16-year-old compared to the 19-year-old adult 
defendant.  Among defense-biased participants, there were no differences between the 
three defendant conditions for verdict, confidence in verdict, or standard of proof.  This 
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research suggests that some jurors may demonstrate some bias against juveniles who are 
tried as adults.  One limitation of this research however, is that the participants in this 
study were undergraduate students.  Not only are undergraduate students not necessarily 
representative of the jury pool, the adult defendant in the trial summary used was only 
19-years-old, and many of the undergraduate participants were likely very close to this 
age.  Depending on the extent to which the participants viewed themselves as adults, they 
may have been less likely to view the 19-year-old as an adult.   
In an attempt to build on the results of both Levine et al.’s (2001) and Tang and 
Nunez’s (2003) research, Tang et al. (2009) conducted two studies in which they 
examined participants’ reactions to either a juvenile being tried as an adult in criminal 
court, a juvenile being tried in juvenile court, or an adult being tried in criminal court.  
The researchers measured pretrial bias with the JBS in an attempt to replicate Tang and 
Nunez’s (2003) finding that prosecution-biased participants (compared to defense-biased 
participants) judged a 16-year-old defendant tried as an adult more harshly than an adult 
charged with the same crime.  In the first study, undergraduate student participants were 
assigned to one of three defendant conditions, and were told only that a 16-year-old was 
being tried as an adult in criminal court, a 16-year-old was being tried in juvenile court, 
or that a 19-year-old was being tried in criminal court.  The researchers did not give 
participants any other information.  Participants then used their best guess to rate the 
seriousness of the crime, the defendant’s dangerousness to society, and the possibility 
that the defendant was a chronic offender on a 10-point scale.   
The results showed that the juvenile tried as an adult was rated as having 
committed a more serious crime than both other defendants, was rated as being more 
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dangerous to society than both other defendants, and was rated as more likely to be a 
chronic offender than both other defendants (Tang et al., 2009).  There were no 
differences between the juvenile tried in juvenile court and the adult defendant in any of 
these three categories.  Although there was a main effect for pretrial bias, showing that 
prosecution-biased participants judged all defendants more harshly on two of the three 
crime/defendant rating categories, there was no interaction between trial venue and 
pretrial bias.  This finding was inconsistent with what Tang and Nunez (2003) reported in 
their research (prosecution-biased participants judged the juvenile tried as an adult more 
harshly than they did the adult defendant, whereas defense-biased participants did not).   
To replicate and extend these results, Tang et al. (2009) conducted a second study 
using community participants rather than undergraduate students, and measuring whether 
people categorize juvenile defendants as fitting into a superpredator stereotype or into a 
wayward youth stereotype.  The superpredator stereotype represents a more negative 
view of juvenile offenders, depicting them as “natural born criminals,” while the 
wayward youth stereotype represents a more positive view of juvenile offenders, 
depicting their delinquent behavior as a result of their environment (Tang et al., 2009).  
The researchers posited that the differing reactions of prosecution- and defense-biased 
participants to the 16-year-old defendant in Tang and Nunez’s (2003) research might 
have resulted from these individuals endorsing different stereotypes about juvenile 
offenders.  Thus, they expected prosecution-biased participants (relative to defense-
biased participants) to hold more negative stereotypes about the juvenile tried as an adult, 
in addition to judging him more harshly on the three categories from the first study.  
Participants followed the same procedure as in the first study, but those judging either of 
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the two 16-year-old defendants also answered two yes/no questions assessing whether 
they endorsed either of the above-mentioned stereotypes.   
As found in the first study, participants rated the juvenile tried as an adult as 
having committed a more serious crime than the other two defendants, and as being more 
dangerous to society than the other two defendants (Tang et al., 2009).  There was no 
difference between the juvenile tried as an adult and the adult defendant for possibility of 
being a chronic offender.  Prosecution-biased participants also rated all defendants as 
having been charged with a more serious crime, as being more dangerous, and as having 
a higher possibility of being a chronic offender than did defense-biased participants.  
However, there was no interaction between trial venue and pretrial bias.  Tang et al. 
(2009) did find that defense-biased participants were more likely to evaluate juvenile 
defendants as wayward youth rather than superpredators (compared to prosecution-biased 
participants), regardless of whether the juvenile was being tried in juvenile or criminal 
court.   
Although these results are suggestive of a general bias against juveniles tried as 
adults, the research lacks ecological validity in that participants were asked to make 
judgments about defendants based on very little information, even less information than 
Levine et al. (2001) provided their participants.  In an actual trial, a juror would receive 
far more information, including the charged crime and other various details about the 
circumstances surrounding the alleged commission of the crime.  It is highly likely that 
jurors given this additional information would come to different conclusions than 
participants did in these studies.  Additionally, the researchers did not use the 
stereotyping measure to predict final judgments about the juvenile defendants.  It would 
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have been more informative to know whether endorsement of certain stereotypes led to 
harsher judgments of the juvenile tried as an adult compared to the juvenile tried in 
juvenile court.  The current research extends Tang et al.’s research by measuring 
participants’ stereotypes about juveniles tried as adults, and then using those measures to 
predict judgments of guilt. 
Not all research examining this issue has found bias against juveniles tried as 
adults.  Several studies comparing perceptions of juveniles tried as adults and adult 
defendants have found that mock jurors judge the two types of defendants equally.  
Warling and Peterson-Badali (2003) examined whether the age of a defendant and 
attitudes about youth crime would affect verdict and sentencing decisions.  Participants 
read a written trial summary in which the defendant, aged 13-, 17-, or 25-years-old, was 
charged with second-degree murder.  Participants then indicated whether they thought the 
defendant was guilty or not guilty, and if they found him guilty, they indicated the 
sentence he should receive (2, 5, 10, 15, or 25 years in prison).  They also completed the 
JBS, and several scales designed to measure attitudes about juvenile culpability and 
youth crime.   
Surprisingly, the results showed no significant effects on verdict for the 
defendant’s age (Warling & Peterson-Badali, 2003).  Of the juror bias and attitude 
measures completed, only the JBS was significantly related to verdict, showing that 
participants who were prosecution-biased were more likely to vote guilty than those who 
were defense-biased.  Defendant age did have an effect on sentence length, such that as 
the defendant’s age increased, so did the recommended sentence length.  However, the 
Juvenile Culpability Scale and the Attitude toward Youth Crime Scale both accounted for 
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a significant proportion of the sentencing variance.  Participants who believed the law 
should hold youth more accountable for their crimes and those who believed that youth 
crime is increasing were more likely to recommend longer sentences.   
In Warling and Peterson-Badali’s (2003) study, defendant age did not 
significantly affect verdict decisions.  However, this could be at least partially because 
overall there was a low conviction rate (35% of student participants and 25% of 
community participants voted guilty).  A more ambiguous case regarding the guilt of the 
defendant would be more effective at detecting juror biases.  Nonetheless, these results 
are inconsistent with the findings of Tang and Nunez (2003) and Tang et al. (2009).  One 
possible contributor to this inconsistency could be the fact that Tang and Nunez and Tang 
et al. explicitly informed participants that the juvenile defendants in their scenarios were 
being tried in criminal court as adults.  There was no mention of this in Warling and 
Peterson-Badali’s study; participants only learned about the defendant’s age.  Tang and 
Nunez (2003) also administered a manipulation check, asking how old the defendant in 
the case was, immediately before participants rendered a verdict.  This could have made 
age more salient than it was in the Warling and Peterson-Badali study.   
Woody and Walker (in press) also examined this issue, again finding no evidence 
of disparate treatment of juveniles tried as adults.  The researchers examined the effects 
of age, crime type, crime outcome, and pretrial bias on verdicts and sentence 
recommendations.  Participants read a short trial summary describing either a 14-year-old 
being tried as an adult, or a 24-year-old adult defendant.  The trial summary also varied 
crime type, so that some participants read that the defendant was accused of committing a 
crime against property, and some read he was accused of committing a crime against a 
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person.  Furthermore, within each crime type condition there was either a mild or a 
severe outcome ($500 of property stolen or $500 in medical bills for the mild outcomes, 
and $50,000 of property stolen or $50,000 in medical bills for the severe outcomes).  
Following the trial summary, participants read a set of standard jury instructions, 
indicated whether they believed the defendant was guilty or not guilty, and completed 
several other measures.  If they found the defendant guilty, they also indicated what 
sentence he should receive.  Similar to Warling and Peterson-Badali’s study, results 
showed no significant differences in verdicts for defendant age, but participants did give 
longer sentences to the adult defendant compared to the 14-year-old defendant.   
Do jurors judge juveniles tried as adults more harshly than adults charged with the 
same crimes?  The answer to this question is still unclear.  Inconsistent results from a 
number of studies make it difficult to conclude whether juveniles receive fair treatment in 
the criminal justice system.  A possible explanation for the generic prejudice shown by 
only some individuals in this area of research is the experience of negative emotions, 
specifically anger, fear, and sadness, which jurors would likely experience in response to 
a juvenile who has been accused of committing a serious crime.  It is possible that 
something about prosecution-biased participants in Tang and Nunez’s (2003) study led 
them to respond to the scenario with anger, while defense-biased participants may have 
responded with another emotion, such as fear or sadness.  It is also possible that details in 
the different scenarios used in each of the studies examining this issue evoked different 
emotions in the participants in each study.  This possibility is important to consider, 
because according to the Appraisal-Tendency Framework (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 
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2001), different emotions can affect judgment and decision making in very different 
ways.   
CHAPTER 7: The Effect of Emotion on Judgment and Decision Making: The 
Appraisal-Tendency Framework 
There is a growing body of research demonstrating that specific emotions can 
affect judgment and decision making in a wide variety of contexts.  This line of research 
builds on cognitive appraisal theory, which posits that different individuals will appraise 
the same set of circumstances differently, leading to the elicitation of different emotions 
(Smith, David, & Kirby, 2006; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Lazarus, 1991; Frijda, 1987; 
Roseman, 1984, 1991; Scherer, 1984).  In other words, it is the manner in which a 
situation is evaluated, not the situation itself, that determines whether an individual will 
experience an emotion, and what that emotion will be.  The contents of these evaluations, 
referred to as appraisal dimensions, not only determine which emotion an individual will 
experience, but also continue to affect decision making after the emotion-inducing event 
has been resolved (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001).  Research suggests that the appraisals 
associated with anger lead angry individuals to process more heuristically, while the 
appraisals associated with sadness and fear lead sad and fearful individuals to process 
more systematically (Tiedens & Linton, 2001; Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; 
Semmler & Brewer, 2002; Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Small & Lerner, 2008; 
Ask & Granhag, 2007).  Therefore, an angry juror processing heuristically, who also 
brings to a criminal trial a generic prejudice against all juveniles tried as adults, will be 
more likely to make judgments about a juvenile’s guilt based on that prejudice.  This is a 
disturbing possibility, and demonstrates the important need to examine the effects of 
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emotion on jurors’ judgments of juveniles tried as adults.  To explore fully how emotions 
may affect jurors’ decisions, I will first provide a brief summary of cognitive appraisal 
theory, followed by a more in-depth examination of the Appraisal-Tendency Framework.   
Cognitive Appraisal Theory 
Cognitive appraisal theory has led to the development of a number of specific 
appraisal models, which can be broken down into three categories: structural, procedural, 
and relational models (Smith et al., 2006).  Structural models testing cognitive appraisal 
theory endeavor to describe the contents of appraisals, specifically the evaluations 
individuals make and the outcomes of those evaluations, which lead to the elicitation of 
different emotions.  The types of evaluations made, also known as appraisal dimensions, 
differ somewhat from one model to another, but most models share the same basic 
dimensions.  Procedural models attempt to describe how appraisals elicit emotions, by 
examining the cognitive processes that underlie making appraisals.  Relational models 
describe the relational information that individuals draw on when making emotion-
eliciting appraisals, specifically information regarding what the circumstances entail for 
an individual’s own well-being based on his or her own needs, goals, and abilities (Smith 
et al., 2006).  The proposed research will focus on a structural model of cognitive 
appraisal theory, because according to the Appraisal-Tendency Framework, it is the 
contents of appraisals that influence subsequent judgment and decisions (Lerner & 
Keltner, 2000, 2001).   
Researchers have developed a number of different structural models of appraisal 
theory over the years (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Lazarus, 1991, 2001; Roseman, 1984; 
Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Frijda, 1987, 1993; Scherer, 1984, 2001; Ortony, Clore, 
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& Collins, 1988; Smith & Lazarus, 1993).  Most of these models are very similar, but do 
identify some different appraisal dimensions.  Generally, structural models include an 
evaluation of the importance or relevance of the stimulus situation to an individual, which 
determines how intense the resulting emotional reaction is (Smith et al., 2006).  They also 
usually include an evaluation of how desirable the situation is, which differentiates 
positive from negative emotions.  Additionally, many models include one or more 
appraisal dimensions regarding the individual’s assessment of the degree to which he or 
she is able to cope with the situation.  This differentiates emotions that are associated 
with low coping ability (sadness and fear) from those associated with high coping ability 
(calmness, challenge, and determination).  Finally, the majority of models include an 
evaluation of whom or what caused or is responsible for an event or situation (Smith et 
al., 2006).  The Appraisal Tendency Framework examines how these appraisal 
dimensions influence judgment and decisions. 
The Appraisal-Tendency Framework (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001) draws on 
the work of Smith and Ellsworth (1985).  Similar to other structural models of appraisal, 
Smith and Ellsworth’s (1985) model posits that a unique pattern of cognitive appraisals 
characterizes each emotion.  Smith and Ellsworth identified six cognitive dimensions that 
define the patterns of appraisal underlying different emotions:  pleasantness, anticipated 
effort, certainty, attentional activity, self-other responsibility, and situational control.  
Pleasantness is simply whether an emotion is considered pleasant or unpleasant (i.e., 
positive or negative).  Attentional activity refers to whether a stimulus motivates one to 
examine it more closely or to turn away from it.  Tests of this model show that most 
pleasant emotions are associated with a strong desire to attend to a situation.  Certainty is 
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concerned with how certain or uncertain one is about an event or situation.  Fear, hope, 
and surprise are all associated with uncertainty, while happiness and anger are associated 
with certainty.  Situational control involves an evaluation of whether a human or the 
situation controls an event.  This is important for distinguishing between anger and 
sadness, because anger is associated with the belief that a person is responsible for an 
occurrence, and sadness is associated with the belief that the circumstance is responsible 
for an occurrence.  Self-other responsibility goes one step further and involves an 
evaluation of whether the self is responsible for an event or whether another person is 
responsible for an event.  An evaluation that the self is responsible for an event could 
result in guilt, while an evaluation that another person is responsible could result in anger.  
Anticipated effort involves an evaluation of how much effort the situation will require an 
individual to expend.  It is especially important for differentiating pleasant emotions, 
such as challenge (high anticipated effort) and happiness (very low anticipated effort).  
The majority of unpleasant emotions are all associated with high anticipated effort.   
According to Smith and Ellsworth’s (1985) model, central dimensions 
characterize each emotion.  For example, anger is an unpleasant emotion, associated with 
certainty, and strong attributions of human agency and other-responsibility.  While 
sadness is also unpleasant, it is associated with uncertainty, very high levels of situational 
control, and moderately high appraisals of other-responsibility.  Fear is unpleasant and is 
associated with high levels of uncertainty, high levels of situational control, and 
appraisals of other-responsibility (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  Therefore, although all 
three emotions are unpleasant, they differ in regards to their positions on the spectrum of 
appraisals of certainty and situation/individual control. 
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Cognitive appraisal theory posits that two individuals will experience the same 
emotion in response to a situation or event only if their appraisals of the situation or event 
are the same.  Two individuals who experience different appraisals of the same situation 
or event will experience different emotions (Roseman, 1991).  For example, if two people 
witness the same unpleasant event, but one believes another individual caused the event, 
and the other believes the situation caused the event, they will experience different 
resulting emotions, with the first individual experiencing anger and the second likely 
experiencing sadness.  Appraisals of the same event can differ from person to person due 
to differences in personality characteristics, personal goals, needs, abilities, and past 
experiences (Smith et al., 2006).  Thus, one college student may experience anxiety in 
response to an upcoming exam, while another may view the exam as a challenge (Smith 
et al., 2006).  The two students will appraise the upcoming exam differently based on 
their different abilities.   
The Appraisal-Tendency Framework 
The Appraisal-Tendency Framework (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001) builds on 
and extends initial tests of structural cognitive appraisal models by going beyond 
identifying the appraisal dimensions associated with specific emotions, and examining 
how the different appraisal dimensions associated with emotions affect subsequent 
judgment and decisions.  Over the years, a number of researchers have examined the 
effects of emotion on judgment and decision making, but they have mainly used a 
valence-based approach, contrasting the effects of positive and negative affect on 
judgment and decisions (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Bless et al., 1996; Mackie & Worth, 
1989; Forgas & Bower, 1987; Forgas, 1991; Kavanagh & Bower, 1985; Keltner, Locke, 
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& Audrain, 1993).  For example, research has demonstrated that when making judgments 
about future events, people who are in a negative mood tend to make more pessimistic 
predictions, and those in a positive mood tend to make more optimistic predictions 
(Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Wright & Bower, 1992).   
Lerner and Keltner (2000, 2001) reasoned that if specific emotions are 
characterized by different patterns of cognitive appraisals, then specific emotions of the 
same valence will not always have the same effects on judgment and choice.  Fear and 
anger are both obviously negative emotions, but they differ in regards to certainty and 
control.  Situational control and uncertainty define fear, whereas a sense of individual 
control and certainty define anger.  Therefore, these two emotions could have very 
different effects on decisions.  The Appraisal-Tendency Framework (Lerner & Keltner, 
2000, 2001) proposes that specific emotions activate a cognitive predisposition to 
appraise events in the future in accordance with the central appraisal dimensions 
associated with the emotion.  This is important to consider in the context of a juvenile 
being tried as an adult, because an angry juror who must determine the guilt of a juvenile 
defendant might come to a different conclusion than a sad or fearful juror, due to the 
different patterns of appraisal associated with each emotion.   
 Although the initial approach to the study of cognitive appraisal viewed appraisal 
patterns as the cause of emotions, it is important to note that emotions can also result 
from unconscious priming or bodily feedback (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006).  Regardless of 
the source of an emotion, an individual will still experience the appraisals associated with 
that emotion.  The purpose of these appraisals is to help the individual respond to the 
situation or event that evoked the emotion; however, appraisal tendencies persist even 
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after the individual is no longer in the emotion-provoking situation, and then affect how 
the individual interprets subsequent choices and decisions (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006).  For 
example, consider a juror who comes to court to hear a trial involving a juvenile who has 
been transferred to criminal court.  The juror has had a terrible morning; his wife forgot 
to wake him up before she left, he didn’t have time to get coffee, and he encountered 
multiple traffic jams and bad drivers on the way to the courthouse.  As a result, he is 
feeling very angry.  When he sits down and proceedings begin, he is still fuming.  
Although the trial is unrelated to the events that angered the juror, the appraisal 
dimensions associated with this emotion (certainty, human agency, and other-
responsibility) continue to influence his decisions and the way he processes the testimony 
he hears that morning.  But how exactly do these appraisal tendencies influence his 
judgment?  The following review of research examining the effects of emotions on 
judgment and decision making will shed light on how appraisal tendencies affect how 
people think and process information.   
Research Supporting the Appraisal-Tendency Framework  
Evidence supporting the Appraisal-Tendency Framework comes from several 
areas of research.  Keltner, Ellsworth, and Edwards (1993) were among the first to 
examine whether different specific negative emotions have different effects on social 
judgment consistent with their underlying appraisal dimensions.  In one experiment, they 
examined the effects of sadness and anger on ratings of the likelihood that situational and 
human caused events would occur.  They found that sad participants found negative 
events caused by the situation to be more likely to occur than angry participants did, 
while angry participants were more likely to see negative events caused by people to be 
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likely to occur.  In a second experiment, the researchers induced participants to feel sad, 
angry, or they received a neutral mood induction manipulation.  Participants then read a 
scenario that was ambiguous as to whether the cause was due to an individual or the 
situation, and made judgments about the cause of the event.  Keltner et al. (1993) found 
that sad participants were more likely than were angry participants to cite situational 
causes, while angry participants were more likely than were sad participants to cite other 
individuals as the cause of the event.   
While Keltner et al.’s (1993) research demonstrated that people will make 
attributions about the causes of events based on the emotion they are experiencing, other 
research has examined how emotions affect the outcomes of certain types of judgments.  
For example, a number of studies have used the Appraisal-Tendency Framework to 
examine emotion in the area of risk assessment.  Lerner and Keltner (2000) compared the 
effects of two different negative emotions on judgments of risk, as opposed to comparing 
positive and negative moods, as valence-based approaches do.  Specifically, they 
examined risk assessments made by dispositionally angry and fearful people.  A 
dispositional emotion is one that a person tends to react with across time and situations.  
Risk perception is an ideal area to examine the effects of anger and fear on judgment 
because perceptions of uncertainty and lack of individual control determine judgments of 
risk (Lerner & Keltner, 2000).  The researchers hypothesized that the sense of situational 
control and uncertainty associated with fear should lead to more pessimistic risk 
assessments, while the sense of individual control and certainty associated with anger 
should lead to more optimistic risk assessments.   
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Participants completed measures of dispositional fear and anger, followed by a 
risk assessment questionnaire.  The risk assessment questionnaire presented participants 
with 12 events that cause a certain number of deaths in the United States each year (i.e., 
floods, brain cancer, strokes).  Based on the knowledge that 50,000 people in the United 
States die in car accidents each year, the questionnaire asked participants to estimate the 
number of annual deaths due to each of the 12 events.  As hypothesized, the results 
showed that fear was positively related to perceived risk (fearful participants gave higher 
risk assessments) and anger was negatively related to risk (angry participants gave lower 
risk assessments) (Lerner & Keltner, 2000).  Despite the fact that anger and fear are both 
high in negative valence, the two emotions had very different effects on participants’ 
perceptions of risk, contrary to what the valence-based approach predicts.   
Lerner and Keltner (2001) extended this research, conducting a series of studies in 
which they measured dispositional emotions, experimentally induced emotions, and 
examined how these emotions influenced a wider range of judgments.  In one 
experiment, the researchers measured dispositional fear and anger, and had participants 
evaluate one of two hypothetical programs to combat an unusual Asian disease said to be 
expected to kill 600 people.  One program was framed as a gain (i.e., if program A is 
adopted, 200 people will be saved), and the other was framed as a loss (i.e., if program B 
is adopted, 400 people will die).  Previous research has shown that choices involving 
gains are often risk averse, and choices involving losses are often risk taking (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981, as cited in Lerner & Keltner, 2001).  The researchers found that 
regardless of how the program was framed (gain vs. loss), the effects of individual 
differences in dispositional fear and anger determined the choices participants made, with 
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angry participants making risky choices and fearful participants making risk-averse 
choices (Lerner & Keltner, 2001).   
Lerner and Keltner (2001) went on to induce situational emotions in another 
experiment, in order to address the possibility that dispositional emotion might be 
associated with individual differences in risk-related life experiences.  The researchers 
induced participants to feel anger or fear, and then asked them to complete a risk 
perception measure.  The results showed that compared with fear, anger produced greater 
optimism in risk estimates (Lerner & Keltner, 2001).     
Extending the research on emotion and risk perception to a more realistic setting, 
Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, and Fischhoff (2003) examined naturally occurring and 
manipulated feelings of fear and anger in response to the terrorist attacks of September 
11.  Using a national sample, the researchers conducted the study in two waves.  The first 
wave occurred only nine days after the attacks, and consisted of participants answering 
questions about the attacks and completing measures of anxiety and desire for vengeance 
in order to measure naturally occurring fear and anger that occurred shortly after the 
attacks.   
During the second wave, which occurred approximately two months later, the 
researchers experimentally manipulated fear and anger with the same sample of 
participants by asking them to write about what aspects of the attacks made them angry, 
or what aspects of the attacks made them afraid (Lerner et al., 2003).  Participants also 
viewed a picture and listened to an audio clip that had been pre-tested and shown to 
evoke the target emotion (either fear or anger depending on the participant’s assigned 
condition).  Following this, participants completed three risk measures.  Lerner et al. 
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(2003) found that experimentally manipulated anger led to more optimistic (lower) 
estimates of risk, while manipulated fear led to more pessimistic (higher) estimates of 
risk on all measures.  Additionally, naturally occurring anger (desire for vengeance) from 
the first wave predicted lower risk estimates at wave two, and naturally occurring anxiety 
predicted higher risk estimates at wave two, providing convergent evidence for the 
distinct effects of anger and fear on risk perception.   
 In a third wave of data collection in this line of research, Fischhoff, Gonzalez, 
Lerner, and Small (2005) examined the effects of fear, anger, and neutral emotion on 
judgments of past risks and future risks associated with terrorism.  Researchers contacted 
participants who completed wave two of Lerner et al.’s (2003) study to participate in 
another study one year later.  Participants completed one of two emotion “recall” 
manipulations, in which they either relived the emotion manipulation they had completed 
in wave two, or took a neutral perspective.  All participants then made judgments about 
the probability of eight risky events occurring, in three different ways.  First, participants 
reported what they remembered predicting during wave two the year before (in which 
they had completed the exact same risk survey).  Next, they estimated what they thought 
the probability of each event occurring was, according to their current knowledge about 
the United States and its enemies.  Finally, they estimated the probability of the eight 
events occurring in the next 12 months.  For all three types of judgments, predictions of 
future risk, and memories and judgments of past risks associated with terrorism, the 
researchers found that anger activated lower (more optimistic) risk estimates than both 
fear and neutral emotion, while fear activated higher (more pessimistic) risk estimates 
than both anger and neutral emotion (Fischhoff et al., 2005).  These results are notable 
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because they show that emotions not only influence judgments about the unknown future, 
but also influence judgments about the known past.  
 Risk perception is not the only type of judgment that emotions can influence.  
Bodenhausen et al. (1994) found that different emotions had different effects on whether 
participants used stereotypes to make decisions in student misconduct scenarios and in a 
persuasion scenario.  In their first study, the researchers induced participants to feel 
angry, sad, or neutral and then asked them to read one of four cases of alleged student 
misconduct.  Two cases involved assault, and two involved a student cheating on an 
exam.  Furthermore, within each case type a stereotype either was present, or was not 
present.  In half of the assault cases, the accused student had a Hispanic name (stereotype 
present condition), and in the other half the student had a non-Hispanic name.  In half of 
the cheating cases the scenario included a description of the accused student as a “well 
known track-and-field athlete on campus” (stereotype present condition), while the other 
half of the cases left out this description.  After reading about the case, participants rated 
the likelihood that the accused student was guilty.  For those participants who were in the 
sad and neutral conditions, there were no differences in guilt judgments among stereotype 
conditions; however, the angry participants were much more likely to find the student 
guilty in the stereotype present conditions.   
Bodenhausen et al. (1994) also found similar effects in a persuasion scenario.  
Participants all read the same persuasive essay about raising the legal driving age from 16 
to 18.  Researchers told half of the participants that the essay had been written by “a 
group of transportation policy experts at Princeton University” (high expertise), and told 
the other half that the essay had been written by “a group of students at Sinclair 
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Community College in New Jersey” (low expertise).  Participants then indicated their 
agreement with the position advocated for in the essay.  Results showed that angry 
participants were significantly more likely to be persuaded by the argument when it was 
attributed to the expert source, compared to sad participants, who were unaffected by the 
source of the argument.   
Why do emotions associated with different appraisal dimensions have such varied 
effects on decision making?  The studies examining risk perception initially suggested 
that emotions whose central appraisal dimensions are related to certainty/uncertainty and 
individual/situational control affect risk perception because these very dimensions are 
central to decisions about risk (Lerner & Keltner, 2000).  Bodenhausen et al.’s (1994) 
results suggest however, that the distinct effects of some emotions on judgment and 
decision making may be a result of those emotions influencing depth of cognitive 
processing.  The results of both of Bodenhausen et al.’s (1994) experiments suggest that 
angry people tend to process more heuristically than do sad people, who tend to process 
more systematically.  Heuristic processing involves a reliance on simple inferential rules 
or heuristics to make decisions, and requires very little cognitive effort (Chaiken, 
Liberman, & Eagly, 1989).  This means that when processing heuristically, people will 
use stereotypes and heuristics such as “experts can be trusted” (as demonstrated in 
Bodenhausen et al.’s [1994] research) to guide their decisions and behavior.  On the other 
hand, systematic processing involves analyzing all informational input available to 
determine its importance for the decision at hand, and integrating all relevant information 
to make judgments or decisions (Chaiken et al., 1989).  Systematic processing requires 
more than minimal cognitive effort.   
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Further support for the proposition that emotions affect depth of cognitive 
processing comes from Semmler and Brewer’s (2002) research.  The researchers 
manipulated sadness (vs. neutral emotion) through emotional statements of witnesses and 
details about the harm to the victim in an audio recording of a criminal trial, and varied 
whether participants were exposed to consistent or inconsistent testimony.  Results 
suggested that sad participants were able to recall inconsistencies in the testimony more 
accurately than were those in the neutral condition, indicating that those induced to feel 
sadness engaged in deeper, systematic processing.  Unfortunately, the researchers did not 
compare sadness with another emotion, as Bodenhausen et al. did.   
Similar to Semmler and Brewer, Lerner et al. (1998) also only examined one 
emotion, but they looked at anger rather than sadness.  The researchers induced 
participants to either experience anger or no emotion, and examined how this and 
whether or not the participant thought an expert would hold them accountable for their 
decisions affected punitiveness in several civil cases.  They found that angry participants 
were more punitive than were neutral participants.  However, when the researchers told 
participants they were going to hold them accountable for their decisions, angry 
participants were less punitive than when they were unaccountable.  Additionally, with 
increasing anger and unaccountability, perceptions of the extent to which the defendant 
acted out of free will or coercion did not affect severity of punishment, while it did 
influence punitiveness among participants held accountable.  The researchers concluded 
that the attenuation of punitiveness occurred because holding participants accountable 
may have led them to ask themselves what their justification was for assigning that level 
of punishment, which in turn led to more systematic processing.   
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While the studies discussed above identified which specific emotions lead to more 
heuristic or systematic processing, they did not actually assess why different emotions 
differentially affect depth of cognitive processing.  Tiedens and Linton (2001) attempted 
to explain why this effect occurs.  They hypothesized that experiencing emotions 
associated with certainty (such as anger) should lead to more certainty in subsequent 
decisions and judgments (and vice versa for uncertain emotions), and that emotions 
associated with certainty would then lead to more heuristic processing, while emotions 
associated with uncertainty (such as fear and sadness) would lead to more systematic 
processing.  Based on Chaiken et al.’s (1989) sufficiency threshold hypothesis, they 
reasoned that feeling certain tells people that their thoughts or decisions are correct, and 
that further processing is not necessary.  When people feel uncertain, they will make a 
greater effort to process information until they feel sufficiently certain about whatever 
they are thinking about or deciding. 
Tiedens and Linton (2001) focused on emotions associated with appraisals of 
certainty and tested their hypotheses in a series of experiments.  In Experiment 1, they 
induced participants to feel disgusted, fearful, happy, or hopeful by having them write 
about an autobiographical emotional event (disgust and happiness are associated with 
certainty, and fear and hope are associated with uncertainty).  Then in an ostensibly 
unrelated study, participants made a number of predictions about what would happen in 
the year 2000 (data was collected in 1998).  The researchers found that participants who 
experienced disgust and happiness were more certain about their predictions than were 
participants who experienced fear and hope.  The researchers noted that this provided 
support for the notion that appraisal dimensions associated with specific emotions can 
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affect judgment about subsequent, unrelated events.  Furthermore, this study 
demonstrated that emotions of different valences, such as happiness, clearly a positive 
emotion, and disgust, clearly a negative emotion, can have similar effects on judgment 
due to their underlying appraisal dimensions.   
In Experiment 2, the researchers tested whether certainty-associated emotions 
would lead to more heuristic processing and uncertainty-associated emotions would lead 
to more systematic processing (Tiedens & Linton, 2001).  The experimenters induced 
participants to feel angry, content, worried, or surprised.  Anger and contentment are 
associated with certainty, while worry and surprise are associated with uncertainty, and 
negative valence characterizes anger and worry, while positive valence characterizes 
contentment and surprise.  Participants then all read the same essay advocating for ending 
grade inflation.  The experimenter informed participants that either another student or a 
distinguished professor of education had written the essay, following which participants 
indicated their agreement with a number of statements about the essay.  The results 
showed that participants who experienced certainty-associated emotions, and who 
believed that a professor had written the essay, indicated significantly more agreement 
with the essay than those who read the essay by the student.  However, there was no 
difference in level of persuasion for participants induced to feel uncertainty-associated 
emotions.  In other words, participants who experienced certainty-associated emotions 
were more likely to process heuristically and to use the source of the essay to decide 
whether they agreed with it.  On the other hand, the source of the essay did not affect 
those participants who experienced uncertainty-associated emotions and used more 
systematic cognitive processing (Tiedens & Linton, 2001).  Notably, the valence of the 
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experienced emotions had no effect on the extent to which participants used heuristic or 
systematic processing to make decisions.  The type of processing participants used to 
make decisions was determined only by the level of certainty or uncertainty associated 
with each emotion.   
In their third experiment, Tiedens and Linton (2001) examined how emotions 
affect stereotype use.  They focused on negative emotions, specifically fear and disgust, 
because these negative emotions tend to be involved with prejudice and stereotyping.  
Using film clips, they induced participants to feel either fear or disgust.  Then in a 
second, “unrelated” study, participants read a scenario about a professor accusing a 
student of cheating.  All participants read the same scenario, except that half of the 
scenarios described the student as being a well-known athlete, and the other half omitted 
this description.  Participants then indicated how likely they thought it was that the 
student had cheated.  Participants in the disgust condition indicated that the athlete was 
more likely to have cheated than was the unidentified student; however, those 
participants induced to feel fear were equally likely to judge the student as having 
cheated regardless of whether they read about the athlete or the unidentified student.  
These results suggest that those participants experiencing disgust, an emotion associated 
with certainty, relied on the stereotype that athletes are more likely to cheat to decide 
whether the student in the scenario had in fact cheated, indicating greater heuristic 
processing.  Those participants experiencing fear, an emotion associated with uncertainty, 
processed more systematically, and thus were unaffected by the presence of the athlete 
stereotype.   
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Tiedens and Linton (2001) also conducted a mediation analysis to determine 
whether task certainty mediated the relationship between emotion and belief that the 
student athlete had cheated.  The researchers conducted a mediation analysis using only 
data from the athlete condition, because in the unidentified student condition there was no 
opportunity for participants to stereotype.  After completing the emotion manipulation, 
and before completing the stereotyping task, participants completed a measure of how 
certain they were that they could identify the appropriate outcome in the task.  Analyses 
indicated that participants in the disgust condition were more certain than those who were 
in the fear condition, as the Appraisal-Tendency Framework predicts.  The researchers 
used this measure of task certainty for the mediation analysis.  A series of regression 
analyses showed that emotion predicted task certainty, and predicted the belief that the 
athlete had cheated.  Task certainty also predicted the belief that the athlete had cheated, 
and when the researchers entered both emotion and task certainty as predictors for belief 
that the athlete had cheated, only task certainty was a significant predictor, indicating that 
certainty mediated the relationship between emotion and belief that the athlete had 
cheated.  As task certainty increased, so did belief that the athlete had cheated.  The 
researchers concluded that participants experiencing a certainty-related emotion were 
more likely to rely on stereotypes to decide whether a student had cheated, and that this 
occurred due to the certainty associated with emotions, not the emotions themselves 
(Tiedens & Linton, 2001).   
In their fourth and final experiment, Tiedens and Linton (2001) examined only 
sadness.  Sadness is an emotion that lies more toward the middle of the spectrum for 
certainty and uncertainty.  It is associated more with uncertainty than certainty, but is still 
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less uncertain than fear, therefore it is more likely that people will sometimes feel sad and 
uncertain but will also sometimes feel sad and certain.  The researchers sought to 
examine whether the same emotion, associated with either uncertainty or certainty, would 
have different effects on judgment.   
Participants were either induced to feel sad and certain, sad and uncertain, sad and 
neutral (no certainty instruction), or they received only a neutral emotion induction.  
Participants then read about a new product: half of the participants read a strong 
argument for the product, and half read a weak argument, and then rated on a nine-point 
scale whether they would consider buying the product.  Tiedens and Linton (2001) found 
that those who were sad and uncertain, or who were only sad (no certainty manipulation), 
were more likely to consider buying the product if they had received the strong argument 
rather than the weak argument. As predicted, those who were sad and certain, and those 
who had received the neutral emotion manipulation, were equally as likely to indicate 
that they would purchase the product no matter which argument they read.  (Although the 
neutral and sad/certain participants did not demonstrate significant differences in their 
attitudes about buying the product, neutral participants’ responses showed marginal 
differences in their attitudes toward the product depending on which argument they read, 
suggesting that the sad/certain participants might have processed more heuristically.)  
The results of this study provided further support for the researchers’ conclusion that 
certainty-associated emotions lead to more heuristic processing and uncertainty-
associated emotions lead to more systematic processing.  Even when participants felt 
equally sad, the differences in certainty appraisals led to differences in depth of cognitive 
processing.   
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Although the Appraisal-Tendency Framework has been applied extensively to 
risk assessment scenarios, and a number of other types of decision-making scenarios, 
researchers have only just begun to apply it to the field of legal decision making (Wiener, 
Bornstein, & Voss, 2006; see also Feigenson & Park, 2006).  For example, Ask and 
Granhag (2007) recently examined the effects of anger and sadness on criminal 
investigators’ judgments about the reliability of eyewitness statements, hypothesizing that 
anger would lead criminal investigators to make judgments based on pre-existing 
expectations and beliefs, and that sadness would lead to deeper processing.   
Participants were actual police investigators, and Ask and Granhag (2007) 
manipulated sadness and anger by asking participants to remember an event that they had 
experienced while working as a police officer that made them sad or angry.  Participants 
then read a summary of an assault case, followed by two statements from eyewitnesses.  
The first statement was always consistent with the prevailing theory about the crime (that 
the victim’s father had committed the assault).  The second statement, however, was 
either consistent with the theory, or inconsistent with it.  Participants rated how reliable 
and trustworthy they thought each eyewitness was, and indicated how much weight they 
would assign to the witness as evidence.  They also rated how likely it was that the father 
was guilty of committing the assault.   
Results showed that sad participants were significantly more convinced that the 
suspect was guilty when they read the consistent eyewitness statement compared to when 
they read the inconsistent eyewitness statement; however, there was no difference in 
judgments of guilt between the two witness statement conditions for the angry 
participants.  Additionally, sad participants in the consistent eyewitness statement 
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condition perceived the evidence as stronger than did those in the inconsistent condition.  
Yet, as was found for ratings of guilt, there were no differences in ratings of evidence 
strength for the angry participants in the consistent and inconsistent conditions (Ask & 
Granhag, 2007).  Sad investigators appear to have processed the information more 
systematically, detecting differences in evidence quality that angry investigators, 
processing more heuristically, seem to have missed.   
Ask and Granhag (2007) concluded that investigators’ emotions might influence 
their open-mindedness when conducting investigations.  If an investigator is angry, he or 
she may rely too heavily on pre-existing notions about the crime, and not rely enough on 
new information discovered during an investigation.  It is important to note that these 
participants were experienced police investigators, and yet emotions still influenced their 
judgments.  These results could have important implications for juror decision-making 
research.  Similar to a police investigator, a juror who is angry may form an initial 
impression of the defendant’s guilt, and may not attend to or give sufficient weight to 
contradictory evidence presented later in a trial.  It is also possible that angry people 
(compared to sad or fearful people) will be more likely to interpret ambiguous evidence 
to support their initial suspicions or impressions.   
This is particularly important to consider in the case of a juvenile being tried as an 
adult, because research has shown that jurors’ initial impressions of juveniles tried as 
adults are quite negative (Levine et al., 2001; Tang et al., 2009).  The experience of an 
emotion such as anger should exacerbate or facilitate this generic prejudice.  If jurors 
experience anger when faced with a juvenile defendant, they will in turn process more 
heuristically throughout the juvenile’s trial.  The effect of anger will have a greater 
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impact on decisions made about a juvenile tried as an adult compared to an adult 
defendant because jurors are more likely to endorse negative stereotypes about juveniles 
tried as adults compared to adult defendants.  Angry jurors will use negative stereotypes 
about juvenile defendants to make judgments throughout a trial because they will be 
processing more heuristically. 
It is also important to note that Ask and Granhag (2007) found that emotion 
influenced judgments of police investigators, who have extensive experience with 
emotion-arousing crimes and evidence.  Jurors generally have very little experience with 
this type of information, and thus may be even more susceptible to the effects of 
emotions in a legal decision-making setting.  
The study of the effect of emotions in this type of trial setting is important 
because a trial involving a juvenile defendant may elicit stronger emotions in jurors than 
a trial involving an adult defendant.  Violent crimes are inherently upsetting and 
disturbing, but violent crimes committed by youth may be even more shocking to many 
people.  Moreover, the examination of emotions and their effects on judgment and 
decision making could help explain the inconsistencies found among the studies 
investigating juror perceptions of juveniles tried as adults.  The finding that prosecution-
biased participants in one study demonstrated bias against a juvenile tried as an adult 
(Tang & Nunez, 2003), while in another study participants exhibited this bias regardless 
of their pretrial bias (Tang et al., 2009), could be explained by the emotions those 
participants experienced.  It is possible that some aspect of the detailed trial summary 
used by Tang and Nunez (2003) elicited anger only in prosecution-biased participants, 
causing them to rely on a generic prejudice against all juveniles tried as adults, leading to 
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harsher judgments of the juvenile defendant.  Furthermore, it is possible that the lack of 
details in Tang et al.’s (2009) research led all jurors to use stereotypes about juveniles 
tried as adults to make their judgments, simply because they had no other information on 
which to base them.   
CHAPTER 8: Current Research 
 The goal of this research was to clarify and extend the inconsistent results of 
previous studies examining juror perceptions of juveniles tried in criminal court by 
examining the effects of emotion on mock jurors’ perceptions of juveniles tried as adults.  
Study 1 directly assessed which stereotypes people associate with juveniles tried as adults 
compared to juveniles tried in juvenile court and adults tried in criminal court.  The 
results of this study were the basis of a stereotyping measure for use in study 2.  The 
purpose of study 2 was to determine whether and under what conditions mock jurors use 
these stereotypes to make judgments of guilt.  Several weeks before completing the main 
portion of the study, study 2 participants completed a questionnaire assessing negative 
stereotypes associated with juveniles tried as adults and a measure of pretrial bias 
consisting of items from both the JBS and the Pretrial Juror Attitude Questionnaire 
(PJAQ) (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983; Myers & Lecci, 1998; Lecci & Myers, 2002; Lecci 
& Myers, 2008).  For the main portion of the study, participants completed an emotion 
manipulation, following which they completed a short appraisal questionnaire and an 
emotion manipulation check.  They then read either a written trial summary describing a 
juvenile or an adult tried for the same crime in criminal court.  Participants determined 
whether the defendant was guilty of committing first-degree murder, second-degree 
murder, or manslaughter, and indicated how confident they were in their verdict, in 
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addition to completing a standard of proof questionnaire, a defendant age manipulation 
check, and an emotion manipulation check.  The resulting design was a 4 (emotion: 
anger, sadness, fear, neutral) x 2 (defendant age: 16-juvenile, 25-adult) between subjects 
design.   
Pretrial bias was included as a covariate because it has been included in the 
majority of the research studies examining juror perceptions of juveniles tried as adults 
(Tang & Nunez, 2003; Warling & Peterson-Badali, 2003; Tang et al., 2009; Woody & 
Walker, in press).  Other researchers in this area have generally used the JBS to measure 
pretrial bias, but this study measured pretrial bias using items from both the JBS and the 
PJAQ, because the PJAQ has demonstrated superior predictive validity in some recently 
published research (Lecci & Myers, 2008).  However, because researchers have used the 
JBS in the majority of studies examining perceptions of juveniles tried as adults, this 
study included all items pertaining to both instruments.   
The primary purpose of this research was to test whether experienced emotion 
could clarify the inconsistent results found in several studies regarding prosecution-
biased mock jurors, and their perceptions of juveniles tried as adults.  Prosecution-biased 
jurors may be more likely than other jurors are to react with anger when faced with a 
juvenile tried as an adult.  It is possible that in past research prosecution-biased 
participants treated juveniles tried as adults harshly due to the experience of anger.  For 
purposes of experimental control, this study manipulated emotions instead of measuring 
naturally occurring emotions.  However, an emotion manipulation check assessed what 
emotions participants in the neutral emotion condition experienced, which served as an 
indicator of what emotions both defense- and prosecution-biased jurors naturally 
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experienced in reaction to both juvenile and adult defendants in criminal court.  This 
allowed for an examination of whether prosecution-biased participants did indeed react 
with anger as opposed to sadness or fear.   
Additionally, both the emotions of sadness and fear were included as examples of 
uncertainty-associated emotions for several reasons.  First, sadness and fear are both 
emotions that an individual could naturally experience in response to a juvenile offender 
tried as an adult in criminal court.  Second, many studies using the Appraisal-Tendency 
Framework as a basis for studying emotion compare either anger and sadness or anger 
and fear, but rarely compare sadness and fear.  This is likely because sadness and fear are 
similar in regards to where they stand on the appraisal dimensions of certainty and 
control, as both emotions are associated with uncertainty and situational control, while 
anger is associated with certainty and individual/human control (Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985).  However, as demonstrated by Tiedens and Linton (2001), sadness falls more 
toward the middle of the spectrum for certainty (compared to fear, which lies closer to the 
uncertain end of the certainty spectrum), such that people will sometimes feel sad and 
uncertain, and will sometimes feel sad and certain.  Therefore, when exposed to a 
juvenile tried as an adult, people may naturally experience sadness, but depending on 
their appraisals of the situation, they may experience sadness and uncertainty, or sadness 
and certainty.  If they experiences sadness and uncertainty, they will process information 
more systematically, similar to fearful individuals.  On the other hand, if they experience 
sadness and certainty, they will process more heuristically, similar to angry individuals.  
The inclusion of manipulations of both sadness and fear explored the subtle differences 
between these emotions both of which are potential juror reactions to violent crime.   
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CHAPTER 9: Study 1 
Study 1 assessed whether, and to what extent, individuals associate certain 
negative stereotypes with juveniles tried as adults, juveniles tried in juvenile court, and 
adult defendants.  A stereotype is “a socially shared set of beliefs about traits that are 
characteristic of members of a social category” (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).  Stereotypes 
guide judgment and behavior in that an individual acts toward a person in a stereotyped 
group as if that person possesses the traits included in the stereotype.  For this reason, it is 
important to examine whether people hold negative stereotypes about juveniles tried as 
adults, and what these stereotypes are.  Furthermore, because the purpose of study 2 was 
to assess whether mock jurors use negative stereotypes about juveniles tried as adults to 
make guilt determinations, it was necessary to first determine whether people do indeed 
associate certain negative stereotypes with juveniles tried as adults to a greater extent 
than they do with juveniles tried in juvenile court and adult offenders. 
Several researchers have examined stereotypes about juvenile offenders (not 
specific to whether they are tried in juvenile or criminal court), finding that some 
individuals endorse a “superpredator” stereotype while others endorse a “wayward 
youth” stereotype (Haegerich, 2002, as cited in Tang et al., 2009; Tang et al., 2009).  The 
superpredator stereotype describes a juvenile offender as “a serious and violent juvenile 
offender who is a threat to public safety, is cold and calculating, has the same decision-
making competencies as adults, is competent to understand the court process, and has 
little rehabilitation potential.”  The wayward youth stereotype describes a juvenile 
offender as “a disadvantaged youth who conducts mostly nonviolent offenses, has been 
failed by parents and the schools, has inferior decision-making abilities compared to 
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adults, does not understand the court process, and should be rehabilitated rather than 
punished” (Haegerich, 2002, as cited in Tang et al., 2009).  Although these stereotypes 
are defined as being very specific to juvenile offenders, they were re-worded slightly to 
be applicable to both juvenile and adult offenders for use in this study.       
The questionnaire for use in study 1 included concepts from both research 
examining stereotypes about juvenile offenders, and research examining stereotypes 
associated with criminals in general.  MacLin and Herrera (2006) examined individuals’ 
stereotypes about criminals, asking participants about the physical characteristics of a 
“typical” criminal, and about what personality traits are most characteristic of criminals.  
Some of the traits found to be most characteristic of criminals included, but are not 
limited to, being angry, vindictive, antisocial, aggressive, hot-tempered, and 
manipulative (MacLin & Herrera, 2006).  Madriz (1997) also examined stereotypes 
about criminals, but with female participants only.  Using in-depth interviews and focus 
groups, Madriz found that women perceived typical criminals to be lazy, bad, immoral, 
cruel, and violent, among other things.  O’Connor (1984) explored perceptions of violent 
criminals in Australia, finding that some of the words and concepts associated with 
violent criminals were dangerous, vicious, unintelligent, commits other crimes, 
immature, and inconsiderate.  The items composing the stereotyping questionnaire in 
study 1 included some of the stereotypes found to be representative of criminals from the 
studies described above, in addition to other items (see “Procedure and materials” 
section for a more detailed description).   
In study 1, participants read a brief description of either a juvenile being tried in 
juvenile court, a juvenile being tried as an adult in criminal court, or an adult being tried 
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in criminal court for armed robbery.  They then rated the extent to which they believed a 
number of negative stereotypes characterized the accused individual.  I expected that 
participants would rate negative stereotypes to be more characteristic of a juvenile tried 
as an adult, compared to a juvenile tried in juvenile court and an adult defendant.   
Method 
 Participants.  Participants were 67 male and 102 female (N = 169, mean age = 
35.6, range 18-70) adults from across the United States.  The majority of participants 
indicated that they were Caucasian (N = 131, 77.5%), while seven indicated they were 
African American (4.1%), 18 were Asian American (10.7%), two were Hispanic (1.2%), 
two were Native American (1.2%), and eight indicated that their ethnicity was “other” 
(4.7%) (ethnicity data for one participant was missing).  All participants had at least a 
high school education, with 36 indicating education at the high school level (N = 36, 
21.3%), 24 with an associate’s degree (14.2%), 63 with a bachelor’s degree (37.3%), 34 
with a master’s degree (20.1%), and 12 indicating that they had a professional degree 
(7.1%).  The majority of participants were also employed full time (N = 118, 69.8%), 30 
were employed part time (17.8%), and 19 were unemployed (11.2%) (employment data 
for two participants was missing).  Study Response, an internet organization operated by 
Syracuse University, recruited participants for the study.  This service sends recruitment 
and reminder emails to a random sample of individuals who have agreed to participate in 
web-based research studies.  Participants received a five-dollar gift certificate to 
Amazon.com for their participation.   
 Procedure and materials.  To recruit participants, Study Response sent out 
invitations to individuals to participate in this study in exchange for a five-dollar gift 
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certificate to Amazon.com.  The email provided a URL address, a username, and a 
password needed to gain access to the online study materials.  Those who did not respond 
to the initial email invitation received seven- and 14-day reminders.  Participants who 
chose to participate went to a website that randomly assigned them to one of three 
conditions: juvenile tried in juvenile court vs. juvenile tried in criminal court vs. adult 
tried in criminal court.  All study materials were posted on a website created using 
SurveyMonkey, an internet survey design and data collection service.  Participants 
completed the study online, in the privacy of their own homes. 
 When participants entered the study website, they completed a standard consent 
form (see Appendix A).  They then read a very brief newspaper article describing the 
commission of an armed robbery, and the individual accused of committing the crime 
(see Appendix B).  It briefly described the commission of the crime, and stated that 
police arrested a suspect and charged him with armed robbery.  Depending on the 
assigned condition, the article went on to state that the suspect was either a 16-year-old 
who would be tried in juvenile court, a 16-year-old who would be tried as an adult in 
criminal court, or a 25-year-old who would be tried in criminal court. 
 Participants then rated the individual in the newspaper article on a number of 
negative stereotypes that may be associated with juveniles tried as adults, and with 
criminals in general (see Appendix C).  The items on this questionnaire consisted of those 
that Levine et al. (2001) used in their study of juvenile defendant stereotypes (has 
committed crimes in the past, has had a lot of previous contact with the police, has gotten 
into trouble just this one time [reverse scored], has a previous criminal record), and items 
from Tang et al.’s (2009) research (defendant is a danger to society, defendant is a 
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chronic offender).  It also included items from Madriz’s (1997) study of women’s 
stereotypes about criminals (is immoral, is cruel, is lazy, is a bad person, is prone to 
violence), items from MacLin and Herrera’s (2006) study of criminal stereotypes (is 
aggressive, is vindictive, is antisocial, is hot-tempered, is manipulative), and items from 
O’Connor’s (1984) study on perceptions of criminals (is intelligent [reverse scored], is 
immature).  Furthermore, the questionnaire included items that represent stereotypes 
people may hold about both juveniles tried as adults and criminals in general (uses illegal 
drugs, could probably be rehabilitated [reverse scored], knows right from wrong, and 
does not feel remorse).  Participants in all conditions also completed two additional items 
addressing common stereotypes about juvenile offenders from Haegerich’s (2002, as 
cited in Tang et al., 2009) research (is a superpredator, is a wayward youth).  Participants 
read a definition of each of these two terms, based on Haegerich’s definitions (the 
wording of the wayward youth item was modified so that in the 25-year-old condition 
participants determined how likely the individual in the article was a wayward youth 
when he was a teenager).  Participants rated the degree to which they agreed with each 
statement on a nine-point Likert scale (1 = not at all, 5 = somewhat, 9 = completely).  
They then completed a brief demographics questionnaire (see Appendix D), which 
included questions about participant age, gender, ethnicity, education, prior jury 
experience, juror eligibility items, and religious and political preferences.  Participants 
also completed a manipulation check question that asked what the age of the individual in 
the newspaper article was, and they answered one question that asked what they thought 
the race of the individual in the newspaper article was.  Although the name of the 
individual in the newspaper article was found to be race-neutral in other research (Keller, 
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2010), it was important to examine what race participants perceived the individual to be.  
Following this, they read a short debriefing statement (see Appendix E). 
Results 
 Preliminary analyses.  Participants’ responses to the manipulation check 
question showed some differences between conditions.  While 49 (94.2%) of the 52 
participants in the 16-year-old in juvenile court condition indicated that the individual in 
the article was 16-years-old, 50 (86.2%) of the 58 participants in the 16-year-old in adult 
court condition indicated that the individual was 16-years-old.  Furthermore, only 35 
(61.4%) of the 57 participants who completed the manipulation check in the 25-year-old 
in adult court condition indicated that the individual was 25 (two participants in this 
condition did not answer the manipulation check question).  A chi-square test of the 
condition by accurate responses to the age manipulation showed a significant relationship 
between accurate responses to the manipulation check and defendant age condition,  2(2) 
= 20.48, p < .001.  Participants more accurately reported the age of the younger as 
compared to the older offender.  
 With regard to responses to the question asking what race participants believed 
the individual in the newspaper article to be, 59 (34.9%) participants indicated that they 
thought the individual was White, 43 (25.4%) believed the individual was Black, four 
(2.4%) believed he was Hispanic, and 63 (37.3%) participants indicated that they did not 
know what the individual’s race was.  Thus, there was no indication that participants 
viewed the defendant as either Black or White.  
 The average completion time for study 1 was 6 minutes and 24 seconds, with a 
standard deviation of 12 minutes and 49 seconds.  
56 
Factor analysis. A factor analysis examined whether the stereotype data 
comprised distinct subscales.  Submitting all items to a factor analysis using principal 
component analysis and the varimax rotation method, produced two factors with 
eigenvalues greater than 1.00.  The first factor (named Chronic Predator factor) explained 
40.4% of the variance with an eigenvalue of 9.69.  Using a loading cutoff of .49, several 
items loaded uniquely on this factor, including: whether the defendant has committed 
other crimes in the past (.79), uses illegal drugs (.78), is vindictive (.66), is a chronic 
offender (.84), is lazy (.57), has a previous criminal record (.84), is hot-tempered (.49), 
has had a lot of previous contact with the police (.82), is manipulative (.62), does not feel 
remorse for what he has done (.63), and is a superpredator (.56).  The second factor 
(named Antisocial factor) explained 11.1% of the variance with an eigenvalue of 2.66.  
Loading on this factor were: the defendant is aggressive (.72), is a danger to society (.82), 
is immoral (.80), is cruel (.77), is a bad person (.80), is prone to violence (.72), and is 
antisocial (.60).  Averaging the scores of the items that loaded on each of the factors 
resulted in two subscales each demonstrating strong internal consistency reliability 
(Chronic Predator factor,  = .93; Antisocial factor,  = .90).   
Next, to test whether participants rated negative stereotypes as more characteristic 
of a juvenile tried as an adult compared to the other two defendants, these scales served 
as the dependent variables in a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with 
defendant type and gender as the independent variables.  There was a significant 
multivariate effect for defendant type, Wilk’s  = .94, F(4, 324) = 2.66, p = .03, p2 = .03, 
and for the defendant type by gender interaction, Wilk’s  = .91, F(4, 324) = 3.89, p < .01, 
p
2 
= .05.  The multivariate effect for gender was not significant, Wilk’s  = .98, F(2, 162) 
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= 1.84, p = .16, p2 = .02.  There were significant univariate defendant type effects on 
both stereotype subscales: F(2, 163) = 4.11, p = .02, p2 = .05 for Chronic Predator, and 
F(2, 163) = 3.09, p = .05, p2 = .04 for Antisocial.  Post-hoc tests showed that participants 
who read about the 25-year-old defendant had higher scores on the Chronic Predator 
subscale than did those who read about both of the 16-year-old defendants.  Post-hoc 
tests did not reveal any significant differences among the three defendant type conditions 
for Antisocial subscale scores.  Unfortunately, there were no significant differences 
between the 16-year-old tried as an adult and either of the other two conditions. There 
were also significant univariate interactions between defendant type and gender for both 
stereotype subscales, F(2, 163) = 6.63, p < .01, p2 = .08 for Chronic Predator, and F(2, 
163) = 6.25, p < .01, p2 = .07 for Antisocial.   
A follow-up MANOVA with defendant type as the independent variable 
examined the interactions, by including only the data for the male participants.  There 
was a significant multivariate effect, Wilk’s  = .77, F(4, 126) = 4.34, p < .01, p2 = .12, 
and significant univariate effects for defendant type on both stereotype subscales: 
Chronic Predator, F(2, 64) = 6.49, p < .01, p2 = .17; Antisocial, F(2, 64) = 8.25, p = .001, 
p
2 
= .21.  Post-hoc tests using the Least Significant Difference (LSD) (p < .05) method 
revealed that men who read about the 16-year-old tried as an adult (M = 6.05, SD = 1.80) 
and the 25-year-old adult defendant (M = 5.36, SD = 1.96) had significantly higher scores 
on the Chronic Predator subscale than did those who read about the 16-year-old tried in 
juvenile court (M = 4.01, SD = 1.92).  Furthermore, men’s scores on the Antisocial 
subscale were significantly higher for those who read about the 16-year-old tried as an 
adult (M = 7.46, SD = .94) compared to those who read about the 16-year-old tried in 
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juvenile court (M = 5.61, SD = 1.79) and those who read about the 25-year-old adult 
defendant (M = 6.50, SD = 1.70).   
The same MANOVA as described above using only data from the female 
participants failed to yield a significant multivariate effect, Wilk’s  = .96, F(4, 196) = 
1.11, p = .35, p2 = .02.  Furthermore, neither univariate effect was significant: Chronic 
Predator, F(2, 99) = 2.06, p = .13, p2 = .04; Antisocial, F(2, 99) = .44, p = .65, p2 = .01.   
MANOVA with individual stereotype items.  A MANOVA, which included 
defendant type (condition) and gender of the participant as between subject factors, 
treated participants’ responses on all individual stereotype items as dependent variables.  
There was a significant multivariate effect for gender, Wilk’s  = .77, F(24, 135) = 1.66, p 
= .04, p2 = .23.  Several of the univariate effects for gender were also significant, 
including the defendant is immature, F(1, 158) = 4.86, p = .03, p2 = .03; is intelligent 
(reverse coded), F(1, 158) = 4.19, p = .04, p2 = .03; got into trouble just this one time 
(reverse coded), F(1, 158) = 6.73, p = .01, p2 = .04; and could probably be rehabilitated 
(reverse coded), F(1, 158) = 5.81, p = .02, p2 = .04.  Examination of the means showed 
that men endorsed “is immature” (M = 6.90, SD = 1.97) to a greater extent than did 
women (M = 6.11, SD = 2.20).  However, after reverse coding, men endorsed the 
remaining three significant stereotype items to a lesser extent than did women 
(“intelligent” Mmen = 5.73, Mwomen = 6.50; “trouble” Mmen = 5.40, Mwomen = 6.38; 
“rehabilitated” Mmen = 3.79, Mwomen = 4.50).   
The remaining multivariate effects were not significant: defendant type, Wilk’s  
= .66, F(48, 270) = 1.30, p = .10, p2 = .19; defendant type by gender interaction, Wilk’s  
= .71, F(48, 270) = 1.05, p = .39, p2 = .16.  There were, however, significant univariate 
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defendant type effects for several of the items.  These included, the defendant has a 
previous criminal record, F(2, 161) = 3.66, p = .03, p2 = .04; is antisocial F(2, 161) = 
3.11, p = .05, p2 = .04; is hot-tempered, F(2, 161) = 4.53, p = .01, p2 = .05; is 
manipulative, F(2, 161) = 3.03, p = .05, p2 = .04; is a superpredator, F(2, 161) = 3.20, p 
= .04, p2 = .04; and got into trouble just this one time (reverse coded), F(2, 161) = 4.29, p 
= .02, p2 = .05.  Post-hoc tests using the LSD method (p < .05) revealed that participants 
rated the 25-year-old defendant as more likely to have a previous criminal record 
compared to the 16-year-old in juvenile court; they rated the 16-year-old tried as an adult 
as being more antisocial than the 16-year-old in juvenile court; they rated both the 25-
year-old and 16-year-old tried as an adult as being more hot-tempered than the 16-year-
old tried in juvenile court; they rated the 25-year-old as being more manipulative than the 
16-year-old in juvenile court; they rated the 25-year-old as more likely to be a 
superpredator than the 16-year-old in juvenile court; and they rated the 16-year-old in 
juvenile court as more likely to have gotten into trouble more than just this one time 
compared to the 16-year-old in adult court (see Table 1 for means and standard 
deviations).  There were no significant differences between the adult defendant and the 
16-year-old tried as an adult.  Table 1 shows that the juvenile tried in juvenile court 
generally showed lower stereotype scores, however the differences between those scores 
and the scores for the other two conditions (juvenile tried as an adult and the adult in 
criminal court) were not always consistent.  
The results also showed significant univariate interactions between defendant type 
and gender for several of the items, including the defendant is a danger to society, F(2, 
158) = 5.23, p = .01, p2 = .06; uses illegal drugs, F(2, 158) = 4.30, p = .02, p2 = .05; is 
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vindictive, F(2, 158) = 9.03, p < .001, p2 = .10; is a chronic offender, F(2, 158) = 6.53, p 
< .01, p2 = .08; is immoral, F(2, 158) = 5.12, p = .01, p2 = .06; has a previous criminal 
record, F(2, 158) = 3.29, p = .04, p2 = .04; is cruel, F(2, 158) = 7.86, p = .001, p2 = .09; 
is a bad person, F(2, 158) = 4.80, p = .01, p2 = .06; has had a lot of previous contact with 
police, F(2, 158) = 4.41, p = .01, p2 = .05; does not feel remorse, F(2, 158) = 3.55, p = 
.03, p2 = .04; and is a superpredator, F(2, 158) = 3.96, p = .02, p2 = .05.   
Follow-up univariate F-tests using only data from the male participants, with 
defendant type as the between subjects variable, produced a number of significant effects 
(see Table 2 for F-tests for each significant stereotype item).  Post-hoc tests using the 
LSD method revealed that male participants rated the 16-year-old tried as an adult as 
being more of a danger to society, more vindictive, and more prone to violence than they 
did the adult defendant (see Table 2 for means and standard deviations).  For a number of 
the significant stereotype items male participants gave higher ratings to the 16-year-old 
tried as an adult compared to the 16-year-old tried in juvenile court (has committed other 
crimes in the past, is aggressive, is a danger to society, uses illegal drugs, is vindictive, is 
a chronic offender, is immoral, is cruel, is a bad person, and is prone to violence).  For 
the remainder of the significant stereotype items male participants gave higher ratings to 
both the 16-year-old tried as an adult and the adult defendant compared to the 16-year-old 
tried in juvenile court (has a previous criminal record, is hot-tempered, has had a lot of 
previous contact with police, is manipulative, does not feel remorse for what he has done, 
and is a superpredator).  Thus, as the factor score analyses reported above, men showed 
more differences in stereotype scores across defendant type, which tended to support men 
endorsing an overall stereotype of juveniles tried as adults.  
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Follow-up univariate F-tests using only data from the female participants, with 
defendant type as the between subjects variable, produced only three univariate effects 
for defendant type.  These were, whether the defendant is vindictive, F(2, 98) = 3.61, p = 
.03, p2 = .07; is a chronic offender, F(2, 98) = 3.16, p = .05, p2 = .06; and got into 
trouble more than just this one time, F(2, 98) = 3.48, p = .04, p2 = .07.  Post-hoc tests 
revealed that women rated the 25-year-old defendant as being more vindictive (M = 5.06, 
SD = 2.37) and more likely to be a chronic offender (M = 5.00, SD = 2.14) than the 16-
year-old tried as an adult (vindictive, M = 3.68, SD = 1.79; chronic offender, M = 3.74, 
SD = 2.15).  They also rated the 16-year-old tried in juvenile court as being more likely to 
have gotten into trouble more than just this one time (M = 6.94, SD = 1.61) compared to 
the 16-year-old tried as an adult (M = 5.74, SD = 1.97).  Women did not endorse more 
any of the stereotypes for the juvenile tried as an adult compared to the other defendants.  
Thus, evidence for a stereotype of youth tried as adults is much weaker for women than 
for men.  
Binary logistic regression analysis.  Another way to test for stereotypes against 
juveniles tried as adults uses binary logistic regression to discriminate between conditions 
(16-year-old tried in juvenile court vs. 16-year-old tried in adult court vs. 25-year-old 
tried in adult court) as a function of participant ratings on the stereotype items.  The first 
regression used as the criterion variable a dummy coded factor which compared the 16-
year-old tried in juvenile court (0) and the 16-year-old tried as an adult (1) using all 24 
stereotype items as predictors.  The model was not significant, 2(24, N = 106) = 31.70, p 
= .14, Nagelkerke R2 = .35.  The second regression comparing the 16-year-old tried as a 
juvenile with the 25-year-old tried as an adult produced a significant effect, 2(24, N = 
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107) = 40.16, p = .02, Nagelkerke R2 = .42.  The model predicted 69.4% (n = 34) of the 
16-year-old juvenile and 72.4% (n = 42) of the 25-year-old adult conditions correctly, for 
an overall accuracy of 71.0%.  Only one stereotype item, knows the difference between 
right and wrong, reliably predicted condition membership, B = -.41, Wald = 10.60, p = 
.001, Exp(B) = .66.  Participants who read about the adult defendant were almost half as 
likely to indicate that he knew the difference between right and wrong compared to the 
juvenile tried in juvenile court.  The third regression compared the 16-year-old tried as an 
adult (dummy coded 0) with the 25-year-old tried in adult criminal court (dummy coded 
1).  The model was nearly significant, 2(24, N = 115) = 35.91, p = .06, Nagelkerke R2 = 
.36.  The model accurately predicted 73.7% (n = 42) of the 16-year-old adult and 69.0% 
(n = 40) of the 25-year-old adult conditions, for an overall accuracy of 71.3%.  Five of 
the stereotype items significantly contributed to the model. They were: uses illegal drugs, 
B = -.39, Wald = 3.95, p = .05, Exp(B) = .67; is prone to violence, B = -.48, Wald = 4.94, 
p = .03, Exp(B) = .62; is immature, B = .35, Wald = 4.02, p = .05, Exp(B) = 1.41; knows 
the difference between right and wrong, B = -.37, Wald = 9.46, p < .01, Exp(B) = .69; and 
does not feel remorse for what he has done, B = .48, Wald = 6.86, p = .01, Exp(B) = 1.62.  
Participants who read about the juvenile tried as an adult were more likely to indicate that 
he used illegal drugs, was prone to violence, and knew the difference between right and 
wrong compared to the adult defendant.  Participants who read about the adult defendant 
were more likely to indicate that he was immature and that he did not feel remorse for 
what he had done compared to the juvenile tried as an adult.    
Discussion 
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 The results of study 1 suggest that some people do endorse more some negative 
stereotype items about criminals for juveniles tried as adults as compared to juveniles 
tried in juvenile court and adult defendants.  Men endorsed more strongly a number of 
stereotype items (has committed other crimes in the past, is aggressive, is a danger to 
society, uses illegal drugs, is vindictive, is a chronic offender, is immoral, is cruel, is a 
bad person, and is prone to violence) for the juvenile tried as an adult compared to the 
juvenile tried in juvenile court.  The same result emerged for the Chronic Predator factor.  
Furthermore, men also more strongly endorsed three of the stereotype items (is a danger 
to society, is vindictive, and is prone to violence) for the juvenile tried as an adult 
compared to the adult defendant.  Men also had higher scores on the Antisocial factor 
when they read about the juvenile tried as an adult compared to both other defendants.  
This subscale contained all of the items men endorsed more for the juvenile tried as an 
adult compared to the juvenile tried in juvenile court, and it contained two of the three 
items men endorsed more for the juvenile tried as an adult compared to the adult 
defendant.  Women did not endorse any stereotype items or subscales more for the 
juvenile tried as an adult compared to the other defendants.   
Results from a logistic regression suggest that the endorsement of three stereotype 
items reliably differentiated defendant-type condition membership.  Those who endorsed 
uses illegal drugs, is prone to violence, and knows the difference between right and 
wrong, were more likely to have read about the juvenile tried as an adult compared to the 
adult defendant (these results, however, should be interpreted with caution, as the model 
was only nearly statistically significant).  These results, combined with the results of the 
MANOVAs, suggest that at least one stereotype item (prone to violence) may be 
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consistently viewed as more characteristic of juveniles tried as adults compared to adult 
defendants, and a handful of other items may be more characteristic of juveniles tried as 
adults compared to juveniles tried in juvenile court.   
Overall, the analyses utilizing the factors from the factor analysis provide the 
most clear and concise results regarding participants’ stereotype endorsements.  Men 
endorsed one factor more for the juvenile tried as an adult compared to the juvenile tried 
in juvenile court, and endorsed the other factor more for the juvenile tried as an adult 
compared to both other defendants.  The use of two distinct factors allowed for a less 
complicated summary of participants’ views of juveniles tried as adults, compared to the 
analyses that included all of the stereotype items individually.  
Men seemed to endorse negative stereotypes more strongly for the juvenile tried 
as an adult compared to the other defendants, while women did not show this bias.  
Although the original hypotheses did not address any potential differences between men 
and women’s judgments of juveniles tried as adults, there is research that suggests that 
men are more punitive and endorse rehabilitation less as a goal of punishment for crimes 
as compared to women (Applegate, Cullen, & Fisher, 2002).  Studies have also shown 
that men tend to favor the death penalty more than women do (Cochran & Sanders, 2009; 
Whitehead & Blankenship, 2000; Sandys & McGarrell, 1995; Bohm, 1998).  It could be 
that men exhibited some bias toward the juvenile tried as an adult because they tend to 
have attitudes toward criminals that are more punitive in general.  Men’s bias toward all 
criminals may augment their negative views or stereotypes of juveniles tried as adults.  
On the other hand, women would be less likely to judge a juvenile tried as an adult 
harshly if they do indeed tend to be less punitive and more in favor of rehabilitation.  This 
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could be particularly true when the criminal is a juvenile defendant, because regardless of 
the trial venue, the young age of the defendant could reinforce notions of rehabilitation 
rather than punishment.   
The results of the manipulation check could also provide some explanation for the 
stereotype endorsements observed in the main analyses.  A large number of participants 
in the 25-year-old defendant condition were unable to identify accurately the age of the 
defendant.  A chi-square test demonstrated a significant relationship between defendant 
age condition and accuracy in answers on the manipulation check question, suggesting 
that the inaccuracy of participants in the 25-year-old condition did not occur by chance.  
It could be that something about the 25-year-old condition led participants to focus less 
on the age of the defendant, and in turn, led them to make judgments about the stereotype 
items differently than the participants who were aware of the defendant’s age.  The large 
number of participants who seem to have missed the 25-year-old defendant age 
manipulation may have weakened any effects of defendant age on stereotype 
endorsement.   
Another possible explanation for these results is that people do endorse specific 
negative stereotypes about juveniles tried as adults, but that they were not included on 
this stereotype questionnaire.  Although the questionnaire consisted of items drawn from 
the literature on criminal stereotypes, it is possible that negative stereotypes about 
juveniles tried as adults are very specific and different from general stereotypes about 
criminals.  Future research should examine a broader spectrum of stereotypes, based on 
not only stereotypes about criminals, but also stereotypes about adolescents in general.   
CHAPTER 10: Study 2 
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 Study 2 utilized the results from study 1 to examine whether the experience of 
specific emotions affects mock jurors’ use of negative stereotypes to make judgments of 
guilt for a juvenile tried as an adult and an adult defendant.  Participants completed the 
stereotype items from study 1 and a pretrial bias measure, several weeks before 
completing the second phase of the study.  During the second phase, participants 
completed an emotion manipulation, and then read either a short trial summary 
describing a juvenile or an adult being tried for the same crime in criminal court.  The 
defendant age condition did not include a juvenile being tried in juvenile court because in 
the juvenile justice system juries do not determine guilt.  For this reason, the majority of 
the jury studies in this area leave out conditions in which a juvenile court adjudicates a 
youth with criminal charges.  One study that did include this type of condition found no 
differences between mock jurors’ judgments of a juvenile in juvenile court and of an 
adult defendant in criminal court (Tang et al., 2009).   
Participants in study 2 indicated whether they believed the defendant was guilty 
or not guilty of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and manslaughter, and 
indicated their confidence in their verdict.  Finally, they indicated what standard of proof 
they used to determine the defendant’s guilt.  The resulting design was a 4 (emotion: 
anger, sadness, fear, neutral) x 2 (defendant age: 16-juvenile, 25-adult) between subjects 
design.   
Hypotheses for this design included a main effect for emotion, such that 
compared to sad, fearful, and neutral participants, angry participants would make harsher 
judgments about both defendants on all dependent variables, and a main effect for 
defendant age, with participants judging the juvenile defendant more harshly on all 
67 
dependent variables compared to the adult defendant.  The last expected main effect 
hypothesis concerned pretrial bias, such that those individuals who indicated a greater 
prosecution bias (as opposed to defense bias) would make harsher judgments about both 
types of defendant on all dependent variables.   
Other hypotheses included a two-way interaction between stereotyping and 
defendant age, such that as participants’ stereotyping scores increased (indicating greater 
negative stereotyping of juveniles tried as adults) they would judge the juvenile defendant 
more harshly than would those participants with lower stereotyping scores.  Those 
participants in the adult defendant condition would judge both defendants equally 
regardless of their scores on the stereotyping measure.  A second two-way interaction 
hypothesis involving emotion and defendant age anticipated that angry participants would 
judge the juvenile defendant more harshly than they would the adult defendant on all 
dependent measures.  Sad, fearful, and neutral participants would show no differences in 
their judgments of the juvenile and adult defendants.  Another interaction between 
emotion and pretrial bias predicted that neutral and angry participants who were more 
prosecution-biased, would judge both types of defendants more harshly than those neutral 
and angry participants who were more defense-biased.  There should have been no 
differences in prosecution- and defense-biased participants’ judgments within the sad and 
fearful emotion conditions because the experience of sadness and fear should lead to 
more systematic processing, allowing these participants to make decisions based on 
details of the case rather than relying on their pre-existing attitudes.   
Finally, and most importantly, the literature reviewed favored a three-way 
interaction between emotion, defendant age, and stereotyping.  Angry participants who 
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received higher scores on the stereotyping measure (indicating greater negative 
stereotyping of juveniles tried as adults) would judge the juvenile defendant more harshly 
than they would the adult defendant.  Angry participants who received lower scores on 
the stereotyping measure would judge the juvenile and adult defendants equally.  Based 
on this logic, participants in the neutral emotion condition who received higher scores on 
the stereotyping measure would also judge the juvenile defendant more harshly than they 
would judge the adult defendant, but the size of this effect would be smaller than the 
effect found among angry participants who received high scores on the stereotyping 
measure.  Sad and fearful participants would judge the juvenile and adult defendants 
equally, regardless of their scores on the stereotyping measure.  Furthermore, scores on 
the stereotyping measure would mediate the interaction between emotion and defendant 
age, such that the interaction would no longer be significant after controlling stereotyping 
scores.  Similarly, appraisals of certainty would mediate the effects of anger on 
judgments made about the juvenile defendant, such that the relationship between anger 
and judgments of the juvenile defendant would attenuate after controlling for certainty.  
Method 
 Participants.  Participants were 178 male and 188 female (N = 367, one did not 
indicate his or her gender) jury-eligible adults (mean age = 42.2, SD = 13.8, range = 18-
86) from across the United States.  To be jury eligible in most states, an individual must 
be 18 or older and must either have a drivers license or be registered to vote in that state.  
The majority of participants indicated that they were Caucasian (N = 316, 86.1%), while 
13 indicated they were African American (3.5%), 17 were Asian American (4.6%), nine 
were Hispanic (2.5%), one was Latin American (.3%), two were Native American (.5%), 
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and eight indicated that their ethnicity was “other” (2.2%) (one participant did not 
indicate his or her ethnicity).  Participants indicated a variety of education levels, with 
one participant indicating less than a high school education (.3%), 109 with a high school 
education (29.7%), 68 with an associate’s degree (18.5%), 139 with a bachelor’s degree 
(37.9%), 37 with a master’s degree (10.1%), and 12 indicating that they had a 
professional degree (3.3%) (one participant did not indicate his or her education level).  A 
little more than half of the participants indicated that they were employed full time (N = 
209, 56.9%), 44 indicated that they were employed part time (12.0%), and 108 indicated 
that they were unemployed (29.4%) (employment data for six participants was missing).  
 Procedure.  Data collection for study 2 consisted of two phases.   
Phase one.  The first phase of data collection involved completing two 
questionnaires, the pretrial bias questionnaire, and the stereotyping measure from study 1.  
Participants also read a short crime scenario and indicated whether they believed the 
defendant in the scenario was guilty, which served as a distracter from the true purpose of 
the research.  Study Response sent email invitations to individuals who met jury-
eligibility requirements (they were at least 18 years old and were either registered voters 
or held valid drivers’ licenses in their state of residence).  Study response invited people 
to participate in this research in exchange for a total of 15 dollars in Amazon.com gift 
certificates.  The email explained that participants would receive five dollars in gift 
certificates for completing the first phase of data collection, and then would receive the 
remaining 10 dollars in gift certificates for completing the second phase.  Phase 1 
recruitment over-sampled by 50 percent to account for attrition in phase 2.  The email 
provided a URL address, a username, and a password needed to gain access to the online 
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study materials.  Those who did not respond to the initial email invitation received seven- 
and 14-day reminders.  All study materials were posted on a website created using 
SurveyMonkey, an internet survey design and data collection service.  Participants 
completed the study online, in the privacy of their own homes.   
Participants who chose to participate went to a website where they first completed 
a standard consent form (see Appendix F).  Participants then completed the stereotyping 
measure from study 1 (see Appendix G).  Next, they completed the pretrial bias 
questionnaire (see Appendix H) labeled “Legal Opinions Survey” to conceal the true 
purpose of the measure (Tang & Nunez, 2003).  Following this, participants completed a 
shortened version of the Attitudes toward Rape questionnaire (Appendix I), read a short 
crime scenario, and determined whether the defendant in the scenario was guilty (see 
Appendix J).  The Attitudes toward Rape questionnaire and crime scenario task served to 
distract participants from the true purpose of the study. 
Phase two.  The second phase of the study occurred approximately two to three 
weeks later, so that the act of completing the pretrial bias measure and stereotyping 
measure would not unduly influence participants’ responses on the juror decision-making 
task.  Study Response contacted participants who participated in phase one, and asked 
them to participate in phase two of the study in exchange for a 10-dollar Amazon.com 
gift certificate.  If they chose to participate, an email directed them to a website that 
randomly assigned them to one of the eight conditions created by crossing the emotion 
and defendant age factors.   
When participants first entered the study website, they learned that they would 
participate in two short unrelated experiments, one examining how individuals write 
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about life events (Bodenhausen et al., 1994), and the other examining legal decision 
making (see Appendix K).  Participants then completed the emotion manipulation (see 
Appendix L).  Although participants completed the emotion manipulation before they 
read the trial summary, research on the Appraisal-Tendency Framework shows that the 
appraisals associated with an emotional state, will carry over and affect subsequent, 
unrelated judgments and decisions (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006).  After completing the 
emotion manipulation, participants completed a shortened version of Smith and 
Ellsworth’s (1985) appraisal questionnaire (see Appendix M).   
Before continuing on to the next part of the study, participants completed emotion 
manipulation checks to assess whether the emotion induction had an immediate effect on 
participants’ emotional experiences independent of the case facts (see Appendix N).  The 
facts of the case which participants evaluated may have influenced their emotions, thus 
the emotion manipulation check that participants completed at the end of the study may 
not have been an accurate indicator of what they were feeling when they first began to 
read about the case.   
Once participants completed the emotion manipulation check, the survey website 
provided them with materials for the ostensible second study.  First, participants read a 
short set of instructions, explaining that they would read about a case in which the 
defendant was being charged with first-degree murder, and that they should put 
themselves in the position of a juror who was hearing the case in court.  The instructions 
stated that the participants would determine whether the defendant was guilty at the end 
of the trial summary.   
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Participants then read a relatively short (six pages) written trial summary, 
describing a case that was ambiguous as to whether the defendant was guilty or innocent 
(see Appendix O).  A pilot study with undergraduate student participants demonstrated 
that the scenarios produced ambiguous ratings of the defendant’s guilt.  In the final pilot 
study version of the trial summary used in the main part of study 2, 54% of the 
participants found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, or 
manslaughter and 46% found him not guilty of any charge.  Depending on their assigned 
condition, participants read either that a 16-year-old male was being charged with murder 
and tried as an adult in criminal court, or that a 25-year-old male was being charged with 
murder and tried in criminal court.  Previous research using a 16-year-old defendant 
found some bias against that defendant when he was tried as an adult in criminal court 
(Tang & Nunez, 2003), and other research examining juror perceptions of juvenile 
defendants used a 25-year-old defendant as the adult defendant in a similar study 
(Warling & Peterson-Badali, 2003).   
After reading the trial summary, participants answered a manipulation check 
question that asked what the defendant’s age was in the trial summary (see Appendix P).  
This question was one of several others (i.e., “What is the defendant’s name?”) so that the 
purpose of the study was not obvious.  This question served not only as a manipulation 
check, but also served to reinforce the age manipulation before participants completed the 
dependent measures.  Participants then rendered a verdict (guilty or not guilty) for each 
of the charges (first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and manslaughter).  
Participants also indicated their certainty in the correctness of each verdict, and answered 
a question assessing the standard of proof they used to determine the defendant’s guilt 
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(see Appendix Q).  Following this, participants completed an emotion manipulation 
check (see Appendix N).  Finally, participants completed a demographics questionnaire 
(see Appendix R), and read a debriefing statement (see Appendix S).   
Materials.  In order to prevent participants from discovering the true purpose of 
the study, the informed consent form described the study as being three separate 
experiments that different members of a research group were conducting (see Appendix 
F).  The consent form stated that a group of researchers studying social cognition was 
interested in a number of different types of information processing, and to facilitate data 
collection they combined several of their experiments.  The consent form went on to 
explain that data collection would occur at two different points in time.  The first phase of 
data collection would occur immediately following reading of the consent form, and 
would consist of “Experiment 1.”  The second phase of data collection would occur 
several weeks later and would consist of “Experiments 2 and 3.”  The research was 
described in this manner to avoid suspicion about the pretrial bias and stereotyping 
measures being related to the second phase of the study, and to avoid suspicion about the 
emotion manipulation being related to the juror decision-making task.   
The stereotyping questionnaire (see Appendix G) included all of the stereotyping 
items used in study 1.  This measure instructed participants to “Imagine a juvenile who 
has committed a crime and is now being tried as an adult in criminal court.”  It went on to 
instruct them to indicate the extent to which they agreed with a number of statements 
concerning the individual that they imagined.  The instruction allowed the use of the 
same wording for each stereotype item on the questionnaire as in study 1.  Participants 
rated each item on a nine-point scale (1 = not at all, 5 = somewhat, 9 = completely).   
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The pretrial bias questionnaire consisted of items from both the JBS (Kassin & 
Wrightsman, 1983) and the PJAQ (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983; Myers & Lecci, 1998; 
Lecci & Myers, 2002; Lecci & Myers, 2008) (see Appendix H).  The JBS consists of 17 
items that assess juror pretrial bias along two dimensions, probability of commission and 
reasonable doubt.  The PJAQ consists of 29 items designed to measure pretrial bias, 
including 12 of the items from the JBS.  Lecci and Myers (2002, 2008) developed the 
PJAQ using items from the JBS and other measures of pretrial bias and using a lay 
consensual approach to generate new items.  An example of some of the items on the JBS 
and the PJAQ are, “If a suspect runs from police, then he probably committed the crime,” 
“Generally, the police make an arrest only when they are sure about who committed the 
crime,” and “A defendant should be found guilty if 11 out of 12 jurors vote guilty.”  
Aggregated answers to these items yielded two subscales that make up the JBS, and three 
of the six subscales that make up the PJAQ.  Analyses included only three of the PJAQ 
subscales (conviction proneness, system confidence, and cynicism toward the defense), 
because they are the three that are most similar to the constructs assessed that make up 
the JBS.   
The Attitudes toward Rape questionnaire items only served as a distracter from 
the true purpose of the study; therefore, I did not analyze responses to this measure.  An 
example of some items on the questionnaire are, “A charge of rape two days after the act 
has occurred is probably not rape,” and “Rapists are motivated more by a desire for 
power than by a desire for sex” (see Appendix I).  The crime scenario that served as a 
distracter described an attempted sexual assault (see Appendix J).  Participants read a 
one-page scenario describing the attempted sexual assault and then determined whether 
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the defendant in the scenario was guilty or not guilty of first-degree attempted sexual 
assault.   
At the beginning of the second phase of data collection participants read a cover 
sheet explaining that they were going to be participating in two separate experiments, one 
relating to life events and one relating to legal decision making (see Appendix K).  
Following this, participants completed the emotion manipulation (see Appendix L).  The 
emotion manipulation, labeled the “Life Events Questionnaire,” informed participants 
that the researchers were interested in how individuals write about life events.  The 
instructions asked participants in the anger condition to write about three to five things 
that make them angry, then to describe in more detail the one situation that makes them, 
or has made them, most angry.  The instructions also asked participants to write the 
description so that someone reading it might get angry just from learning about the event 
(Small & Lerner, 2008).  In the sad and fearful conditions, the instructions were the same, 
except that they asked participants to write about three to five things that make them sad 
or scared.  The neutral emotion condition instructed participants to write about three to 
five activities that they had done that day.  The instructions next asked participants to 
write a detailed description of two of the activities that they had described in the first 
question, and to write the description so that someone reading it could reconstruct the 
way in which the individual completed those activities (Small & Lerner, 2008).   
Participants then completed a shortened version of Smith and Ellsworth’s (1985) 
appraisal questionnaire, in which they completed three items assessing appraisals of 
certainty and three items assessing appraisals of control on nine-point scales (1 = not at 
all, 5 = somewhat, and 9 = extremely) (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Smith & Ellsworth, 
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1985) (see Appendix M).  Each question asked to what extent the events the participant 
described on the emotion manipulation were certain or uncertain, and to what extent the 
events were under individual versus situational control.  The three certainty items 
demonstrated poor reliability (internal consistency  = .46), as did the three control items 
(internal consistency  = .22).  Therefore, all analyses used these items individually, 
rather than averaged together as a single scale.  
After completing the appraisal questionnaire, participants completed an emotion 
manipulation check (see Appendix N).  The manipulation check asked participants to 
report how they felt “right now” by rating six emotions (happiness, anger, disgust, 
sadness, fear, and surprise) on nine-point scales (1 = not at all, 5 = moderately, 9 = 
extremely strongly).   
The trial summary that participants read reflected the events in a real case 
involving a juvenile who a jury found guilty of murdering a woman in his neighborhood 
during an attempted burglary (see Appendix O).  In this trial summary, the defendant 
faced a charge of first-degree murder for the bludgeoning death of a woman.  The trial 
summary included brief overviews of the prosecution’s and defense’s opening 
statements, witness testimonies (including testimony of the defendant), and closing 
arguments of the prosecution and defense.  In this scenario, police found the victim’s 
blood on items in a duffle bag belonging to the defendant in an abandoned van near his 
house.  The defendant admitted to entering some of his other neighbors’ homes and 
stealing their credit card information, but denied murdering the victim, and suggested that 
his friend who was involved in the credit card thefts was the one responsible for the 
murder.  There were two versions of the trial summary, one in which the defendant was 
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described as a 25-year-old adult, and one in which he was described as a 16-year-old 
juvenile.  All information in the trial summaries was identical except for the age of the 
defendant, and the age of one of the witnesses (the summary described the defendant’s 
friend as being the same age as the defendant to bolster the age manipulation).  In 
addition, in the 16-year-old defendant trial summary the instructions on the first page 
stated that the juvenile was being tried as an adult in criminal court.  Keller (2010) tested 
the names of the defendant and his friend and found them to be race-neutral.  
After reading the trial summary, participants completed the age manipulation 
check, which read, “How old is the defendant?” (see Appendix P).  It also asked 
participants what the defendant’s name was and how the victim died, to distract from the 
true purpose of the study.  Participants then completed the Final Verdict Questionnaire 
(see Appendix Q).  They read instructions explaining that the state bears the burden of 
proof to convince the jurors beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime with which he was charged, and they read the statutory definitions of first-degree 
murder, second-degree murder, and manslaughter according to Nebraska law.  They then 
indicated what they believed was the appropriate verdict (guilty or not guilty) for each of 
the three charges, and they indicated their certainty in the correctness of each verdict on 
9-point scales, with 1 equaling “not at all certain” and 9 equaling “very certain.”  
Participants then indicated what standard of proof they used to determine the defendant’s 
guilt.  This question read, “The defendant should be found guilty if there is at least a __% 
chance that he committed the crime” (Tang & Nunez, 2003), and required respondents to 
fill in the percentage. 
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Following this, participants completed a second emotion manipulation check (see 
Appendix N), in which they were asked to report how they felt after completing the juror 
decision-making task by rating the six emotions (happiness, anger, disgust, sadness, fear, 
and surprise) a second time on nine-point scales (1 = not at all, 5 = moderately, 9 = 
extremely strongly).     
Finally, participants completed a demographics questionnaire (see Appendix R), 
which consisted of items asking about participant age, gender, ethnicity, education, prior 
jury experience, juror eligibility items, and religious and political preferences.  There was 
also one question that asked what participants believed the defendant’s race to be, and 
two suspicion check questions, included to determine whether participants knew the true 
purpose of the study.  After completing the demographics questionnaire, participants read 
a debriefing statement (see Appendix S).   
Results 
Preliminary analyses. 
Data cleaning.  To be jury-eligible in most states, citizens must be at least 18 
years old and without felony convictions.  Jury clerks select individuals at random from 
lists of registered voters and people with valid driver’s licenses.  To simulate jury clerk 
selection, the final data set did not include three participants who were not registered to 
vote and did not have a valid driver’s license, one participant who was not a United 
States citizen, and eight participants who indicated that they were felons without civil 
rights.  I also removed 14 participants who did not complete the emotion manipulation: 
five originally assigned to the anger condition, three from the sadness condition, three 
from the fear condition, and three from the neutral condition.  Thus, participants removed 
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because of failure to complete the emotion measures came from each of the study 
conditions.  Finally, although a number of participants realized that the emotion 
manipulation was related to the juror decision-making task in the second part of the 
study, none indicated that they knew how or why emotions would affect decision making, 
therefore no participants were excluded based on their responses to suspicion check 
questions.  The final data set consisted of 178 jury-eligible men and 188 jury-eligible 
women (and one participant who did not indicate his or her gender) randomly assigned to 
one of the eight experimental conditions. 
 Defendant age manipulation check.  Of the 184 participants in the 16-year-old 
defendant condition who completed the manipulation check, 162 (88.0%) correctly 
answered that the defendant in the trial summary was 16 years old.  Of the 171 
participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition who completed the manipulation 
check, 133 (77.8%) correctly answered that the defendant was 25 years old.  A chi-square 
test revealed that there was a significant relationship between defendant age condition 
and accurate completion of the manipulation check, 2(1) = 6.65, p = .01.  As in study 1, 
a sizable minority of participants in the 25-year-old condition did not accurately identify 
the defendant’s age, which may have affected their decision making in the remainder of 
the study.  The discussion section addresses this limitation more fully.  
 Defendant race.  With regard to participants’ responses to the question on the 
demographics questionnaire about the defendant’s race, of 367 participants, 189 (51.5%) 
indicated that they thought the defendant was White, 51 (13.9%) indicated that they 
thought the defendant was Black, and 127 (34.6%) indicated that they did not know, or 
had not thought about the race of the defendant.  Of the 185 participants in the16-year-old 
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defendant condition, 91 (49.2%) indicated that the defendant was White, 28 (15.1%) 
indicated that the defendant was Black, and 66 (35.7%) indicated that they did not know 
what the race of the defendant was.  Of the 182 participants in the 25-year-old defendant 
condition, 98 (53.8%) indicated that the defendant was White, 23 (12.6%) indicated that 
the defendant was Black, and 61 (33.5%) indicated that they did not know the race of the 
defendant. 
Pretrial bias measures.  A summed score for the 17 items that make up the JBS 
scale resulted in scale values ranging from 23 to 77 (scores can range from 17 to 85), 
with a mean of 53.27 (SD = 7.68) and a median of 54.  The internal consistency 
(coefficient alpha) for this scale was .66.  Summed scores for the 18 items constituting 
the three subscales of the PJAQ ranged from 18 to 81 (scores can range from 18 to 90), 
with a mean of 56.45 (SD = 10.41) and a median of 56.  The internal consistency for this 
scale was .83.  For both measures, higher scores indicate greater prosecution and 
conviction bias, while lower scores indicate greater defense bias.  The analyses that 
follow make use of the PJAQ and not the JBS because the reliability of the PJAQ was 
much higher.  
Stereotyping measure.  Factor analysis of the stereotype items in study 1 
provided two distinct stereotype factors.  Male participants rated one of the factors 
significantly higher for juveniles tried as adults compared to adult defendants.  Analyses 
with these stereotype factors provided the most concise evidence of a stereotype of 
juveniles transferred to criminal court.  For this reason, the stereotype subscales in study 
2 averaged the same items that resulted from the study 1 factor analysis.  The subscales 
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both demonstrated more than adequate internal consistency (Chronic Predator,  = .93; 
Antisocial,  = .91), therefore the main analyses make use of these factors.   
Attrition.  Of the 471 participants who completed the first phase of study 2, 393 
(83.4%) of those completed the second phase as well, with 78 (16.6%) participants 
dropping out of the study between phases 1 and 2.  To identify which participants 
dropped out of the study before phase 2 I created a new variable in which those 
participants who completed both phases of the study were coded as zero and those who 
only completed phase 1 were coded as one.  To examine any significant differences in 
pretrial bias scores and stereotyping scores among participants who did and did not 
complete the second phase of the study, I submitted the phase one data for all participants 
to a one-way ANOVA, with the new variable as the between subjects variable and 
pretrial bias and both stereotype subscales as the dependent variables.  There were no 
significant differences between those participants who did and did not complete phase 2 
of the study for pretrial bias, F(1, 469) = .31, p = .58, p2 = .001, the Chronic Predator 
subscale, F(1, 469) = .093, p = .76, p2 = .000, or the Antisocial subscale, F(1, 469) = .17, 
p = .68, p2 = .000.  
Completion time. The average completion time for phase 1 of study 2 was 16 
minutes and 53 seconds, with a standard deviation of 30 minutes and 40 seconds.  The 
average completion time for phase 2 of study 2 was 38 minutes and 4 seconds, with a 
standard deviation of 37 minutes and 46 seconds. 
Emotion manipulation checks.  ANOVAs with each of the relevant self-reported 
emotions (anger, fear, sadness) as dependent variables, with manipulated emotion as the 
independent variable tested the effect of the emotion manipulations for the first measure 
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of emotion just after the manipulation, and for the second measure at the end of the trial.  
For the first manipulation check, there were significant main effects of manipulated 
emotion on each of the relevant self-reported emotions: anger F(3, 363) = 28.49, p < 
.001, p2 = .19; sadness F(3, 363) = 26.48, p < .001, p2 = .18; fear F(3, 363) = 9.63, p < 
.001, p2 = .07.  Post-hoc tests using the LSD method (p < .05) showed that participants 
in the anger condition (M = 4.96, SD = 2.52) demonstrated significantly greater self-
reported anger than did participants in the sadness (M = 3.55, SD = 2.44), fear (M = 2.99, 
SD = 2.21), and neutral (M = 1.83, SD = 1.70) conditions.  Furthermore, those in the 
sadness condition (M = 5.74, SD = 2.59) demonstrated greater self-reported sadness than 
did those in the anger (M = 4.52, SD = 2.65), fear (M = 3.97, SD = 2.78), and neutral (M 
= 2.37, SD = 1.94) conditions.  Finally, participants in the fear condition (M = 4.03, SD = 
2.62) demonstrated greater self-reported fear than those in the anger (M = 2.97, SD = 
2.52), sadness (M = 3.55, SD = 2.65), and neutral (M = 2.07, SD = 1.87) conditions. 
The same analyses performed on the relevant self-reported emotions provided at 
the second manipulation check, after participants had determined the appropriate verdict 
for the defendant, showed significant main effects for manipulated emotion on each of 
the relevant self-reported emotions: anger F(3, 363) = 4.52, p < .01, p2 = .04; sadness 
F(3, 363) = 3.89, p = .01, p2 = .03; fear F(3, 363) = 3.01, p = .03, p2 = .02.  Post-hoc 
tests using the LSD method (p < .05) showed that participants in the anger condition (M = 
3.73, SD = 2.39) demonstrated significantly greater self-reported anger than did 
participants in the neutral condition (M = 2.49, SD = 2.11).  There were no significant 
differences in self-reported anger between those in the anger condition and those in the 
sadness (M = 3.48, SD = 2.41) and fear (M = 3.58, SD = 2.46) conditions.  Those 
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participants in the sadness condition (M = 4.59, SD = 2.47) demonstrated greater self-
reported sadness than did those in the neutral condition (M = 3.40, SD = 2.35).  
Participants in the fear (M = 4.33, SD = 2.64) and anger (M = 4.52, SD = 2.57) conditions 
did not show any significant differences in self-reported sadness compares to those in the 
sadness condition.  Participants in the fear condition (M = 3.35, SD = 2.62) demonstrated 
greater self-reported fear than those in the sadness (M = 2.65, SD = 2.05) and neutral (M 
= 2.37, SD = 2.01) conditions.  There was not a significant difference in self-reported fear 
for those in the anger condition (M = 3.05, SD = 2.41) compared to those in the fear 
condition.  It is not surprising that participants would experience a variety of negative 
emotions after reading the trial summary.  However, it was most important for 
participants to experience the manipulated emotions before they read the trial summary, 
as appraisals associated with emotions affect how individuals remember and interpret 
information.  Therefore the fact that participants experienced other emotions after reading 
the trial summary does not mean that the emotion manipulation was ineffective, rather the 
results of the first manipulation check show that it was effective at the point in time when 
it was most important for participants to experience those negative emotions.   
Effects of emotion on certainty and control appraisals.  Several one-way 
ANOVAs tested whether manipulated emotions affected participants’ certainty and 
control appraisals as cognitive appraisal theory would predict.  For the certainty 
measures, higher scores indicated greater certainty while lower scores indicated greater 
uncertainty.  For the control measures, higher scores indicated individual control and 
lower scores indicated situational control (due to the poor internal consistency of the 
certainty items and control items they could not be averaged and used as a scale).  A one-
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way ANOVA using manipulated emotion as the independent variable and the first 
certainty measure (In the events that you described on the previous pages, how well did 
you understand what was happening in those situations?) as the dependent variable, 
showed some of the expected differences among the manipulated emotions, F(3, 363) = 
14.85, p < .001, p2 = .11.  Post-hoc tests using the LSD method (p < .05) revealed that 
those in the anger condition (M = 7.45, SD = 1.91) demonstrated significantly higher 
ratings of event certainty compared to those participants in the fear condition (M = 6.84, 
SD = 2.08).  Those in the fear condition indicated significantly less certainty than those in 
all three other emotion conditions (sadness, M = 7.36, SD = 2.05; neutral, M = 8.69, SD = 
.59).  Furthermore, those in the neutral condition indicated significantly higher ratings of 
certainty than did participants in all three other emotion conditions.  There was not a 
significant difference in certainty among those in the anger and sadness conditions.   
Reverse coding the second certainty appraisal item (how uncertain were you 
about what would happen…), and using it as a dependent variable in the same ANOVA 
as above produced a significant effect for emotion, F(3, 363) = 21.05, p < .001, p2 = .15.  
Post-hoc tests using the LSD method demonstrated a pattern of effects identical to those 
above (anger, M = 4.62, SD = 2.20; sadness, M = 4.52, SD = 2.50; fear, M = 3.32, SD = 
2.21; neutral, M = 6.24, SD = 2.45).  A third ANOVA examined the effect of emotion on 
the third certainty item (In the events that you described on the previous pages, how well 
could you typically predict what was going to happen next?).  The effect of emotion was 
significant, F(3, 363) = 20.74, p < .001, p2 = .15, and post-hoc tests revealed a slightly 
different pattern of effects than those found for the other two certainty items.  Those in 
the anger condition (M = 5.76, SD = 2.32) indicated significantly greater certainty than 
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those in the sadness (M = 4.40, SD = 2.59) and fear (M = 4.27, SD = 2.53) conditions, 
while those in the neutral condition (M = 6.72, SD = 1.82) indicated greater certainty than 
those in all three other conditions.  There was not a significant difference in certainty 
appraisals among those in the sadness and fear conditions.   
Next, several one-way ANOVAs examined the effects of manipulated emotion on 
each of the three items measuring control appraisals.  For the first item (In the events that 
you described on the previous pages, to what extent did you typically feel that someone 
other than yourself had the ability to influence what was happening?), the ANOVA 
showed a significant effect for emotion, F(3, 363) = 12.17, p < .001.  Post-hoc tests 
demonstrated the expected pattern of effects, with participants in the anger condition (M 
= 7.22, SD = 1.99) demonstrating significantly higher ratings of individual control (as 
opposed to situational control) compared to those in the sadness (M = 5.66, SD = 2.94), 
fear (M = 5.67, SD = 2.79), and neutral (M = 4.95, SD = 2.70) conditions.  There were no 
other significant differences among the emotion conditions.   
The next ANOVA examined the effect of emotion on the second control appraisal 
item (In the events that you described on the previous pages, to what extent did you 
typically feel that someone else was to blame for what was happening in the situation?), 
and again found a significant effect for emotion, F(3, 363) = 57.52, p < .001.  As seen 
above, those in the anger condition (M = 7.59, SD = 1.82) indicated higher ratings of 
individual control than did those in the sadness (M = 5.10, SD = 2.95), fear (M = 4.75, SD 
= 2.93), and neutral (M = 2.53, SD = 2.22) conditions.  Furthermore, those in the neutral 
condition indicated lower ratings of individual control than did those in all three other 
emotion conditions.  There were no significant differences in control appraisals for those 
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in the sadness and fear conditions.  The final ANOVA used the third control appraisal 
measure as the dependent variable (In the events that you described on the previous 
pages, to what extent were the events beyond anyone’s control?), and again found a 
significant effect for emotion, F(3, 363) = 25.52, p < .001.  Post-hoc tests revealed a very 
different pattern of effects compared to those for the other control measures.  Participants 
in the sadness condition (M = 5.55, SD = 2.88) demonstrated higher ratings of individual 
control than did those in the anger (M = 3.83, SD = 2.60) and neutral (M = 3.32, SD = 
2.23) conditions. Those in the fear condition (M = 6.16, SD = 2.10) indicated greater 
individual control than did those in the anger and neutral conditions.   
Verdict analyses. 
 Guilty versus not guilty verdicts.  Overall, 176 (48.0%) participants did not find 
the defendant guilty of any charge, while 191 (52.0%) participants found the defendant 
guilty of at least one charge.  Within the 16-year-old defendant condition, 91 (49.2%) 
participants did not find the defendant guilty of any charge, and 94 (50.8%) participants 
found the defendant guilty of at least one charge.  Within the 25-year-old defendant 
condition, 85 (46.7%) participants did not find the defendant guilty of any charge, while 
97 (53.3%) participants found the defendant guilty of at least one charge (see Table 3 for 
further breakdowns of all verdicts by charge type, defendant age condition, and emotion 
condition).   
First, a forced entry binary logistic regression treated guilty/not guilty verdicts 
collapsed across all three charges as the dependent variable.  The predictor variables were 
defendant age, three dummy variables representing the different manipulated emotions 
(in this analysis and the following verdict analyses emotion was dummy coded using the 
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neutral condition as the reference group), juror pretrial bias, both stereotype subscales, 
and a number of two-way and three-way interaction terms stemming from the 
hypotheses.1  Standardized pretrial bias and stereotype subscale scores replaced raw 
scores to increase the interpretability of the resulting Beta weights.  The model was 
significant, 2(21, N = 367) = 52.15, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .18, and correctly 
predicted 60.8% (n = 107) of the not guilty verdicts and 69.6% (n = 133) of the guilty 
verdicts, for an overall accuracy of 65.4%.  There were a number of significant predictors 
of guilt.  Table 4 shows the logistic regression coefficient, Wald test, and odds ratio for 
each of the predictors.  Defendant age, two of the emotion dummy variables, the Chronic 
Predator subscale, and two of the two-way interactions (sadness by defendant age and 
fear by defendant age) significantly predicted verdicts collapsed across the three charge 
types.  When holding all other variables constant, participants in the 16-year-old 
defendant condition were more likely to find the defendant guilty of at least one charge 
compared to those in the 25-year-old defendant condition.2  Participants in the anger and 
sadness conditions were both more likely to find the defendant guilty of at least one 
charge compared to those participants in the neutral condition.  Furthermore, as scores on 
the Chronic Predator subscale increased, participants were more likely to find the 
defendant guilty of at least one charge.   
A binary logistic regression using only the data from the 16-year-old defendant 
condition served as simple effects analyses for the two-way interactions between the 
sadness dummy variable and defendant age and the fear dummy variable and defendant 
age.  Serving as predictors were the three emotion dummy variables, pretrial bias, both 
stereotype subscales, and several two-way interaction terms with guilt as the dependent 
88 
variable.  The model was significant, 2(15, N = 185) = 26.46, p = .03, Nagelkerke R2 = 
.18, and correctly predicted 63.7% (n = 58) of the not guilty verdicts and 68.1% (n = 64) 
of the guilty verdicts, for an overall accuracy of 65.9%.  However, there were no 
significant predictors of verdicts (see Table 5).   
The same logistic regression using only data from the 25-year-old condition also 
yielded a significant overall model, 2(15, N = 182) = 32.48, p = .01, Nagelkerke R2 = .22, 
and correctly predicted 62.4% (n = 53) of the not guilty verdicts and 70.1% (n = 68) of 
the guilty verdicts, for an overall accuracy of 66.5%.  Furthermore, the dummy variables 
for anger and sadness both significantly predicted verdicts.  Those in the anger condition 
were four times more likely to find the defendant guilty of at least one charge compared 
to those in the neutral condition, and those in the sadness condition were nearly three and 
a half times more likely to find the defendant guilty of at least one charge compared to 
those in the neutral condition (see Table 5).    
The next logistic regression analysis took apart the interactions in the opposite 
direction, testing the effects of defendant age within each emotion condition by first 
including only the data for those participants in the sadness condition.  Predictors were 
the defendant age dummy variable, pretrial bias, both stereotype subscales, and several 
two-way interaction terms, with guilt as the dependent variable.  The model was 
significant, 2(7, N = 105) = 17.71, p = .01, Nagelkerke R2 = .21, and correctly predicted 
63.5% (n = 33) of the not guilty verdicts and 69.8% (n = 37) of the guilty verdicts, for an 
overall accuracy of 66.7%.  Chronic Predator was the only significant predictor of 
verdicts (see Table 6), such that as scores on the Chronic Predator subscale increased 
participants were more likely to find the defendant guilty of at least one charge.  Next, 
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selecting the data for those participants in the fear condition produced a non-significant 
model, 2(7, N = 88) = 11.30, p = .13, Nagelkerke R2 = .16, and correctly predicted 65.2% 
(n = 30) of the not guilty verdicts and 57.1% (n = 24) of the guilty verdicts, for an overall 
accuracy of 61.4% (see Table 6). 
First-degree murder verdicts.  For the question asking whether the defendant was 
guilty of first-degree murder, guilty verdicts were coded 1 and not guilty verdicts 0.  
Overall, 271 (73.8%) participants indicated that the defendant was not guilty of first-
degree murder, and 96 (26.2%) participants indicated that the defendant was guilty of 
first-degree murder.  Of those participants in the 16-year-old condition, 136 (73.5%) 
found the defendant not guilty, and 49 (26.5%) found him guilty of first-degree-murder.  
Of those in the 25-year-old condition, 135 (74.2%) found the defendant not guilty, and 47 
(25.8%) found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder.   
Predictor variables in the binary logistic regression analysis of these data were 
defendant age, the three dummy variables representing each manipulated emotion, 
pretrial bias, both stereotype subscales, and several two-way and three-way interaction 
terms predicting first-degree murder guilty/not guilty verdicts.  For pretrial bias and the 
stereotype subscales, the standardized scores served as continuous measures as in the 
verdict analyses above.  The model was significant, 2(21, N = 367) = 53.69, p < .001, 
Nagelkerke R2 = .20, and correctly predicted 95.6% (n = 259) of the not guilty verdicts 
and 25.0% (n = 24) of the guilty verdicts, for an overall accuracy of 77.1%.  Defendant 
age, all three of the emotion dummy variables, and all three of the two-way interactions 
between defendant age and emotion significantly predicted first-degree murder verdicts 
(see Table 7).  Holding all other variables constant, participants in the 16-year-old 
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defendant condition were more likely to find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder 
compared to those in the 25-year-old defendant condition.3  Participants in the anger, 
sadness, and fear conditions were all more likely to find the defendant guilty of first-
degree murder than those participants in the neutral condition.   
Using the same simple effect analysis strategy as above, a binary logistic 
regression with the three emotion dummy variables, pretrial bias, both stereotype 
subscales, and several two-way interaction terms as the predictors treated first-degree 
murder guilt as the dependent variable.  Using data from only the 16-year-old defendant 
condition, the model was nearly significant, 2(15, N = 185) = 24.50, p = .06, Nagelkerke 
R2 = .18, and correctly predicted 97.1% (n = 132) of the not guilty verdicts but only 
18.4% (n = 9) of the guilty verdicts, for an overall accuracy of 76.2%.  (See Table 8 for 
regression coefficients, Wald tests, and odds ratios for each predictor).  However, none of 
the variables significantly predicted first-degree murder verdicts.  For the 25-year-old 
defendant, the model was significant, 2(15, N = 182) = 49.19, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = 
.35, and correctly predicted 94.8% (n = 128) of the not guilty verdicts and 40.4% (n = 19) 
of the guilty verdicts, for an overall accuracy of 80.8%.  The dummy variables for anger 
and sadness both significantly predicted verdicts.  Those in the anger condition were 13 
times more likely to find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder compared to those in 
the neutral emotion condition, and those in the sadness condition were more than eight 
and a half times more likely to have found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder 
compared to those in the neutral condition (see Table 8).     
The next model, which used only the participants in the anger condition and a 
similar regression to test the effects of defendant age included as predictors the defendant 
91 
age dummy variable, pretrial bias, both stereotype subscales, and several two-way 
interaction terms, and first-degree murder verdict as the dependent variable.  The model 
was significant, 2(7, N = 99) = 15.74, p = .03, Nagelkerke R2 = .21, and correctly 
predicted 94.3% (n = 66) of the not guilty verdicts and 24.1% (n = 7) of the guilty 
verdicts, for an overall accuracy of 73.7%.  However, none of the variables significantly 
predicted first-degree murder verdicts (see Table 9).   
The same model using only the participants in the sadness condition was 
significant, 2(7, N = 105) = 16.83, p = .02, Nagelkerke R2 = .22, and correctly predicted 
94.9% (n = 75) of the not guilty verdicts and 23.1% (n = 6) of the guilty verdicts, for an 
overall accuracy of 77.1%.  Pretrial bias was the only significant predictor of verdicts 
(see Table 9), such that as scores on the pretrial bias measure increased, participants were 
more likely to find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder.   
Finally, the logistic regression examining participants in the fear condition was 
significant, 2(7, N = 88) = 23.91, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .34, and correctly predicted 
95.2% (n = 59) of the not guilty verdicts and 46.2% (n = 12) of the guilty verdicts, for an 
overall accuracy of 80.7%.  Pretrial bias significantly predicted verdicts, such that as 
pretrial bias scores increased (indicating greater prosecution bias), participants were more 
likely to find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder (see Table 9).  Furthermore, the 
interaction between defendant age and pretrial bias was significant.  Examination of the 
correlations between first-degree murder verdicts and pretrial bias scores within each 
defendant age condition (among those participants in the fear condition) revealed a non-
significant correlation within the 16-year-old condition, r(38) = -.02, p = .89, but a 
significant correlation within the 25-year-old condition, r(46) = .52, p < .001.  
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Participants made to feel fearful, who read about the 25-year-old defendant, were more 
likely to find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder as their scores on the pretrial 
bias measure increased (indicating greater prosecution bias).   
Second-degree murder verdicts.  Overall, 263 (71.7%) participants indicated that 
the defendant was not guilty of second-degree-murder, while 104 (28.3%) indicated that 
he was guilty.  Within the 16-year-old condition, 136 (73.5%) did not find the defendant 
guilty, while 49 (26.5%) did find the defendant guilty of second-degree-murder.  Within 
the 25-year-old condition, 127 (69.8%) did not find the defendant guilty of second-degree 
murder while 55 (30.2%) did.   
Predictor variables in the binary logistic regression analysis of these data were 
defendant age, the three dummy variables representing each manipulated emotion, 
pretrial bias, both stereotype subscales, and several two-way and three-way interaction 
terms predicting second-degree murder guilty/not guilty verdicts.  For pretrial bias and 
the stereotype subscales, the standardized scores served as continuous measures as in the 
verdict analyses above.  The model was significant, 2(21, N = 367) = 34.09, p = .04, 
Nagelkerke R2 = .13, and correctly predicted 94.3% (n = 248) of the not guilty verdicts 
and 17.3% (n = 18) of the guilty verdicts, for an overall accuracy of 72.5%.  Only one of 
the predictors, Chronic Predator, was significant (see Table 10).  As participants’ scores 
on the Chronic Predator subscale increased, they were more likely to find the defendant 
guilty of second-degree murder.   
Manslaughter verdicts.  For manslaughter verdicts, 266 (72.5%) participants 
found the defendant not guilty, while 101 (27.5%) found him guilty of manslaughter.  Of 
those in the 16-year-old condition, 136 (73.5%) found the defendant not guilty, and 49 
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(26.5%) found him guilty of manslaughter.  Of those in the 25-year-old condition, 130 
(71.4%) found the defendant not guilty, and 52 (28.6%) found him guilty of 
manslaughter.   
Analysis using the same logistic regression as above, but with manslaughter 
guilty/not guilty verdicts as the dependent variable, produced a significant model, 2(21, 
N = 367) = 40.22, p = .01, Nagelkerke R2 = .15.  The model correctly predicted 94.7% (n 
= 252) of the not guilty verdicts and 14.9% (n = 15) of the guilty verdicts, for an overall 
accuracy of 72.8%.  Both stereotype subscales significantly predicted manslaughter 
verdicts, such that as scores on the Chronic Predator subscale increased, participants were 
more likely to find the defendant guilty of manslaughter, but as scores on the Antisocial 
subscale decreased, participants were more likely to find the defendant guilty of 
manslaughter (see Table 11).   
Verdict certainty ratings. 
First-degree murder guilt certainty.  The first step in creating a verdict certainty 
variable was to code guilty verdicts as 1 and not guilty verdicts as -1 for each charge.  
Multiplying each participant’s recoded guilty/not guilty verdict by their certainty in that 
verdict produced guilt certainty scores that ranged from -9 to 9, with -9 indicating the 
participant was very certain in a not guilty verdict, and 9 indicating that the participant 
was very certain in a guilty verdict.  A 4 (emotion: anger, sadness, fear, neutral) x 2 
(defendant age: 16-juvenile, 25-adult) ANCOVA with pretrial bias and both stereotype 
subscales as covariates, and first-degree murder verdict certainty as the dependent 
variable, tested the hypothesized main effects and interactions.  First, there was a 
significant main effect for defendant age, F(1, 335) = 7.21, p = .01, p2 = .02, such that 
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participants were less certain in a not guilty verdict for the 16-year-old defendant 
(estimated marginal mean = -2.53, SE = .46) than they were for the adult defendant 
(estimated marginal mean = -2.73, SE = .47).4  There was also a significant main effect 
for pretrial bias, F(1, 335) = 11.10, p = .001, p2 = .03 (see Table 12 for all F-tests).  A 
positive correlation between pretrial bias and first-degree murder guilt certainty indicated 
that as scores on the PJAQ increased, indicating greater prosecution bias, the more 
certain participants were in a guilty first-degree murder verdict, r(365) = .26, p < .001.   
Furthermore, there was a significant interaction between defendant age and 
pretrial bias, F(1, 335) = 6.59, p = .01, p2 = .02.  Follow-up correlations examining the 
relationship between pretrial bias and verdict certainty within each defendant age 
condition showed that there was a significant correlation between pretrial bias and verdict 
certainty only within the 25-year-old defendant condition, r(180) = .40, p < .001.  As 
pretrial bias scores increased, indicating greater prosecution bias, certainty in a first-
degree murder verdict increased for those who read about the 25-year-old defendant.  The 
relationship between pretrial bias and verdict certainty within the 16-year-old condition 
was not significant, r(183) = .13, p = .08.   
Second-degree murder guilt certainty.  Making use of the same ANCOVA 
approach for certainty in a second-degree murder guilty verdict produced a nearly 
significant effect for emotion, F(3, 335) = 2.53, p = .06, p2 = .02, however, follow-up 
tests using the LSD method did not demonstrate any significant differences in verdict 
certainty among the four emotion conditions.  There was also a significant main effect for 
pretrial bias, F(1, 335) = 8.78, p < .01, p2 = .03, such that as pretrial bias increased, 
certainty in a second-degree murder verdict increased, r(365) = .21, p < .001.  Finally, 
95 
there was a significant main effect for Chronic Predator, F(1, 335) = 3.84, p = .05, p2 = 
.01, such that as scores on the Chronic Predator subscale increased, participants were 
more certain in a second-degree murder guilty verdict, r(365) = .20, p < .001.  None of 
the other effects were significant (see Table 13 for F-tests).   
Manslaughter guilt certainty.  For certainty in a manslaughter guilty verdict, 
there was again a significant effect for pretrial bias, F(1, 335) = 7.66, p = .01, p2 = .02, 
such that as pretrial bias increased, certainty in a manslaughter verdict increased, r(365) = 
.18, p = .001.  The main effect of Chronic Predator was also significant, F(1, 335) = 4.42, 
p = .04, p2 = .01, such that as scores on the Chronic Predator subscale increased, 
participants indicated greater certainty in a manslaughter guilty verdict, r(365) = .18, p = 
.001.  Finally, there was a nearly significant interaction between emotion and defendant 
age, F(3, 335) = 2.53, p = .06, p2 = .02 (see Table 14 for all F-tests).  A follow-up 
ANCOVA using only data from those in the 16-year-old condition revealed a non-
significant effect for emotion, F(3, 169) = 2.05, p = .11, p2 = .04.  The same ANCOVA 
performed on the data from those participants in the 25-year-old condition also failed to 
reveal a significant effect for emotion, F(3, 166) = 2.11, p = .10, p2 = .04.  Reversing the 
simple effects test to examine further the interaction between emotion and defendant age, 
resulted in an ANCOVA examining the effects of defendant age, pretrial bias, both 
stereotype subscales, and several two-way interactions on manslaughter guilt certainty 
within the anger condition.  The main effect for defendant age was not significant, F(1, 
91) = 2.95, p = .09, p2 = .03.  The same analysis conducted with participants in the 
sadness condition failed to produce a significant effect for defendant age, F(1, 97) = 3.05, 
p = .08, p2 = .03, as did the analysis with participants in the neutral condition, F(1, 67) = 
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.95, p = .33, p2 = .01.  The ANCOVA using data from those in the fear condition 
revealed a non-significant main effect for defendant age, F(1, 80) = .94, p = .34, p2 = 
.01.    
Standard of proof ratings. 
Standard of proof analyses.  The same 4 (emotion: anger, sadness, fear, neutral) 
x 2 (defendant age: 16-juvenile, 25-adult) ANCOVA with pretrial bias and both 
stereotype subscales as covariates used standard of proof as the dependant variable 
instead of the verdict certainty measure.  Responses on the standard of proof item could 
range from 1 to 100 percent.  There was a significant main effect for the Chronic Predator 
subscale, F(1, 331) = 4.83, p = .03, p2 = .01, however, a follow-up correlation between 
Chronic Predator and standard of proof was non-significant, r(361) = -.09, p = .11.  There 
were also significant two-way interactions between defendant age and the Chronic 
Predator subscale (F(1, 331) = 7.29, p = .01, p2 = .02), and defendant age and the 
Antisocial subscale (F(1, 331) = 6.46, p = .01, p2 = .02).  There were no other significant 
main effects or interactions (see Table 15 for F-tests).  Follow-up correlations between 
standard of proof and both stereotype subscales within each defendant age condition were 
not significant (16-year-old defendant condition, r(182) = -.06, p = .42Chronic Predator, r(182) 
= -.08, p = .27Antisocial; 25-year-old defendant condition, r(177) = -.11, p = .14Chronic Predator, 
r(177) = .04, p = .61Antisocial).   
Mediation analyses.  
  Overview.  According to cognitive appraisal theory (Smith et al., 2006; Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985; Lazarus, 1991; Frijda, 1987; Roseman, 1984, 1991; Scherer, 1984) 
specific emotions give rise to different patterns of cognitive appraisals.  People feeling 
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angry are likely to experience high levels of certainty and attribute high levels of person-
centered control (as opposed to situational control) when judging the causes of social 
events.  At the same time, people feeling fear and to a lesser extent sadness are likely to 
experience low levels of certainty and high levels of situational control.  Therefore, angry 
(as opposed to fearful, sad, or neutral) mock jurors should feel more certain about the 
guilt of offenders, especially juveniles tried as adults, and because of that certainty should 
be more likely to find them guilty of homicide charges.  Thus, the hypothesized causal 
chain involving anger was that manipulated anger (as compared to a neutral emotion) 
would produce high levels of certainty and personal control, which in turn would result in 
greater likelihood of guilty verdicts overall and a higher likelihood of guilty verdicts for 
specific charges.  The hypothesized causal chain involving fear (and to a lesser extent 
sadness)  was that manipulated fear or sadness (as compared to a neutral emotion) would 
produce lower levels of certainty and higher levels of situational control, which in turn 
would result in a lower likelihood of guilty verdicts overall and a lower likelihood of 
guilty verdicts for specific charges.  
One standard method of examining whether measures purported to be part of a 
causal chain mediate the relationships between earlier and later constructs in that 
purported chain follows the Barron and Kenny (1986) approach.  In this case, 
manipulated anger should produce a greater number of guilty verdicts (path C).  There 
should also be a positive association between manipulated anger and certainty (path A) 
and between manipulated anger and personal control (path A), and a positive association 
between certainty and guilty verdicts and personal control and guilty verdicts (path B).  
Finally, when statistical analyses account for certainty and personal control as measured 
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covariates, the relationship between anger and guilty verdicts should attenuate (path C).  
Similarly, manipulated fear, and to a lesser extent sadness, should produce fewer guilty 
verdicts (path C), should produce lower levels of certainty (path A), and lower levels of 
personal control (i.e., higher levels of situational control) (path A).  Again, when 
statistical analyses account for certainty and situational control as measured covariates, 
the relationship between fear or sadness and guilty verdicts should attenuate (path C).  
Mediation analyses for certainty on overall guilty/not guilty verdicts.  The test of 
whether appraisals of certainty mediated the effects of emotions on judgments of guilt 
collapsed across all three charge types consisted of three separate mediation analyses, 
each one using one of the three certainty items completed at the beginning of the study as 
a mediator.   
For the first certainty item (In the events that you described on the previous 
pages, how well did you understand what was happening in those situations?), a linear 
regression with the three emotion dummy codes (each using the neutral condition as the 
reference group) predicting certainty appraisals yielded significant negative effects for all 
three emotions, Banger=-1.24, p<.001, Bsadness=-1.33, p<.001, Bfear=-1.85, p<.001 
(path A).  Next, a logistic regression with the three emotion dummy codes predicting 
guilty/not guilty verdicts revealed a significant effect for anger only, Banger=.70, p=.02, 
Bsadness=.21, p=.50, Bfear=.10, p=.76.  Finally, a logistic regression using the three 
emotion dummy codes and certainty as the predictors and guilty/not guilty verdicts as the 
dependent variable produced estimates of paths B and C.  Anger (path C) significantly 
predicted verdict (B = .70, p = .03) while certainty (path B) did not (B = .000, p = .99), 
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indicating that the first certainty item did not mediate the influence of any of the 
manipulated emotions on guilty/not guilty verdicts.   
The mediation analysis for the second certainty item (In the events that you 
described on the previous pages, how uncertain were you about what would happen in 
various situations?) was similar.  Calculation of path A showed that all three of the 
emotion dummy codes significantly predicted certainty, Banger=-1.62, p<.001, Bsadness=-
1.72, p<.001, Bfear=-2.92, p<.001.  Path C was the same as above, showing that only 
anger significantly predicted verdicts, Banger=.70, p=.02, Bsadness=.21, p=.50, 
Bfear=.10, p=.76.  Calculation of paths B and C’ showed that certainty did not 
significantly predict verdict (B = -.07, p = .14) and anger had only a nearly significant 
effect on verdict (B = .60, p = .06), demonstrating that the second certainty item did not 
mediate the influence of any of the manipulated emotions on verdicts.   
Mediation for the third certainty item (In the events that you described on the 
previous pages, how well could you typically predict what was going to happen next?) 
proceeded in the same way.  Calculation of path A showed that all three emotion dummy 
codes significantly predicted certainty, Banger=-.96, p=.01, Bsadness=-2.32, p<.001, 
Bfear=-2.45, p<.001.  Path C was the same as above, showing that only anger 
significantly predicted verdicts, Banger=.70, p=.02, Bsadness=.21, p=.50, 
Bfear=.10, p=.76.  Finally, calculation of paths B and C revealed that certainty did not 
significantly predict verdicts (B = .05, p = .27) while anger did (B = .75, p = .02), 
showing that the third certainty item did not mediate the influence of any of the 
manipulated emotions on verdicts.   
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Mediation analyses for certainty on overall guilty/not guilty verdicts (25-year-
old condition).  In the main analyses, emotion significantly predicted verdicts for those 
who read about the 25-year-old defendant.  Therefore, the same three mediation analyses 
as above examined whether certainty mediated the effects of emotion on guilty/not guilty 
verdicts for only those in the 25-year-old defendant condition.  A linear regression with 
the three emotion dummy codes predicting certainty appraisals (for the first certainty 
item) yielded significant negative effects for all three dummy codes, Banger=-.92, p=.03, 
Bsadness=-1.35, p=.001, Bfear=-1.82, p<.001 (path A).  Next, a logistic regression using 
the three emotion dummy codes to predict guilty/not guilty verdicts showed significant 
effects for anger, Banger=1.18, p=.01, and sadness, Bsadness=1.03, p=.02, but not fear, 
Bfear=.70, p=.11.  Finally, a logistic regression with the three emotion dummy codes and 
certainty predicting guilty/not guilty verdicts produced estimates of paths B and C.  
Anger and sadness (path C) significantly predicted verdicts (Banger = 1.26, p = .01; Bsadness 
= 1.14, p = .01), fear had a nearly significant effect on verdicts (B = .85, p = .07), and 
certainty (path B) did not significantly predict verdicts (B = .08, p = .31).  The first 
certainty item did not mediate the influence of any of the manipulated emotions on 
guilty/not guilty verdicts for those participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition.  
For the second certainty item, a linear regression using the three emotion dummy 
codes to predict certainty appraisals yielded significant negative effects for all three 
emotions, Banger=-1.74, p=.001, Bsadness=-1.88, p<.001, Bfear=-3.03, p<.001 (path A).  
The logistic regression estimating path C showed that both anger and sadness 
significantly predicted verdicts (Banger=1.18, p=.01, Bsadness= 1.03, p=.02) while fear 
did not (Bfear=.70, p=.11).  Finally, calculation of paths B and C showed that certainty 
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had a nearly significant effect on verdict (B = -.12, p = .06) and anger significantly 
predicted verdict (B = .98, p = .04), suggesting that the second certainty item may have 
mediated the influence of manipulated anger on verdicts.  A Sobel test examined whether 
the indirect effect of anger on verdict via certainty appraisals was significantly different 
from zero, but found that the effect was not significant (Sobel test statistic = 1.63, p = 
.10).  Appraisals of certainty measured with the second certainty item did not mediate the 
effect of anger (or sadness and fear) on verdicts for those in the 25-year-old condition.  
Mediation analysis for the third certainty item showed that for path A, sadness 
(B=-2.27, p<.001) and fear (B=-3.00, p<.001) significantly predicted certainty, while 
anger did not, B=-.91, p=.08.  Path C was the same as above, showing that both anger 
and sadness significantly predicted verdicts (Banger=1.18, p=.01, Bsadness= 1.03, p=.02) 
while fear did not (Bfear=.70, p=.11).  The logistic regression calculating paths B and C 
showed that while anger (B = 1.27, p = .01) and sadness (B = 1.24, p = .01) significantly 
predicted verdicts, fear (B = .98, p = .04) and certainty (B = .09, p = .17) did not, 
demonstrating that the third certainty item did not mediate the effect of any of the 
manipulated emotions on verdicts for those in the 25-year-old condition.   
Mediation analyses for certainty on first-degree murder verdicts. Mediation 
analyses for first-degree murder verdicts were identical to those above, using each 
certainty item in a separate analysis.  First, a linear regression with all three emotion 
dummy codes predicting certainty appraisals (measured with the first certainty item) 
indicated that all three emotion dummy codes significantly predicted certainty appraisals 
(Banger=-1.24, p<.001; Bsadness=-1.33, p<.001; Bfear=-1.85, p<.001) (path A).  Next, a 
logistic regression with all three emotion dummy codes predicting first-degree murder 
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verdicts yielded no significant effects on verdicts (Banger=.51, p=.17; 
Bsadness=.28, p=.45; Bfear=.52, p=.16).  The second step of the mediation analysis 
failed; therefore, the first certainty item did not mediate the effect of emotion on verdicts.     
Despite the fact that emotion did have a significant effect on certainty appraisals 
for both the second (Banger=-1.62, p<.001, Bsadness=-1.72, p < .001, Bfear=-
2.92, p<.001) and third (Banger=-.96, p=.01, Bsadness=-2.32, p < .001, Bfear=-
2.45, p<.001) certainty items, because the emotion dummy codes did not significantly 
predict first-degree murder verdicts in the logistic regression above, there could be no 
evidence of certainty mediating the effect of emotion on verdicts.  This finding is 
counterintuitive, because in the main analyses there was a significant effect of emotion on 
first-degree murder verdicts.  It is possible, however, that this occurred because the 
covariates included in the main analyses were not included here.  Furthermore, because 
the effects for emotion were found only among those participants in the 25-year-old 
defendant condition, there could be mediation for only those participants.   
Mediation analyses for certainty on first-degree murder verdicts (25-year-old 
condition).  In the main analyses, the effect of emotion was significant only for those in 
the 25-year-old defendant condition.  Therefore, three mediation analyses examined 
whether certainty mediated the effects of emotion on first-degree murder verdicts for only 
those in the 25-year-old defendant condition.  A linear regression testing the effects of the 
three emotion dummy codes on certainty appraisals (measured with the first certainty 
item), yielded significant negative effects for all three emotions, Banger=-.92, p=.03, 
Bsadness=-1.35, p=.001, Bfear=-1.82, p<.001 (path A).  Next, a logistic regression using 
the three emotion dummy codes to predict first-degree murder verdicts showed 
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significant effects for all three emotions (Banger=1.85, p=.01; Bsadness=1.57, p=.02; 
Bfear=1.72, p=.01).  Finally, a logistic regression using the three emotion dummy codes 
and certainty to predict first-degree murder verdicts produced estimates of paths B and 
C.  Anger, sadness, and fear (path C) significantly predicted verdict (Banger = 2.07, p < 
.01; Bsadness = 1.86, p = .01; Bfear = 2.16, p < .01), as did certainty (path B) (B = .27, p = 
.02).  Sobel tests for each emotion indicated that the first certainty item did not mediate 
the effect of anger on first-degree murder verdicts (Sobel test statistic = -1.63, p = .10); 
however, it did mediate the effect of sadness on first-degree murder verdicts for those in 
the 25-year-old condition (Sobel test statistic = -1.95, p = .05).  Furthermore, certainty 
appraisals from the first certainty item also mediated the effect of fear on first-degree 
murder verdicts for those participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition (Sobel test 
statistic = -2.11, p = .04).   
Mediation analyses for the second certainty item showed that for path A, all three 
emotions significantly predicted certainty (Banger=-1.74, p=.001, Bsadness= -
1.88, p<.001, Bfear=-3.03, p<.001).  Path C was the same as above, with all three 
emotion dummy codes significantly predicting first-degree murder verdicts 
(Banger=1.85, p=.01; Bsadness=1.57, p=.02; Bfear=1.72, p=.01).  A logistic regression 
then examined the effects of emotion and certainty simultaneously on first-degree murder 
verdicts, revealing significant positive effects for anger (B=1.65, p=.02) and sadness 
(B=1.34, p=.05), a nearly significant effect for fear (B=1.34, p=.06), and a non-
significant effect for certainty (B=-.14, p=.09).  The second certainty item did not 
mediate the effect of emotion on first-degree murder verdicts for those participants in the 
25-year-old condition.  
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The same analyses examined mediation for the third certainty item.  A linear 
regression revealed that sadness (B=-.91, p=.08) and fear (B=-2.27, p<.001) both 
significantly predicted certainty appraisals while anger (B=-3.00, p<.001) did not (path 
A).  The logistic regression examining the effects of emotions on first-degree murder 
verdicts showed that all three emotion dummy codes significantly predicted first-degree 
murder verdicts (Banger=1.85, p=.01; Bsadness=1.57, p=.02; Bfear=1.72, p=.01).  
Finally, the logistic regression using the three emotion dummy codes and certainty to 
predict first-degree murder verdicts revealed that anger, sadness, and fear (path C) 
significantly predicted verdicts (Banger = 1.97, p < .01; Bsadness = 1.86, p = .01; Bfear = 2.12, 
p < .01), while certainty (path B) did not (B = .13, p = .08).  For participants in the 25-
year-old defendant condition the third certainty item did not mediate the effect of 
emotion on first-degree murder verdicts.   
Mediation analyses for control on overall guilty/not guilty verdicts.  Mediation 
analyses testing whether appraisals of control mediated the effects of emotion on verdicts 
were identical to those described above.  For the first control item (In the events that you 
described on the previous pages, to what extent did you typically feel that someone other 
than yourself had the ability to influence what was happening?), a linear regression using 
the three emotion dummy codes to predict control appraisals yielded a significant effect 
for anger only (B=2.28, p<.001; Bsadness=.71, p=.07; Bfear=.72, p=.08) (path A).  
Next, a logistic regression using the three emotion dummy codes to predict guilty/not 
guilty verdicts revealed a significant effect for anger (B=.70, p=.02), but not for sadness 
(B=.21, p=.50) or fear (B=.10, p=.76).  Finally, a logistic regression with the three 
emotion dummy codes and control as the predictors and guilty/not guilty verdict as the 
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dependent variable produced estimates of paths B and C.  Anger significantly predicted 
verdict (B = .75, p = .02); however sadness (B = .22, p = .47), fear (B = .11, p = .73), and 
control did not (B = -.02, p = .63), indicating that the first control item did not mediate 
the influence of any of the manipulated emotions on guilty/not guilty verdicts. 
Next, a linear regression used the three emotion dummy codes to predict 
appraisals of control for the second control item (In the events that you described on the 
previous pages, to what extent did you typically feel that someone else was to blame for 
what was happening in the situation?), yielding significant positive effects for all three 
emotions (Banger=5.05, p<.001; Bsadness=2.56, p<.001; Bfear=2.22, p<.001).  As 
shown above, the logistic regression estimating path C revealed a significant effect for 
anger (B=.70, p=.02), but not for sadness (B=.21, p=.50) or fear (B=.10, p=.76).  
Finally, a logistic regression with all three emotion dummy codes and control predicting 
verdicts found a nearly significant effect for anger (B=.70, p=.06), but no other 
significant effects (Bsadness=.21, p=.52; Bfear=.10, p=.77; Bcontrol = .000, p = 1.00).  The 
second control item did not mediate the effect of any of the manipulated emotions on 
verdicts.   
A linear regression examining the effects of the three emotion dummy codes on 
the third control item (In the events that you described on the previous pages, to what 
extent were the events beyond anyone’s control?) yielded significant effects for sadness 
(B=2.23, p<.001) and fear (B=2.84, p<.001) but not for anger (B=.51, p=.19).  
Next, as seen above, the logistic regression examining the effects of each emotion on 
verdicts (path C) demonstrated a significant effect for anger (B=.70, p=.02), but not for 
sadness (B=.21, p=.50) or fear (B=.10, p=.76).  Finally, the logistic regression 
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estimating paths B and C revealed significant effects for anger (B=.66, p=.04) and for 
control (B=.11, p=.01), but not for sadness (B=-.04, p=.89) or for fear (B=-
.22, p=.51).  Unfortunately, because anger did not significantly predict appraisals of 
control in the first step, the steps of mediation were not all satisfied, showing that the 
third control item did not mediate the effects of any of the emotions on verdicts.   
Mediation analyses for control on overall guilty/not guilty verdicts (25-year-old 
condition).  As noted above in the certainty mediation analyses, the effect of emotion was 
strongest among those participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition; therefore, I 
conducted mediation analyses with only those participants in the 25-year-old defendant 
condition in addition to those described above.  For the first control item, the linear 
regression using the emotion dummy codes to predict control appraisals yielded a 
significant effect for anger only (Banger=2.14, p<.001; Bsadness=.78, p=.17; 
Bfear=.15, p=.80) (path A).  Then a logistic regression used the emotion dummy codes 
to predict verdicts, showing significant effects for anger (B=1.18, p=.01) and sadness 
(B=1.03, p=.02) but not fear (B=.70, p=.11) (path C).  The final logistic regression 
revealed significant effects for anger and sadness but not for fear (Banger=1.20, p=.01; 
Bsadness=1.03, p=.02; Bfear=.70, p=.11) (path C) or for control (B=-.01, p=.87) (path 
B).  The first control item did not mediate the effect of emotion on guilty/not guilty 
verdicts for those participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition.  
The linear regression examining the effects of the emotion dummy codes on the 
second control item revealed significant effects for all three emotions 
(Banger=4.70, p<.001; Bsadness=2.70, p<.001; Bfear=1.61, p=.01).  The logistic 
regression estimating path C was the same as above, with significant effects for anger 
107 
(B=1.18, p=.01) and sadness (B=1.03, p=.02) but not for fear (B=.70, p=.11).  Then, 
the final logistic regression using emotion and control to predict guilty/not guilty verdicts 
yielded a significant effect for sadness only (Banger=.96, p=.07; Bsadness=.90, p=.05; 
Bfear=.63, p=.16; Bcontrol = .05, p = .41).  The second control item did not mediate the 
effect of emotion on guilty/not guilty verdicts for participants in the 25-year-old 
defendant condition.   
Mediation analysis for the third control item produced significant effects for 
sadness and fear in a linear regression predicting control appraisals (Banger=.33, p=.56; 
Bsadness=2.17, p<.001; Bfear=2.69, p<.001) (path A).  A logistic regression significant 
effects for anger (B=1.18, p=.01) and sadness (B=1.03, p=.02) but not fear 
(B=.70, p=.11).  Then for last logistic regression significant effect for anger 
(B=1.16, p=.01) and nearly significant effect for sadness (B=.87, p=.06), but effects 
for fear (B=.50, p=.28) and control (B=.08, p=.21) were not significant.  For those 
participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition, the third control item did not mediate 
the effects of manipulated emotion on guilty/not guilty verdicts.  
Mediation analyses for control on first-degree murder verdicts.  For the first 
control item, a linear regression using all three emotion dummy codes to predict control 
appraisals yielded a significant effect for anger (B=2.28, p<.001), but not for sadness 
(B=.71, p=.07) or fear (B=.72, p=.08).  The second step in this mediation analysis, 
examining whether emotion significantly predicted first-degree murder verdicts, was 
identical to the analysis conducted for certainty.  As was shown above, none of the 
emotion dummy codes significantly predicted first-degree murder verdicts, therefore it 
can be concluded that for participants in all conditions, none of the control items 
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mediated the effects of emotion on verdicts.  However, because the effects of emotion 
were strongest among those participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition, the 
following analyses examine whether control mediated the effects of emotion on first-
degree murder verdicts for that group of participants.   
Mediation analyses for control on first-degree murder verdicts (25-year-old 
condition).  Using data from only those participants in the 25-year-old defendant 
condition, a linear regression examining the effects of each emotion dummy code on 
appraisals of control (measured with the first control item) yielded a significant effect for 
anger (B=2.14, p< .001) but not for sadness (B=.78, p=.17) or for fear 
(B=.15, p=.80) (path A).  Next, a logistic regression using all three emotion dummy 
codes to predict first-degree murder verdicts produced significant effects for all three 
emotions (Banger=1.85, p=.01; Bsadness=1.57, p=.02; Bfear=1.72, p=.01) (path C).  
Finally, a logistic regression estimating paths B and C revealed that all three emotions 
significantly predicted verdicts (Banger=1.76, p=.01; Bsadness=1.53, p=.02; 
Bfear=1.72, p=.01) while control did not (B=.05, p=.48).  Therefore, the first control 
item did not mediate the effects of manipulated emotion on first-degree murder verdicts 
for those participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition.  
For the second control item, a linear regression using all three emotion dummy 
codes to predict control appraisals produced significant effects for all three emotions 
(Banger=4.70, p<.001; Bsadness=2.70, p<.001; Bfear=1.61, p=.01).  As shown in the last 
analysis, a logistic regression examining the effects of emotions on first-degree murder 
verdicts yielded significant effects for all three emotions (Banger=1.85, p=.01; 
Bsadness=1.57, p=.02; Bfear=1.72, p=.01).  Then, the final logistic regression using the 
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three emotion dummy codes and control to predict verdicts produced significant effects 
for all three emotions (Banger=1.64, p=.03; Bsadness=1.45, p=.04; Bfear=1.65, p=.02) 
but not for control (B=.05, p=.49).  These results indicate that the second control item 
did not mediate the effect of emotions on first-degree murder verdicts for participants in 
the 25-year-old defendant condition.   
A linear regression using the three emotion dummy codes to predict control 
appraisals (measured with the third control item) revealed significant effects for sadness 
(B=2.17, p< .001) and for fear (B=2.69, p<.001), but not for anger (B=.33, p=.56).  
Then the logistic regression using each emotion to predict verdicts yielded the same 
results as described above, with significant effects for all three emotions 
(Banger=1.85, p=.01; Bsadness=1.57, p=.02; Bfear=1.72, p=.01).  Finally, a logistic 
regression examining the effects of the three emotion dummy codes and control 
simultaneously produced significant effects for all three emotions (Banger=1.83, p=.01; 
Bsadness=1.42, p=.04; Bfear=1.54, p=.03) but not for control (B=.07, p=.29).  The third 
control item did not mediate the effect of any of the emotions on first-degree murder 
verdicts for those participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition.   
Effects of the trial on emotions.  To examine the effects of the trial on 
respondents’ self-reported emotions, I submitted the data for only those participants in 
the neutral emotion condition to a 2 (defendant age: 16-juvenile, 25-adult) x 3 (self-
reported emotion: anger, sadness, fear) x 2 (time of emotion measurement: time 1, time 
2) repeated measures ANOVA, with self-reported emotion and time of emotion 
measurement as the repeated measures.  There was a significant effect for self-reported 
emotion, F(2, 146) = 11.91, p < .001, p2 = .14; however, the interaction between self-
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reported emotion and defendant age was not significant, F(2, 146) = .26, p = .77, p2 = 
.004.  There was also a significant effect for time of emotion measurement, F(1, 73) = 
13.44, p < .001, p2 = .16, and the interaction between time of emotion measurement and 
defendant age was significant, F(1, 73) = 7.09, p = .01, p2 = .09.  Furthermore, the 
interaction between self-reported emotion and time of emotion measurement was 
significant, F(2, 146) = 5.70, p < .01, p2 = .07.  The three-way interaction between self-
reported emotion, time of emotion measurement, and defendant age was not significant, 
F(2, 146) = .57, p = .57, p2 = .01.  
 Several repeated measures ANOVAs examined the interaction between time of 
emotion measurement and defendant age using only data from those who received the 
neutral emotion manipulation and who read about the 16-year-old defendant.  The 
ANOVA examining the change in self-reported anger from time 1 to time 2 was 
significant, F(1, 34) = 13.77, p = .001, p2 = .29, with participants experiencing greater 
anger after reading the trial summary (M = 1.66time 1, M = 3.00time 2).  Self-reported 
sadness also changed significantly from time 1 to time 2, F(1, 34) = 14.86, p < .001, p2 = 
.30, with participants reporting greater sadness after reading about the trial (M = 2.40time 1, 
M = 3.94time 2).  Participants who read about the 16-year-old defendant also reported 
feeling greater fear after reading the trail summary, F(1, 34) = 6.40, p = .02, p2 = .16 (M 
= 2.03time 1, M = 2.77time 2).   
 The same repeated measures ANOVAs using data from neutral participants who 
read about the 25-year-old defendant failed to reveal any significant effects: anger, F(1, 
39) = .09, p = .77, p2 = .002; sadness, F(1, 39) = 2.72, p = .11, p2 = .07; fear, F(1, 39) = 
.08, p = .78, p2 = .002.  Examination of the means for each self-reported emotion at 
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times 1 and 2 showed that among those in the 25-year-old condition levels of each 
emotion remained fairly low, similar to those reported by participants in the 16-year-old 
condition at time 1 (anger, M = 1.98time 1, M = 2.05time 2; sadness, M = 2.35time 1, M = 
2.93time 2; fear, M = 2.10time 1, M = 2.03time 2).  Only the participants in the 16-year-old 
defendant condition experienced increases in each of the three self-reported emotions 
from the time 1 to the time 2 measurement.   
Follow-ups to the interaction between self-reported emotion and time of emotion 
measurement used a series of paired-samples t-tests to examine the differences between 
self-reported anger and sadness, anger and fear, and sadness and fear at each time of 
emotion measurement.  For the time 1 measurement of each self-reported emotion, 
neutral participants reported experiencing significantly more sadness (M = 2.37, SD = 
1.94) than anger (M = 1.83, SD = 1.70), t(74) = -2.42, p = .02.  There were no significant 
differences between self-reported anger and fear (M = 2.07, SD = 1.87), t(74) = -1.40, p = 
.17, or between sadness and fear, t(74) = 1.68, p = .10. 
At the time 2 measurement, neutral participants reported experiencing 
significantly lower levels of anger (M = 2.49, SD = 2.11) compared to sadness (M = 3.40, 
SD = 2.35), t(74) = -4.30, p < .001, and significantly lower levels of fear (M = 2.37, SD = 
2.01) compared to sadness, t(74) = 5.13, p < .001.  There was not a significant difference 
between mean levels of anger and fear, t(74) = .64, p = .53.  These results suggest that 
participants who did not receive a specific emotion manipulation felt greater sadness than 
anger both before and after reading the trial summary, and more sadness than fear after 
reading the trial summary and determining the defendant’s guilt.  It is unclear why 
participants experienced elevated levels of sadness at time 1, however it is possible that 
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because participants knew that they would be reading about the commission of a serious 
crime in the task following the emotion manipulation, they expected to feel sad, and 
therefore had already begun to feel some sadness. 
Next, three individual ANOVAs with defendant age condition as the independent 
variable and each self-reported emotion (at time 2) as the dependent variable examined 
differences between defendant age conditions for each self-reported emotion for those 
participants in the neutral emotion condition.  There was a significant effect of defendant 
age on self-reported anger, F(1, 73) = 3.94, p = .05, p2 = .05, such that neutral 
participants in the 16-year-old defendant condition experienced greater levels of anger (M 
= 3.00, SD = 2.43) than those in the 25-year-old defendant condition (M = 2.05, SD = 
1.69).  The effects of defendant age on self-reported sadness, F(1, 73) = 3.63, p = .06, p2 
= .05, and on self-reported fear, F(1, 73) = 2.63, p = .11, p2 = .04, were not significant.   
Finally, to examine whether prosecution-biased participants would experience 
more anger than would defense-biased participants, I submitted the data from only those 
participants in the neutral condition to a 2 (defendant age: 16-juvenile, 25-adult) x 3 (self-
reported emotion: anger, sadness, fear) repeated measures ANOVA, with self-reported 
emotion as the repeated measure, and pretrial bias as a covariate.  There was a significant 
effect for self-reported emotion, F(2, 144) = 3.40, p = .04, p2 = .05; however, the 
interaction between self-reported emotion and pretrial bias was not significant, F(2, 144) 
= 1.55, p = .22, p2 = .02, indicating that self-reported emotion of those in the neutral 
condition did not vary as a function of pretrial bias. 
Alternative explanations: Affect infusion model.  The Affect Infusion Model 
(AIM) (Forgas, 1995; 2008) provides an alternative explanation for the emotion effects 
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found in study 2.  According to this model, positive affect leads to reduced cognitive 
processing effort, and negative affect leads to increased cognitive processing effort.  In 
other words, individuals in a good mood process more heuristically, while those in a bad 
mood process more systematically.  Exploratory analyses examined whether this could 
better explain the effects found in study 2.  A new variable named “negative emotion” 
collapsed the three negative emotion conditions into one level to compare responses of all 
participants who would likely be in a bad mood to those who were in the neutral 
condition.  A binary logistic regression using guilty/not guilty verdicts collapsed across 
all charge types as the dependent variable, with negative emotion, defendant age, juror 
pretrial bias, both stereotype subscales, and a number of two-way and three-way 
interaction terms stemming from the hypotheses revealed a significant model, 2(11, N = 
367) = 39.78, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .14.  The model correctly predicted 57.4% (n = 
101) of the not guilty verdicts and 73.3% (n = 140) of the guilty verdicts, for an overall 
accuracy of 65.7%.  Furthermore, negative emotion (B = 1.11, Wald = 7.81, p = .01, 
Exp(B) = 3.05), defendant age (B = 1.05, Wald = 4.49, p = .03, Exp(B) = 2.85), and the 
interaction between negative emotion and defendant age (B = -1.36, Wald = 6.06, p = .01, 
Exp(B) = .26) all significantly predicted verdicts (see Table 16).  
To further examine the possibility that those participants experiencing any 
negative emotion used more systematic processing and thus judged both defendants 
equally, I submitted the data to a chi-square test, including guilty/not guilty verdicts, 
defendant age, and the negative emotion variable.  Within the negative emotion condition 
there was no significant difference in guilty verdicts for those who read about the 16-
year-old compared to those who read about the 25-year-old, 2(1) = 2.44, p = .07 (see 
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Table 17).  However, within the neutral condition there was a significant difference 
between judgments of guilt for those participants in the 16-year-old and 25-year-old 
defendant conditions, 2(1) = 3.69, p = .05 (see Table 18).  This suggests that those 
participants experiencing any negative emotion were actually processing more 
systematically, as they did not demonstrate any bias against the juvenile tried as an adult.  
This is discussed further in the general discussion section.    
Discussion 
Study 2 attempted to examine how the experience of different negative emotions 
would affect mock jurors’ use of negative stereotypes to make judgments of guilt for a 
juvenile tried as an adult and an adult defendant.  The results of this study provided 
support for some of the hypotheses, but did not support others.  One initial prediction was 
that as participants’ stereotyping scores increased they would judge the juvenile 
defendant more harshly than would those participants with lower stereotyping scores, and 
that those participants in the adult defendant condition would judge the defendant equally 
regardless of their scores on the stereotyping measure.  Furthermore, angry participants 
should have judged the juvenile defendant more harshly than the adult defendant on all 
outcome measures.  Examination of the main effects from several of the analyses 
suggested that participants judged the juvenile defendant more harshly than they did the 
adult defendant.  However, examination of significant interactions revealed a different 
pattern of effects, such that when controlling for pretrial bias and stereotyping, 
participants were actually more likely to find the adult defendant guilty of at least one 
charge (compared to the juvenile defendant) when they were made to feel angry or sad 
(compared to the neutral emotion group).  Emotion did not affect judgments of guilt for 
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those who read about the juvenile defendant.  Participants were also more likely to find 
the adult defendant guilty of first-degree murder when they were made to feel angry or 
sad (compared to those who received the neutral emotion manipulation); however, again, 
emotion did not have an effect on judgments of guilt for the juvenile defendant.  
Furthermore, as participants’ scores on the pretrial bias measure increased (indicating 
greater prosecution bias), participants were more certain in a first-degree murder verdict, 
but only for the adult defendant.  Participants’ certainty in a guilty first-degree murder 
verdict for the juvenile defendant was unaffected by pretrial bias.   
Next, a three-way interaction between emotion, defendant age, and stereotyping, 
predicted that angry participants who received higher scores on the stereotyping measure 
would judge the juvenile defendant more harshly than they would the adult defendant.  
Unfortunately, the three-way interaction was not significant.  Overall, the predicted 
effects for defendant age were unconfirmed. 
 Regarding the effects of manipulated emotion, cognitive appraisal theory predicts 
that angry participants should have judged both defendants more harshly than would 
those participants experiencing fear, sadness, or neutral emotion.  Angry participants 
were more likely than were those in the fear and neutral conditions to find the defendant 
guilty of at least one charge; however, sad participants were equally as likely to find the 
defendant guilty.  For first-degree murder verdicts, participants in the anger, sadness, and 
fear conditions were all more likely to find the defendant guilty than were those in the 
neutral condition.  Thus, there appeared to be a general negative emoting effect rather 
than a specific appraisal impact.  
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Furthermore, participants in the fear condition demonstrated an interesting effect 
that did not follow from the hypotheses.  Fearful participants who read about the 25-year-
old defendant were more likely to find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder as 
pretrial bias scores increased (indicating greater prosecution bias).   
The predicted two-way interaction between emotion and pretrial bias, suggested 
that participants who experienced the neutral and anger emotions and who were more 
prosecution-biased would judge both types of defendant more harshly than those neutral 
and angry participants who were more defense-biased.  The results suggested the 
opposite pattern of effects, with those in the sadness and fear conditions being more 
likely to find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder as pretrial bias scores increased, 
indicating greater prosecution bias.  This result is again inconsistent with cognitive 
appraisal theory.  
Finally, appraisals of certainty should have mediated the effects of anger on 
judgments made about the juvenile defendant, such that after controlling for certainty, the 
relationship between anger and judgments of the juvenile defendant should have 
attenuated.  Mediation analyses demonstrated that certainty mediated the effects of 
sadness and fear on first-degree murder verdicts, only within the 25-year-old defendant 
condition.  However, certainty did not mediate the effects of anger on any judgments of 
the defendants, contrary to expectation.  Mediation analyses examining control as an 
alternative appraisal dimension to explain the emotion effects showed that control did not 
mediate the effects of any of the emotions on any of the verdict measures.   
CHAPTER 11: General Discussion 
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 The current study measured stereotypes of juveniles tried as adults and examined 
the effects of negative emotions on verdict determinations to clarify the inconsistent 
results of past research examining juror perceptions of juveniles tried as adults.  The 
results suggest that mock jurors do not demonstrate a generic prejudice against juveniles 
tried as adults as some other research has shown.  Study 1 attempted to assess whether 
people endorse negative stereotypes about criminals to a greater extent for juveniles tried 
as adults compared to juveniles tried in juvenile court and adult defendants.  The results 
suggested some negative stereotyping of juveniles tried as adults, but only for male 
participants.  Women did not endorse negative stereotypes to a greater extent for 
juveniles tried as adults.  This could be because the stereotype questionnaire actually 
measured general stereotypes about criminals, and did not address stereotypes that may 
be more specific to juveniles tried as adults.  It could also be because people actually do 
not endorse negative stereotypes about criminals to a greater extent for juveniles tried as 
adults compared to adult defendants.  The results of study 2 suggest that this may be the 
case.  In study 2, participants did not judge the juvenile defendant more harshly than they 
did the adult defendant.  In fact, participants who felt angry or sad actually judged the 
adult defendant more harshly than they did the juvenile defendant.   
 Previous studies examining this issue have found some evidence of bias against 
juveniles tried as adults, but others have not.  It may be that there is no general bias 
against juveniles tried as adults, or at least not in situations where jurors receive enough 
detailed information to make informed decisions.  Study 2 used a lengthy trial summary 
including many details, which may have given participants sufficient information to make 
verdict decisions, similar to an actual trial.  Other research in this area that did find bias 
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against a juvenile tried as an adult provided participants with very little information 
regarding the defendant and little to no information regarding the charged crime (Levine 
et al., 2001; Tang et al., 2009).  This may have led participants to rely on their stereotypes 
to make decisions simply because they had no other information to use.  Providing 
participants with a detailed trial summary may have reduced any need to rely on 
stereotypes to make decisions.  Furthermore, male participants in study 1 displayed 
evidence of holding some negative stereotypes about juveniles tried as adults, which 
suggests that men in study 2 should have shown evidence of this bias as well.  However, 
preliminary analyses including gender in study 2 did not find significant main effects for 
gender or significant interactions between gender and either of the stereotype measures.   
 Alternatively, people may be more biased against adult defendants compared to 
juvenile defendants.  Perhaps participants viewed the adult defendant as more culpable 
due to his older age, and thus when they experienced anger (a certainty-associated 
emotion) and sadness (an emotion that can be associated with either certainty or 
uncertainty) they were more likely to judge him harshly compared to the juvenile.  Jurors 
may not experience bias against a juvenile because he or she is transferred to criminal 
court; rather they may take the juvenile’s age into consideration when making judgments, 
and judge him or her more leniently than an adult defendant. 
 Overall, it is difficult for any experiment to accurately determine whether jurors 
in a real trial would exhibit generic prejudice against a juvenile tried as an adult.  One 
factor that was absent from this research was simply the youthful appearance of the 
defendant.  In a real trial, jurors would see the juvenile defendant in court every day, and 
this visual reminder of his age could have a significant impact on how they make verdict 
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decisions.  A juvenile who has more adult-like features may be judged more harshly, 
while a juvenile who appears to be very young may receive treatment that is more lenient.  
Research examining the role of race in capital punishment sentencing decisions has 
shown that Black defendants who have more stereotypical Black features are more likely 
to be sentenced to death (when the victim is White) (Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns, 
& Johnson, 2006).  It is possible that people view certain physical features as more 
characteristic of juveniles who are transferred to criminal court compared to juveniles 
who are not.  Future research should include photographs of the defendants, both juvenile 
and adult, to determine if this affects juror decision making.   
Emotion 
 The effects of emotion on judgments of the adult defendant were mostly in line 
with previous findings regarding the influence emotions have on judgment and decision 
making.  Angry participants were more likely to find the adult defendant guilty of first-
degree murder, compared to those in the fear and neutral emotion conditions.  However, 
those participants in the sadness condition showed a similar pattern of judgments.  
Sadness was included in this study because it lies more toward the middle of the certainty 
spectrum than fear, making it possible for individuals to feel sad and uncertain or sad and 
certain.  Sad people could have been experiencing greater certainty than those in the fear 
condition, so that they made decisions more similar to angry people.  Analyses examining 
the effects of manipulated emotion on certainty appraisals confirmed that both those in 
the anger and sadness conditions demonstrated greater certainty than did those in the fear 
condition on two of the three certainty items.  Therefore, it appears that sad participants 
made similar judgments to those of angry participants because they were experiencing 
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similar levels of certainty.  However, mediation analyses showed very little evidence of 
certainty mediating the effects of emotion on any verdict decisions.  One analysis found 
that certainty mediated the effects of sadness and fear on first-degree murder verdicts for 
those participants in the 25-year-old defendant condition.  However, the main analyses 
yielded significant effects on verdict for angry and sad participants in the 25-year-old 
defendant condition, which leads one to question why certainty did not also mediate the 
effect of anger on verdicts.   
Furthermore, participants in the fear condition demonstrated some judgment 
similar to that which would be expected for an angry individual.  Fearful participants 
were more likely to find the adult defendant guilty of first-degree murder as pretrial bias 
scores increased (indicating greater prosecution bias).  A possible explanation for this 
effect is that after reading the trial summary, participants were still experiencing 
relatively high levels of their manipulated emotions, but were also experiencing high 
levels of other negative emotions.  As the emotion manipulation check data showed, after 
reading the trial summary participants in the anger, fear, and sadness conditions 
demonstrated similar levels of anger and sadness.  Those in the fear and anger conditions 
demonstrated similar levels of fear.  The emotion experienced before reading the trial 
summary is what should have affected how participants processed the information in the 
trial summary; however, by the time participants made their verdict decisions they were 
clearly experiencing elevated levels of more than one negative emotion, and this likely 
affected their judgments.  It could be that in the context of juror decision making it is 
simply the valence of the emotion that impacts decision making, such that the experience 
of any negative emotion affects judgment similarly.  Or, it may be the change in emotion 
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that influences judgment, rather than the absolute emotion itself.  If the experience of any 
emotion increases in intensity, that change alone could affect whether a juror is more or 
less punitive.    
It is also possible that when an individual experiences several emotions at once, 
and one is high in certainty, the certainty associated with that emotion will override the 
uncertainty associated with the other emotions.  Research on the Appraisal-Tendency 
Framework has not addressed this possibility, perhaps for obvious reasons.  Researchers 
generally aim to isolate the effects of one specific emotion on decision making; if an 
individual experienced more than one emotion it would be impossible to know which 
emotion or emotions exerted the most influence on subsequent judgment.  Although it 
would be difficult to accomplish, it would be informative to attempt to induce 
participants to experience two emotions at once, one from each end of the certainty 
spectrum, to determine how this would affect subsequent decision making.   
One way that participants would likely experience more than one emotion would 
be to manipulate integral emotions.  Integral emotions are emotions provoked by 
attributes of the judgment target (Lerner, Han, & Keltner, 2007).  The emotions that 
participants experienced after reading the trial summary were integral emotions.  The 
emotions resulting from the emotion manipulation in this study were incidental emotions, 
meaning the emotions were unrelated to the juror decision-making task.  The manner in 
which participants are made to experience emotions could have different effects on how 
they process information and make verdict decisions (Feigenson & Park, 2006).  
Research examining the effects of appraisal tendencies on decision making has mainly 
used incidental emotions, rather than integral emotions.  This is likely because incidental 
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emotions tend to persist past the emotion-arousing event, affecting subsequent, unrelated 
decisions.  Furthermore, the use of incidental emotions allows for greater experimental 
control.  However, integral emotions could actually be more intense, because they result 
from the judgment target itself, leading to even larger effects of appraisal tendencies.  For 
example, in study 2, the trial summary appeared to arouse a number of negative emotions 
in participants, other than the emotion from the manipulation at the beginning of the 
study.  It is reasonable to expect that emotions resulting from a criminal trial would be 
stronger than the lingering emotions left over from an unrelated event that occurred 
before the trial started.  A valuable addition to the research examining the effects of 
emotion on legal decision making would be to manipulate emotions using the content of a 
trial summary.  However, this would be extremely difficult to accomplish, given that the 
emotions people experience are dependent on their appraisals of events, and different 
people often have different appraisals of the same events.  Furthermore, it would be very 
difficult to do this without confounding the emotion with the evidence in the case that 
leads to the emotional reaction.  Regardless, if researchers could successfully manipulate 
integral emotions it would be informative to examine whether they influence decisions 
the same way incidental emotions do.  
Finally, there is an alternative explanation for the emotion effects found in study 
2.  The AIM (Forgas, 1995; 2008) posits that positive affect leads to more heuristic 
processing, while negative affect leads to more systematic processing.  While this was 
not the theory tested in this research, it does provide a feasible explanation for the results.  
Additional analyses that treated the three negative emotions as one negative emotion 
variable found that overall, those participants who experienced any negative emotion did 
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not demonstrate differences in judgments of the juvenile and adult defendants.  However, 
those participants in the neutral condition judged the juvenile defendant more harshly 
than they did the adult defendant.  This may help to explain the results of past studies in 
which participants judged a juvenile defendant more harshly than they did an adult 
defendant.  No other studies examining this issue have manipulated emotions; therefore 
one would expect that participants in those studies likely entered each study experiencing 
neutral, or very little, emotion.  The experience of negative affect may account for the 
lack of bias toward the juvenile tried as an adult in the current research.   
Pretrial Bias 
A suggested explanation for the results found in prior studies in which 
prosecution-biased participants judged juveniles tried as adults more harshly than they 
did adult defendants was that those participants reacted to trial stimuli with more anger 
than did defense-biased participants.  It could be that the specific details of the trial 
summaries in those studies evoked more anger in prosecution-biased participants, which 
led to the harsher judgments of the juvenile tried as an adult.  However, the details of the 
trial summary used in this study appear to have not affected prosecution-biased 
participants differently than defense-biased participants.  Both types of defendant reacted 
to the trial summary with similar emotions.  Again, it would be valuable to identify what 
details in a trial summary evoke certain emotions, in order to manipulate integral 
emotions.   
It is still unclear why prosecution-biased participants in only some studies 
examining this issue showed bias against a juvenile tried as an adult while defense-biased 
participants did not.  In this study, participants were actually more certain in a first-
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degree murder verdict for the adult defendant as pretrial bias scores increased (indicating 
greater prosecution bias).  It is possible that these differences among studies are a result 
of different details in the trial stimuli used.  For example, the crime with which the 
defendant is charged could differentially affect participants’ decisions (e.g., first-degree 
murder, second-degree murder, burglary, etc.).  Prosecution-biased individuals may view 
certain types of crimes as more characteristic of certain types of criminals, thus resulting 
in harsher judgments when there is an uncharacteristic pairing of crime and criminal type.  
Alternatively, a participant’s general impression of the defendant’s personality, family 
history, and other personal characteristics could affect whether they demonstrate bias 
against a juvenile tried as an adult.  A juvenile tried as an adult who is perceived as being 
a victim of his upbringing could be judged less harshly than his adult counterpart by 
defense-biased participants, but more harshly by prosecution-biased participants who 
may view this as an unacceptable excuse for the defendant’s behavior.   
Stereotyping Measure 
The results of study 1 showed some support for a negative stereotype against 
juveniles tried as adults.  However, this was only true for men.  Research suggests that 
men are more punitive and endorse rehabilitation less as a goal of punishment for crimes 
as compared to women (Applegate et al., 2002), and that men tend to favor the death 
penalty more than women do (Cochran & Sanders, 2009; Whitehead & Blankenship, 
2000; Sandys & McGarrell, 1995; Bohm, 1998).  Therefore, it is not surprising that 
evidence of negative stereotyping of juveniles tried as adults would be stronger among 
men.  On the other hand, the data in study 2 did not reveal the same effect.  It is possible 
that because men are generally more punitive they do hold negative stereotypes about 
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juveniles tried as adults, but they only use these stereotypes when they have little 
information to inform their decisions.  The detailed trial summary in study 2 may have 
provided enough information for male participants to base their decisions on so that they 
did not have to rely on their stereotypes.   
Another possible reason a stronger stereotype effect did not surface could simply 
be that the items included on the stereotyping measure were not representative of 
juveniles tried as adults, but were representative of criminals in general.  There was some 
indication that the stereotype measure constructed for study 2 was more of a measure of 
general bias against criminals, as some analyses showed that participants judged both 
defendants more harshly as their scores on one of the stereotype subscales increased.  
Future research should examine stereotypes that are more specific to youth of various 
ages to determine if there are negative stereotypes about youth that people may endorse 
to a greater extent for juveniles tried as adults.    
Strengths and Limitations 
 This research had several strengths.  First, participants were adults from various 
communities from across the country.  Several of the studies that have examined this 
issue used undergraduate college students as participants, which could be problematic for 
several reasons.  Undergraduates are generally between the ages of 18 and 22, therefore 
the juvenile and adult defendants in the research in this area would only be several years 
younger or older than would be the participants judging them.  Eighteen-year-olds asked 
to determine the guilt of a 16-year-old may view themselves as being more similar to a 
16-year-old defendant than a 25-year-old defendant, thus potentially making it less likely 
that they would find the 16-year-old guilty.  Furthermore, undergraduate students are not 
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representative of the average juror.  By using a sample of adults from across the country, 
I was able to obtain a sample that is more similar to average jurors than those studies 
using undergraduate participants.  This could be one reason why the results of this study 
are not the same as earlier ones in this line of research, which used undergraduate mock 
jurors.  
 Additionally, participants read a detailed trial summary based on a real case.  
Although this is not the same as participating in a real criminal trial, it is still more 
similar to an actual trial than those studies that only provided participants with one or two 
sentences about the defendant.   
Furthermore, this study  not only measured the stereotypes individuals endorse 
about juveniles tried as adults, but to also used those stereotypes to predict judgments of a 
juvenile tried as an adult and an adult defendant.  This extends previous research in which 
researchers measured stereotypes about a juvenile, but did not use them to predict 
judgments of guilt (Tang et al., 2009).   
 There were, of course, several limitations to this research.  Participants completed 
both studies over the internet in their own homes.  Although the computer program took 
precautions  to ensure that participants took their time and paid attention to the details of 
the studies, it is still possible that some participants did not carefully read the trial 
summary, and did not give thoughtful consideration to the questions regarding guilt and 
standard of proof.  Those participants who deviated significantly from the study protocol 
(e.g., those who did not complete the emotion manipulation) were not included in the 
data analyses.  However, there were likely responses remaining from others who did not 
pay attention but whose answers did not identify them as such.  Evidence for this 
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conclusion comes from the fact that a number of participants in both studies were unable 
to identify correctly the age of the defendant in the trial summary.  Results of chi-square 
tests in both studies showed a significant relationship between accurate responses on the 
manipulation checks and defendant age condition.  This is concerning, as inaccurate 
responses should be evenly distributed among conditions due to random assignment of 
participants to conditions.  It is possible that when participants read about the 25-year-old 
defendant, they automatically categorized him as an adult, and in the following minutes 
gave little thought to his actual age.  Participants in the 16-year-old conditions may have 
been more able to remember the defendant’s specific age because it is somewhat more 
shocking to read about a youth committing a violent crime.  Future research should 
develop methods to present the defendant in a way that does not lead to differential 
results in participants’ conscious awareness of the defendant’s age.  
 Furthermore, there were very small numbers of participants who found the 
defendant guilty of each of the individual charges.  When I collapsed verdicts across all 
three charge types to examine who found the defendant guilty of at least one charge, there 
was a relatively even split of guilty/not guilty verdicts.  However, for each individual 
charge, larger numbers of participants found the defendant not guilty rather than guilty.  
These smaller numbers of guilt verdicts may have limited the effects of emotion on 
verdict.  Although pilot tests of the trial summary showed that participants were equally 
likely to find the defendant guilty or not guilty, participants in the pilot study were 
undergraduate students.  It is possible that the adult community sample in study 2 
responded differently to the trial summary than the undergraduates in the pilot test did.  A 
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trial summary that resulted in a more even split of guilty/not guilty verdicts may have 
provided different results.   
 Additionally, 78 (16.6%) participants dropped out of study 2 after completing 
phase 1 and before phase 2.  It is possible that the participants who dropped out of the 
study were different had different traits than those who completed both phases.  Analysis 
examining pretrial bias and stereotyping scores for both groups of participants did not 
reveal any significant differences, however it is possible that these participants differed 
on other unmeasured factors.  
 Finally, even though the detailed trial summary was more similar to an actual trial 
than the stimulus used in some other studies, it is still not equivalent to participating in an 
actual trial.  Participants did not see what the defendant looked like, and study 2 lasted 
only about 30 minutes, whereas a real trial would likely last for days or weeks.  In 
addition, participants did not read jury instructions, and they did not deliberate as a 
group.  It is likely that jurors in a real trial would demonstrate different patterns of 
judgments when presented with a juvenile tried as an adult.   
Future Directions 
The issue of whether jurors exhibit generic prejudice against juveniles tried as 
adults is still unclear.  Many factors may contribute to this issue that future research 
should address.  For example, some recent research has examined the voir dire process in 
cases in which juveniles are transferred to adult criminal court.  Results of archival 
research show that in cases where a juvenile is being tried as an adult, voir dire includes 
questions about whether potential jurors could find the defendant guilty knowing that he 
could spend time in an adult prison (Danielsen, Levett, & Kovera, 2004).  Similar to 
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death qualification, this “juvenile” qualification has the potential to substantially alter the 
make-up of juries charged with determining the guilt of a juvenile tried in criminal court.  
Indeed, researchers have found that in trial simulations, juries comprised of only jurors 
who would be considered juvenile qualified were more likely to convict a juvenile 
defendant being tried as an adult than were juries comprised of both juvenile qualified 
and non-juvenile qualified jurors (those who would likely be excluded from jury service) 
(Levett, Greathouse, Sothmann, Copple, & Kovera, 2006).  Future research should 
examine whether juvenile qualified jurors endorse stereotypes about juveniles tried as 
adults more or less than non-juvenile qualified jurors, and whether this accounts for 
differences in verdicts.   
  In addition, some research shows that jurors are more likely to find a defendant 
guilty when the features of the charged crime match their stereotypes of that type of 
crime (Smith, 1991; Smith, 1993; Smith & Studebaker, 1996).  Similarly, jurors may 
have prior knowledge of the types of crimes they believe juveniles tried as adults are 
likely to have committed, and this could affect guilt determinations.  If the details of the 
crime are not the same as what a juror thinks is typical of a crime committed by a 
juvenile tried as an adult, then he or she will be less likely to find that defendant guilty.  
Researchers should examine whether jurors do believe that certain types of crimes or 
features of crimes are more stereotypical of juveniles who are tried as adults.   
 Another factor that future research should examine is jurors’ knowledge regarding 
the waiver process.  As discussed in this paper, jurors may assume that if a juvenile is 
transferred to criminal court it is the result of an evaluation by a juvenile court judge.  
This may lead them to conclude that the juvenile must be guilty, or must have done 
130 
something very serious for a judge to decide to send the youth to criminal court.  
However, many juveniles are waived to criminal court through other mechanisms, such 
prosecutorial waiver and statutory waiver, which do not involve a direct evaluation by a 
judge.  Jurors may view a juvenile tried as an adult differently depending on the 
mechanism through which he or she was transferred to criminal court.  Researchers 
should vary type of waiver to examine whether this affects verdicts.   
 Regarding the effects of emotions on decision making, future research should 
continue to examine the effects of emotion on judgments of juveniles tried as adults, but 
it should manipulate a wider variety of emotions.  An important emotion absent from this 
study is disgust.  Disgust is a certainty-associated emotion that could have a similar effect 
on judgment as anger.  It is also an emotion that participants would likely experience in 
response to a trial involving a violent crime.  The inclusion of additional negative 
emotions could help clarify how emotions affect judgments of juveniles tried as adults.  
 Finally, future research should examine the interaction between defendant age and 
race.  Although many researchers have examined the effects of an adult defendant’s race 
on verdicts, and some recent research has examined the effects of race on verdicts for a 
juvenile tried as an adult (Stevenson & Bottoms, 2009), no research has examined how 
defendant race and age interact.  While there may not be differences in jurors’ judgments 
of a White juvenile tried as an adult and a White adult defendant, it is possible that jurors 
would judge a Black juvenile tried as an adult more harshly than they would a White 
adult defendant.   
 This research contributes to the growing body of literature addressing the 
important issue of whether the criminal justice system treats juveniles fairly.  There is 
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still too little evidence to allow for a conclusion regarding whether jurors demonstrate 
bias against juveniles who are transferred to adult court.  However, the results of this 
research suggest that jurors may not exhibit bias against juveniles in adult court, or that 
there are more factors involved in jurors’ decision making when it comes to juveniles 
tried as adults.  Additional research will allow us to better understand this complex issue. 
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End Notes 
 1
 I did not include participant gender in the reported main analyses for study 2, 
because in preliminary analyses it did not significantly affect any of the outcome 
variables, and it did not significantly interact with any of the other predictor variables.  
Although there were significant differences between men and women in study 1, because 
gender differences were not part of my original hypotheses and because gender did not 
affect outcomes in study 2, I did not include it as an independent variable.  
 
2
 The main effect of defendant age is very small and is a result of the inclusion of 
the covariates and emotion dummy codes in the model.  A logistic regression with only 
the emotion dummy codes and defendant age predicting guilty/not guilty verdicts resulted 
in a significant model, 2(7, N = 367) = 14.66, p = .04, Nagelkerke R2 = .05, with a nearly 
significant effect for defendant age, B = .91, p = .06; however, a logistic regression with 
only defendant age predicting guilty/not guilty verdicts produced a non-significant 
model, 2(1, N = 367) = .23, p = .63, Nagelkerke R2 = .001.  Defendant age alone did not 
significantly affect verdicts.   
 
3
 The main effect of defendant age is very small and is a result of the inclusion of 
the covariates and emotion dummy codes in the model.  A logistic regression with only 
the emotion dummy codes and defendant age predicting first-degree murder verdicts 
resulted in a non-significant model, 2(7, N = 367) = 12.98, p = .07, Nagelkerke R2 = .05, 
and a logistic regression with only defendant age predicting first-degree murder verdicts 
also produced a non-significant model, 2(1, N = 367) = .02, p = .89, Nagelkerke R2 = 
.000.  Defendant age alone did not significantly affect first-degree murder verdicts. 
 
4 The main effect demonstrating that those in the 16-year-old defendant condition 
were more certain in a guilty verdict than were those in the 25-year-old condition is 
misleading due to the estimated marginal means within the neutral emotion condition.  
While participants in the anger, sadness, and fearful conditions were more certain in a 
guilty verdict for the 25-year-old defendant compared to the 16-year-old, those 
participants in the neutral condition showed the opposite pattern, indicating much greater 
certainty in a guilty verdict for the 16-year-old (M = -1.62) than for the 25-year-old (M = 
-4.74).   
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Tables 
Table 1 
Mean Stereotype Ratings by Defendant Age Condition 
Stereotype Item 
16-year-old juvenile 
Mean (SD) 
16-year-old adult 
Mean (SD) 
25-year-old adult 
Mean (SD) 
Has a previous 
criminal record 
4.20a (2.25) 5.09a,b (2.40) 5.40b (2.33) 
Is antisocial 4.65a (2.24) 5.68b (2.35) 5.40a,b (1.92) 
Is hot-tempered 4.92a (2.13) 6.09b (2.04) 5.84b (2.09) 
Is manipulative 4.20a (2.29) 4.79a,b (2.17) 5.31b (2.47) 
Is a superpredator 3.39a (2.23) 4.18a,b (2.69) 4.59b (2.42) 
Got into trouble just 
this one time 
(reverse coded) 
6.73a (1.80) 5.46b (2.51) 5.91a,b (2.34) 
* Means within each row that do not share subscripts are significantly different at the .05 
level.  
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Table 2 
Significant Univariate Effects of Defendant Type on Men’s Endorsements of Stereotype 
Items 
Stereotype Item F(2, 60) p p2 Mean (SD) 
Has committed other crimes 
in the past 
 16-year-old juvenile 
 16-year-old adult 
 25-year-old adult 
3.33  .04  .10  
 
4.56a (2.71) 
6.61b (2.48) 
5.55a,b (2.46) 
Is aggressive 
 16-year-old juvenile 
 16-year-old adult 
 25-year-old adult 
3.34 .04 .10  
6.28a (2.35) 
7.70b (1.52) 
7.14a,b (1.36) 
Is a danger to society 
 16-year-old juvenile 
 16-year-old adult 
 25-year-old adult 
4.74 .01 .14  
6.06b (2.65) 
7.96a (1.40) 
6.45b (2.28) 
Uses illegal drugs 
 16-year-old juvenile 
 16-year-old adult 
 25-year-old adult 
4.22 .02 .12  
3.17a (2.01) 
5.43b (2.50) 
4.41a,b (2.79) 
Is vindictive 
 16-year-old juvenile 
5.86 .01 .16  
3.78a (2.02) 
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 16-year-old adult 
 25-year-old adult 
6.22b (2.41) 
4.59a (2.52) 
Is a chronic offender 
 16-year-old juvenile 
 16-year-old adult 
 25-year-old adult 
5.16 .01 .15  
3.78a (2.16) 
6.22b (2.43) 
5.05a,b (2.59) 
Is immoral 
 16-year-old juvenile 
 16-year-old adult 
 25-year-old adult 
4.07 .02 .12  
5.72a (2.42) 
7.57b (1.47) 
6.77a,b (2.25) 
Has a previous criminal 
record 
 16-year-old juvenile 
 16-year-old adult 
 25-year-old adult 
5.63 .01 .16  
3.44a (2.18) 
5.78b (2.30) 
5.55b (2.63) 
Is cruel 
 16-year-old juvenile 
 16-year-old adult 
 25-year-old adult 
6.68 .002 .18  
4.67a (2.72) 
7.30b (1.19) 
 6.00a,b (2.76) 
Is a bad person 
 16-year-old juvenile 
 16-year-old adult 
 25-year-old adult 
6.47 .003 .18  
5.17a (2.23) 
7.35b (1.58) 
 6.36a,b (1.99) 
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Is prone to violence 
 16-year-old juvenile 
 16-year-old adult 
 25-year-old adult 
5.31 .01 .15  
6.00a (2.06) 
7.70b (1.26) 
6.36a (2.01) 
Is hot-tempered 
 16-year-old juvenile 
 16-year-old adult 
 25-year-old adult 
6.52 .003 .18  
4.61a (1.82) 
6.87b (1.77) 
6.14b (2.36) 
Has had a lot of previous 
contact with police 
 16-year-old juvenile 
 16-year-old adult 
 25-year-old adult 
5.13 .01 .15  
 
3.67a (2.14) 
6.00b (2.43) 
5.41b (2.48) 
Is manipulative 
 16-year-old juvenile 
 16-year-old adult 
 25-year-old adult 
3.70 .03 .11  
3.56a (2.31) 
5.39b (2.45) 
5.45b (2.60) 
Does not feel remorse for 
what he has done 
 16-year-old juvenile 
 16-year-old adult 
 25-year-old adult 
4.00 .02 .12  
 
4.11a (2.61) 
5.83b (2.23) 
6.00b (2.07) 
Is a superpredator 4.36 .02 .13  
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 16-year-old juvenile 
 16-year-old adult 
 25-year-old adult 
2.94a (2.34) 
5.35b (2.95) 
4.77b (2.58) 
* Means for each dependent variable across conditions that do not share subscripts are 
significantly different at the .05 level.  
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Table 4 
Predictors of Guilty/Not Guilty Verdicts  
Variable B SE Wald  df p Exp(B) 
Emotion       
Anger 1.27 .49 6.68 1 .01 3.56 
Sadness 1.30 .48 7.49 1 .01 3.69 
Fear .80 .47 2.97 1 .09 2.24 
Defendant Age 1.05 .49 4.47 1 .03 2.84 
Pretrial Bias .30 .34 .82 1 .37 1.36 
Chronic Predator .91 .33 7.66 1 .01 2.48 
Antisocial -.47 .30 2.35 1 .13 .63 
Defendant Age x Emotion       
Defendant Age x Anger -.89 .68 1.72 1 .19 .41 
Defendant Age x Sadness -1.83 .66 7.75 1 .01 .16 
Defendant Age x Fear -1.41 .67 4.46 1 .04 .25 
Defendant Age x Chronic 
Predator 
-.68 .74 .85 1 .36 .51 
Defendant Age x Antisocial .16 .79 .04 1 .84 1.19 
Emotion x Pretrial Bias       
Anger x Pretrial Bias .22 .42 .29 1 .59 1.25 
Sadness x Pretrial Bias -.06 .40 .02 1 .88 .94 
Fear x Pretrial Bias -.14 .42 .11 1 .74 .87 
Defendant Age x Stereotyping x       
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Emotion 
Defendant Age x Chronic 
Predator x Anger 
.63 .85 .55 1 .46 1.87 
Defendant Age x Chronic 
Predator x Sadness 
.17 .85 .04 1 .84 1.19 
Defendant Age x Chronic 
Predator x Fear 
-.57 .88 .42 1 .52 .57 
Defendant Age x Antisocial x 
Anger 
-.35 .90 .15 1 .70 .70 
Defendant Age x Antisocial x 
Sadness 
.54 .91 .36 1 .55 1.72 
Defendant Age x Antisocial x 
Fear 
.94 .93 1.02 1 .31 2.56 
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Table 5 
Predictors of Guilty/Not Guilty Verdicts by Defendant Age Condition 
Variable B SE Wald  df p Exp(B) 
16-Year-Old Condition       
Emotion       
Anger .33 .47 .50 1 .48 1.40 
Sadness -.52 .47 1.22 1 .27 .60 
Fear -.55 .49 1.27 1 .26 .58 
Pretrial Bias .78 .52 2.25 1 .13 2.17 
Chronic Predator .20 .69 .08 1 .77 1.22 
Antisocial -.52 .77 .45 1 .51 .60 
Emotion x Stereotyping       
Anger x Chronic 
Predator 
.72 .87 .69 1 .41 2.05 
Sadness x Chronic 
Predator 
.12 .88 .02 1 .89 1.13 
Fear x Chronic 
Predator 
-.40 .91 .19 1 .66 .67 
Anger x Antisocial -.05 .94 .003 1 .96 .95 
Sadness x Antisocial .69 .96 .52 1 .47 1.99 
Fear x Antisocial 1.14 .97 1.38 1 .24 3.13 
Emotion x Pretrial Bias       
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Anger x Pretrial Bias -.47 .61 .60 1 .44 .63 
Sadness x Pretrial 
Bias 
-.21 .63 .11 1 .74 .81 
Fear x Pretrial Bias -.86 .64 1.82 1 .177 .42 
25-Year-Old Condition       
Emotion       
Anger 1.40 .54 6.78 1 .01 4.06 
Sadness 1.24 .48 6.69 1 .01 3.44 
Fear .72 .48 2.22 1 .14 2.06 
Pretrial Bias .003 .50 .000 1 1.00 1.00 
Chronic Predator .62 .79 .62 1 .43 1.87 
Antisocial -.25 .86 .09 1 .77 .78 
Emotion x Stereotyping       
Anger x Chronic 
Predator 
-.36 1.20 .09 1 .76 .70 
Sadness x Chronic 
Predator 
.44 .96 .21 1 .65 1.55 
Fear x Chronic 
Predator 
.82 1.06 .60 1 .44 2.27 
Anger x Antisocial .53 1.17 .21 1 .65 1.70 
Sadness x Antisocial -.40 .99 .16 1 .69 .67 
Fear x Antisocial -.58 1.07 .29 1 .59 .56 
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Emotion x Pretrial Bias       
Anger x Pretrial Bias .81 .68 1.43 1 .23 2.24 
Sadness x Pretrial 
Bias 
-.003 .62 .000 1 1.00 1.00 
Fear x Pretrial Bias .33 .64 .27 1 .60 1.39 
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Table 6 
Predictors of Guilty/Not Guilty Verdicts by Emotion Condition 
Variable B SE Wald df p Exp(B) 
Sadness Condition       
Defendant Age -.77 .43 3.14 1 .08 .47 
Pretrial Bias .000 .37 .000 1 1.00 1.00 
Chronic Predator 1.06 .54 3.83 1 .05 2.90 
Antisocial -.65 .48 1.84 1 .18 .52 
Defendant Age x 
Chronic Predator 
-.75 .77 .93 1 .33 .47 
Defendant Age x 
Antisocial 
.82 .74 1.24 1 .27 2.28 
Defendant Age x Pretrial 
Bias 
.57 .51 1.25 1 .26 1.76 
Fear Condition       
Defendant Age -.29 .46 .38 1 .54 .75 
Pretrial Bias .33 .39 .73 1 .39 1.40 
Chronic Predator 1.44 .70 4.22 1 .04 4.24 
Antisocial -.83 .63 1.75 1 .19 .44 
Defendant Age x 
Chronic Predator 
-1.64 .92 3.17 1 .08 .19 
Defendant Age x 1.45 .85 2.89 1 .09 4.27 
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Antisocial 
Defendant Age x Pretrial 
Bias 
-.42 .54 .60 1 .44 .66 
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Table 7 
Predictors of Guilty/Not Guilty First-Degree Murder Verdicts  
Variable B SE Wald  df p Exp(B) 
Emotion       
Anger 2.30 .76 9.19 1 .002 9.94 
Sadness 1.86 .77 5.91 1 .02 6.42 
Fear 1.92 .76 6.40 1 .01 6.85 
Defendant Age 2.18 .76 8.30 1 .004 8.86 
Pretrial Bias 
.87 .50 2.98 1 .09 2.38 
Chronic Predator 
.31 .37 .73 1 .40 1.37 
Antisocial 
.18 .35 .29 1 .59 1.20 
Defendant Age x Emotion 
 
     
Defendant Age x Anger 
-2.82 .91 9.56 1 .002 .06 
Defendant Age x Sadness 
-2.44 .90 7.34 1 .01 .09 
Defendant Age x Fear 
-2.25 .90 6.29 1 .01 .11 
Defendant Age x Chronic 
Predator 
.21 .81 .07 1 .80 1.24 
Defendant Age x Antisocial 
-.98 .90 1.19 1 .28 .38 
Emotion x Pretrial Bias 
 
     
Anger x Pretrial Bias 
-.72 .56 1.64 1 .20 .49 
Sadness x Pretrial Bias 
-.24 .58 .17 1 .68 .79 
Fear x Pretrial Bias 
-.34 .58 .33 1 .57 .72 
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Defendant Age x Stereotyping 
x Emotion 
 
     
Defendant Age x Chronic 
Predator x Anger 
1.29 1.12 1.33 1 .25 3.64 
Defendant Age x Chronic 
Predator x Sadness 
-.18 1.00 .03 1 .86 .84 
Defendant Age x Chronic 
Predator x Fear 
-.81 .97 .69 1 .41 .45 
Defendant Age x Antisocial 
x Anger 
-.45 1.19 .14 1 .71 .64 
Defendant Age x Antisocial 
x Sadness 
.98 1.09 .81 1 .37 2.66 
Defendant Age x Antisocial 
x Fear 
1.23 1.05 1.38 1 .24 3.44 
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Table 8 
Predictors of Guilty/Not Guilty First-Degree Murder Verdicts by Defendant Age 
Condition 
Variable B SE Wald  df p Exp(B) 
16-Year-Old Condition       
Emotion       
Anger -.61 .55 1.22 1 .27 .54 
Sadness -.70 .56 1.55 1 .21 .50 
Fear -.20 .54 .14 1 .71 .82 
Pretrial Bias .68 .56 1.47 1 .23 1.98 
Chronic Predator .52 .72 .53 1 .47 1.69 
Antisocial -.70 .83 .71 1 .40 .50 
Emotion x Stereotyping       
Anger x Chronic 
Predator 
1.35 1.12 1.45 1 .23 3.84 
Sadness x Chronic 
Predator 
-.29 1.02 .08 1 .78 .75 
Fear x Chronic 
Predator 
-.33 .98 .12 1 .73 .72 
Anger x Antisocial -.39 1.19 .11 1 .74 .67 
Sadness x Antisocial .86 1.11 .61 1 .44 2.37 
Fear x Antisocial 1.12 1.05 1.14 1 .29 3.07 
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Emotion x Pretrial Bias       
Anger x Pretrial Bias -.89 .67 1.80 1 .18 .41 
Sadness x Pretrial 
Bias 
.23 .74 .10 1 .75 1.26 
Fear x Pretrial Bias -1.04 .70 2.21 1 .14 .35 
25-Year-Old Condition       
Emotion       
Anger 2.57 1.14 5.10 1 .02 13.10 
Sadness 2.16 1.13 3.64 1 .06 8.68 
Fear 1.45 1.22 1.42 1 .23 4.26 
Pretrial Bias 1.61 1.18 1.85 1 .17 4.98 
Chronic Predator -.22 1.45 .02 1 .88 .80 
Antisocial .52 1.71 .10 1 .76 1.69 
Emotion x Stereotyping       
Anger x Chronic 
Predator 
.03 1.70 .000 1 .99 1.03 
Sadness x Chronic 
Predator 
.04 1.56 .001 1 .98 1.04 
Fear x Chronic 
Predator 
1.07 1.68 .41 1 .52 2.92 
Anger x Antisocial .14 1.85 .01 1 .94 1.15 
Sadness x Antisocial -.83 1,80 .21 1 .64 .44 
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Fear x Antisocial -.15 1.89 .01 1 .94 .86 
Emotion x Pretrial Bias       
Anger x Pretrial Bias -1.03 1.27 .65 1 .42 .36 
Sadness x Pretrial 
Bias 
-.44 1.31 .11 1 .74 .64 
Fear x Pretrial Bias -.03 1.33 .001 1 .98 .97 
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Table 9 
Predictors of Guilty/Not Guilty First-Degree Murder Verdicts by Emotion Condition 
Variable B SE Wald df p Exp(B) 
Anger Condition       
Defendant Age -.69 .55 1.56 1 .21 .50 
Pretrial Bias .58 .46 1.60 1 .21 1.79 
Chronic Predator -.19 .89 .05 1 .83 .83 
Antisocial .66 .73 .83 1 .36 1.94 
Defendant Age x 
Chronic Predator 
2.06 1.23 2.80 1 .09 7.85 
Defendant Age x 
Antisocial 
-1.76 1.12 2.47 1 .12 .17 
Defendant Age x Pretrial 
Bias 
-.79 .58 1.86 1 .17 .45 
Sadness Condition       
Defendant Age -.36 .54 .44 1 .51 .70 
Pretrial Bias 1.17 .57 4.25 1 .04 3.21 
Chronic Predator -.18 .58 .09 1 .76 .84 
Antisocial -.31 .57 .30 1 .59 .74 
Defendant Age x 
Chronic Predator 
.41 .93 .20 1 .65 1.51 
Defendant Age x .47 .93 .26 1 .61 1.60 
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Antisocial 
Defendant Age x Pretrial 
Bias 
-.25 .74 .12 1 .73 .78 
Fear Condition       
Defendant Age .85 .68 1.54 1 .22 2.33 
Pretrial Bias 1.58 .61 6.59 1 .01 4.83 
Chronic Predator .85 .85 1.02 1 .31 2.35 
Antisocial .37 .80 .22 1 .64 1.45 
Defendant Age x 
Chronic Predator 
-.67 1.07 .39 1 .54 .51 
Defendant Age x 
Antisocial 
.05 1.03 .002 1 .96 1.05 
Defendant Age x Pretrial 
Bias 
-1.94 .74 6.78 1 .01 .14 
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Table 10 
Predictors of Guilty/Not Guilty Second-Degree Murder Verdicts  
Variable B SE Wald  df p Exp(B) 
Emotion       
Anger 
.98 .55 3.16 1 .08 2.67 
Sadness 
.98 .54 3.31 1 .07 2.66 
Fear 
.49 .56 .77 1 .38 1.64 
Defendant Age 
.60 .59 1.02 1 .31 1.82 
Pretrial Bias 
.58 .42 1.87 1 .17 1.78 
Chronic Predator 
.89 .36 6.11 1 .01 2.43 
Antisocial 
-.46 .33 1.99 1 .16 .63 
Defendant Age x Emotion 
 
     
Defendant Age x Anger 
-.84 .75 1.26 1 .26 .43 
Defendant Age x Sadness 
-.95 .74 1.67 1 .20 .39 
Defendant Age x Fear 
-.73 .78 .89 1 .35 .48 
Defendant Age x Chronic 
Predator 
-.11 .87 .02 1 .90 .90 
Defendant Age x Antisocial 
-.27 .93 .08 1 .78 .77 
Emotion x Pretrial Bias 
 
     
Anger x Pretrial Bias 
.02 .49 .001 1 .97 1.02 
Sadness x Pretrial Bias 
-.44 .48 .87 1 .35 .64 
Fear x Pretrial Bias 
-.28 .51 .29 1 .59 .76 
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Defendant Age x Stereotyping x 
Emotion 
 
     
Defendant Age x Chronic 
Predator x Anger 
-.66 .96 .47 1 .50 .52 
Defendant Age x Chronic 
Predator x Sadness 
-.10 1.02 .01 1 .92 .91 
Defendant Age x Chronic 
Predator x Fear 
-.77 1.06 .53 1 .47 .46 
Defendant Age x Antisocial x 
Anger 
.84 1.04 .65 1 .42 2.32 
Defendant Age x Antisocial x 
Sadness 
.24 1.08 .05 1 .83 1.27 
Defendant Age x Antisocial x 
Fear 
.51 1.11 .21 1 .65 1.66 
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Table 11 
Predictors of Guilty/Not Guilty Manslaughter Verdicts  
Variable B SE Wald  df p Exp(B) 
Emotion       
Anger 
.17 .55 .09 1 .76 1.18 
Sadness 
.85 .52 2.75 1 .10 2.35 
Fear 
.28 .54 .27 1 .60 1.33 
Defendant Age 
-.07 .63 .01 1 .91 .93 
Pretrial Bias 
.57 .42 1.82 1 .18 1.77 
Chronic Predator 1.03 .37 7.92 1 .01 2.80 
Antisocial 
-.84 .34 6.01 1 .01 .43 
Defendant Age x Emotion 
 
     
Defendant Age x Anger 
.90 .78 1.31 1 .25 2.45 
Defendant Age x Sadness 
-.66 .78 .72 1 .40 .52 
Defendant Age x Fear 
-.56 .88 .41 1 .52 .57 
Defendant Age x Chronic 
Predator 
.18 1.02 .03 1 .86 1.20 
Defendant Age x Antisocial 
-.11 1.08 .01 1 .92 .90 
Emotion x Pretrial Bias 
 
     
Anger x Pretrial Bias 
-.14 .49 .08 1 .78 .87 
Sadness x Pretrial Bias 
-.48 .48 1.01 1 .32 .62 
Fear x Pretrial Bias 
-.26 .52 .25 1 .62 .77 
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Defendant Age x Stereotyping 
x Emotion 
 
     
Defendant Age x Chronic 
Predator x Anger 
-.48 1.12 .18 1 .67 .62 
Defendant Age x Chronic 
Predator x Sadness 
-1.23 1.13 1.19 1 .28 .293 
Defendant Age x Chronic 
Predator x Fear 
-1.79 1.19 2.25 1 .13 .17 
Defendant Age x Antisocial 
x Anger 
.03 1.20 .001 1 .98 1.03 
Defendant Age x Antisocial 
x Sadness 
1.48 1.20 1.52 1 .22 4.41 
Defendant Age x Antisocial 
x Fear 
2.35 1.30 3.29 1 .07 10.46 
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Table 12 
Effects of Defendant Age, Emotion, Pretrial Bias, and Stereotyping on Certainty in a 
First-Degree Murder Verdict  
Effects F df p p2 
Defendant Age 7.21 1, 335 .01 .02 
Emotion  .19 3, 335 .91 .002 
Pretrial Bias 11.10 1, 335 .001 .03 
Chronic Predator .95 1, 335 .33 .003 
Antisocial .32 1, 335 .57 .001 
Defendant Age x Pretrial 
Bias 
6.59 1, 335 .01 .02 
Emotion x Pretrial Bias .76 3, 335 .52 .01 
Emotion x Defendant Age 1.81 3, 335 .15 .02 
Defendant Age x Chronic 
Predator 
1.31 1, 335 .25 .004 
Defendant Age x 
Stereotyping 2 
.53 1, 335 .47 .002 
Emotion x Defendant Age x 
Pretrial Bias 
1.39 3, 335 .25 .01 
Emotion x Defendant Age x 
Chronic Predator 
.56 6, 335 .76 .01 
Emotion x Defendant Age x .67 6, 335 .67 .01 
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Antisocial 
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Table 13 
Effects of Defendant Age, Emotion, Pretrial Bias, and Stereotyping on Certainty in a 
Second-Degree Murder Verdict  
Effects F df p p2 
Defendant Age .004 1, 335 .95 .000 
Emotion  2.53 3, 335 .06 .02 
Pretrial Bias 8.78 1, 335 .003 .03 
Chronic Predator 3.84 1, 335 .05 .01 
Antisocial .81 1, 335 .37 .002 
Defendant Age x Pretrial 
Bias 
.53 1, 335 .47 .002 
Emotion x Pretrial Bias 1.45 3, 335 .23 .01 
Emotion x Defendant Age 2.00 3, 335 .11 .02 
Defendant Age x Chronic 
Predator 
1.75 1, 335 .19 .01 
Defendant Age x 
Stereotyping 2 
.04 1, 335 .85 .000 
Emotion x Defendant Age x 
Pretrial Bias 
1.92 3, 335 .13 .02 
Emotion x Defendant Age x 
Chronic Predator 
.41 6, 335 .88 .01 
Emotion x Defendant Age x .78 6, 335 .59 .01 
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Antisocial 
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Table 14 
Effects of Defendant Age, Emotion, Pretrial Bias, and Stereotyping on Certainty in a 
Manslaughter Verdict  
Effects F df p p2 
Defendant Age .79 1, 335 .37 .002 
Emotion  1.73 3, 335 .16 .02 
Pretrial Bias 7.66 1, 335 .01 .02 
Chronic Predator 4.42 1, 335 .04 .01 
Antisocial 1.89 1, 335 .17 .01 
Defendant Age x Pretrial 
Bias 
.67 1, 335 .41 .002 
Emotion x Pretrial Bias 1.84 3, 335 .14 .02 
Emotion x Defendant Age 2.53 3, 335 .06 .02 
Defendant Age x Chronic 
Predator 
2.63 1, 335 .11 .01 
Defendant Age x Antisocial 2.00 1, 335 .16 .01 
Emotion x Defendant Age x 
Pretrial Bias 
2.01 3, 335 .11 .02 
Emotion x Defendant Age x 
Chronic Predator 
1.12 6, 335 .35 .02 
Emotion x Defendant Age x 
Antisocial 
1.30 6, 335 .26 .02 
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Table 15 
Effects of Defendant Age, Emotion, Pretrial Bias, and Stereotyping on Standards of Proof  
Effects F df p p2 
Defendant Age .004 1, 331 .95 .000 
Emotion  .33 3, 331 .80 .003 
Pretrial Bias .000 1, 331 .99 .000 
Chronic Predator 4.83 1, 331 .03 .01 
Antisocial 2.42 1, 331 .12 .01 
Defendant Age x Pretrial 
Bias 
.000 1, 331 1.00 .000 
Emotion x Pretrial Bias .84 3, 331 .47 .01 
Emotion x Defendant Age 1.87 3, 331 .14 .02 
Defendant Age x Chronic 
Predator 
7.29 1, 331 .01 .02 
Defendant Age x Antisocial 6.46 1, 331 .01 .02 
Emotion x Defendant Age x 
Pretrial Bias 
.65 3, 331 .58 .01 
Emotion x Defendant Age x 
Chronic Predator 
.67 6, 331 .68 .01 
Emotion x Defendant Age x 
Antisocial 
.47 6, 331 .83 .01 
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Table 16 
Predictors of Guilty/Not Guilty Verdicts with Negative Emotion as a Predictor 
Variable B SE Wald  df p Exp(B) 
Negative Emotion 1.11 .40 7.81 1 .01 3.05 
Defendant Age 1.05 .49 4.49 1 .03 2.85 
Pretrial Bias 
.30 .34 .81 1 .37 1.35 
Chronic Predator 
.92 .32 8.17 1 .004 2.51 
Antisocial 
-.47 .29 2.57 1 .11 .62 
Defendant Age x Negative 
Emotion 
-1.36 .55 6.06 1 .01 .26 
Pretrial Bias x Negative 
Emotion 
-.06 .36 .03 1 .88 .95 
Defendant Age x Chronic 
Predator 
-.69 .73 .88 1 .35 .50 
Defendant Age x Antisocial 
.17 .78 .05 1 .83 1.18 
Defendant Age x Negative 
Emotion x Chronic Predator 
.17 .73 .06 1 .82 1.19 
Defendant Age x Negative 
Emotion x Antisocial 
.34 .79 .18 1 .67 1.40 
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Table 17 
Guilty/Not Guilty Verdicts by Defendant Age and Negative Emotion Condition 
Negative Emotion  
 16-year-old  25-year-old  
Guilty  74 (49.3%)  83 (58.5%)  
Not Guilty  76 (50.7%)  59 (41.5%)  
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Table 18 
Guilty/Not Guilty Verdicts by Defendant Age and Neutral Emotion Condition 
Neutral Emotion  
 16-year-old  25-year-old  
Guilty  20 (57.1%)  14 (35.0%)  
Not Guilty  15 (42.9%)  26 (65.0%)  
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Appendix A 
Informed Consent 
Identification of Project:  Perceptions of Crime and Criminals 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study that examines perceptions of crime and 
criminals. This study will take approximately 15 minutes to complete. You were selected 
as a participant because you have signed up to participate in web-based research through 
Study Response. To complete this study, you must be at least 18 years of age. This study 
is being conducted by researchers at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln under the 
direction of Megan Jones, a graduate student in the Department of Psychology.  
Participation in this study will require approximately 15 minutes of your time. This study 
will take place on the internet. You will read a brief newspaper article about the 
commission of a crime, and answer some questions about your opinions regarding crime 
and criminals. You will also be asked to provide some demographic information.   
You will receive a $5 gift certificate to Amazon.com in exchange for your participation.  
The potential benefits of the current study outweigh any cost that may accompany 
participation. Knowledge generated through this study will help researchers better 
understand how individuals think about crime and criminals. Such knowledge about 
perceptions of crime and criminals can lead to improvements in the legal system.  
 
There are no known risks or discomforts associated with this research. If a participant 
does not feel comfortable answering a question during the session, the participant can 
choose not to respond. You will not be penalized for skipping any questions that you do 
not want to answer. You may skip any questions or stop completing any survey without 
penalty. The alternative to this study is non-participation. Your participation is voluntary. 
You are free to decide not to participate in this study or to withdraw at any time without 
adversely affecting your relationship with the investigators or the University of 
Nebraska-Lincoln. Your refusal to participate will involve no penalty to you or loss of 
any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  
 
The results of this study may be published, but your name and identity will not be 
revealed and all of the data and information collected from you will remain anonymous. 
All data will be identified with numbers that have no links to you as a research participant 
and will be kept in a locked, secure lab in Burnett Hall at the University of Nebraska-
Lincoln for a period of five years after which it will be destroyed. Nonetheless, some of 
the questions on the demographic sheet ask about, among other things, your gender, your 
ethnicity, and your age. Feel free to leave any of those items unanswered if you feel that 
the answers may reveal your identity. 
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Megan Jones (graduate student) and Dr. Richard L. Wiener are conducting this study. 
They will be happy to answer any questions or concerns about the study. You may 
contact Ms. Jones at (402) 472-9639 or mberingerjones@gmail.com, or Dr. Wiener at 
(402) 472-1137 or rwiener2@unl.edu. To obtain more information about your rights as a 
research participant or to report any concerns about the study, please contact the 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln Institutional Review Board (IRB) for Human Research at 
(402) 472-6965. 
 
If you wish to participate in this study, please read the following statement and provide 
your electronic signature by clicking at the bottom of the webpage. It is suggested that 
you print a copy of this informed consent form for your personal records. 
 
I have read and understood the information presented above. If I have any questions 
before I begin, I may contact the researchers. Otherwise, my concerns have been 
answered to my satisfaction via this consent form. I consent to take part in this 
experiment. 
____ I agree, and I consent to take part in this experiment 
____ I disagree, and I do not wish to take part in this experiment 
Name and Phone Number of Investigators:   
Megan Jones   (402) 472-9639 
Dr. Richard Wiener  (402) 472-1137 
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Appendix B 
Newspaper Article (16-year-old, Juvenile court) 
Teen charged with armed robbery 
OMAHA – A 16-year-old Omaha teen was charged Friday with robbing a man at 
gunpoint last month.  
Aiden Davis was charged by the Douglas County Sheriff’s Department with robbery with 
a dangerous weapon. He is currently being held without bail. 
Davis is accused of taking $326 and a cell phone from a man, who he threatened with a 
gun. Davis will be tried in the Douglas County Separate Juvenile Court next month.  
Davis’s trial will be held in the juvenile court in front of a juvenile court judge because of 
his young age.  
 
Newspaper Article (16-year-old, Criminal court) 
Teen charged with armed robbery 
OMAHA – A 16-year-old Omaha teen was charged Friday with robbing a man at 
gunpoint last month.  
Aiden Davis was charged by the Douglas County Sheriff’s Department with robbery with 
a dangerous weapon. He is currently being held without bail. 
Davis is accused of taking $326 and a cell phone from a man, who he threatened with a 
gun. Davis will be tried as an adult in the Douglas County adult Criminal Court next 
month.  Davis’s trial will not be held in the Douglas County Separate Juvenile Court in 
front of a juvenile court judge even though his young age could allow his trial to proceed 
in that venue.   
 
Newspaper Article (25-year-old, Criminal court) 
Man charged with armed robbery 
OMAHA – A 25-year-old Omaha man was charged Friday with robbing a man at 
gunpoint last month. 
Aiden Davis was charged by the Douglas County Sheriff’s Department with robbery with 
a dangerous weapon. He is currently being held without bail. 
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Davis is accused of taking $326 and a cell phone from a man, who he threatened with a 
gun. Davis will be tried in the Douglas County adult Criminal Court next month.  
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Appendix C 
 
Stereotype Questionnaire  
 
Below are a series of statements concerning the individual charged with armed robbery in 
the newspaper article you just read.  Please use your best guess and indicate the degree to 
which you agree or disagree with each statement by selecting the number on the 
numerical scales that best expresses your opinion. 
 
1. This individual has committed other crimes in the past.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
2. This individual is aggressive. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
3. This individual is a danger to society.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
4. This individual uses illegal drugs.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
5. This individual is vindictive. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
6. This individual is a chronic offender.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
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7.  This individual is lazy. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
 
 
8. This individual is immoral.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
9. This individual has a previous criminal record.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
10. This individual is cruel.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
11. This individual is intelligent. (reverse scored) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
12.  This individual is a bad person. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
13. This individual has gotten into trouble just this one time. (reverse scored) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
14. This individual is prone to violence. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
15. This individual is antisocial. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
16. This individual is hot-tempered. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
 
17. This individual has had a lot of previous contact with the police.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
18. This individual is manipulative. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
19. This individual could probably be rehabilitated. (reverse scored) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
20. This individual is immature. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
21. This individual knows the difference between right and wrong. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
22. This individual does not feel remorse for what he has done.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
23. This individual is a superpredator. (A superpredator is a serious and violent offender 
who is a threat to public safety, is cold and calculating, is competent to understand the 
court process, and has little rehabilitation potential.) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
(For 16-year-old conditions) 
24. This individual is a wayward youth. (A wayward youth is a disadvantaged youth who 
conducts mostly nonviolent offenses, has been failed by parents and the schools, has 
inferior decision-making abilities compared to adults, does not understand the court 
process, and should be rehabilitated rather than punished.) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
(For 25-year-old condition) 
24. This individual was a wayward youth when he was a teenager. (A wayward youth is a 
disadvantaged youth who conducts mostly nonviolent offenses, has been failed by parents 
and the schools, has inferior decision-making abilities compared to adults, does not 
understand the court process, and should be rehabilitated rather than punished.) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
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Appendix D 
 
Demographics Questionnaire 
 
1. What is your age?        ____ years old 
 
2.  What is your gender?   ____ Male ____ Female 
 
3.  What is your ethnic origin and/or race?   
 
  _____ African American  _____ Asian American 
  _____ Caucasian   _____ Hispanic  
  _____ Latin American  _____ Native American  
  _____ Other 
 
4.  What is the highest level of formal education that you have completed?  
 
  _____ Less than high school 
  _____ High school 
  _____ Associate’s degree 
  _____ Bachelor’s degree 
  _____ Master’s degree 
  _____ Professional degree (i.e., M.D., J.D., Ph.D.) 
 
5.  Is English your primary language? 
  _____ yes _____ no 
 
6.  Have you served as a juror on:  (check one answer for each): 
 
   a state civil case?   _____ yes _____ no 
   a state criminal case?  _____ yes _____ no 
   a federal civil case?  _____ yes _____ no 
   a federal criminal case?  _____ yes _____ no 
 
7. Are you registered to vote? 
  _____ yes _____ no 
 
8. Do you have a valid driver’s license? 
  _____  yes _____ no 
 
9. Are you a citizen of the United States?   
 _____ yes _____ no 
 
10. Are you a convicted felon without civil rights?    
 _____ yes _____ no 
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11. What is your religious preference (if any)? 
  ___________________________________________________ 
 
12. What is your current work status?  (check one): 
 _____ employed full time _____ employed part time _____ unemployed 
 
13. What is your political affiliation?  (check one): 
  _____ Democrat _____ Republican _____ other _____ none 
 
14. What was the age of the individual described in the newspaper article?  _______ 
 
15. When you read the newspaper article, what did you think the race of the 
individual was? 
 ___________________________________________________ 
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Appendix E 
 
Debriefing 
 
Thank you for participating in this study.  The purpose of this study was to examine 
stereotypes about juveniles who are tried as adults in criminal court.  Some research 
suggests that juveniles who are transferred to criminal court are judged more harshly than 
adults who are charged with the same crimes.  The goal of the current study is to assess 
which stereotypes people associate with juveniles tried as adults compared to juveniles 
tried in juvenile court and adults tried in criminal court.  The results of this study will be 
used to construct a stereotyping measure for use in future research examining juror 
decision making regarding juveniles tried as adults.  
 
Once again, we thank you for your participation; we ask that you not discuss this research 
with any future participants as it may negatively influence the results of our study.  If you 
have any questions or concerns about this project, or if you would like to know the 
general results of the research upon its completion, feel free to contact Megan Jones or 
Richard Wiener at 402-472-9639. 
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Appendix F 
Informed Consent 
Identification of Project:  Social Cognition in Recall of Life Events and Legal Decision 
Making 
 
You are invited to participate in research that examines both social cognition in recall of 
life events, and legal decision making. A group of researchers studying social cognition is 
interested in a number of different types of information processing, and to facilitate data 
collection has combined several of their experiments. You were selected as a participant 
because you have signed up to participate in web-based research through Study 
Response. To complete this research, you must be at least 18 years of age. This research 
is being conducted by researchers at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln under the 
direction of Megan Jones, a graduate student in the Department of Psychology, and Dr. 
Richard Wiener, professor in the Department of Psychology.  
 
This research will consist of three separate experiments. Experiment 1 will take 
approximately 20 minutes to complete. Experiments 2 and 3 will occur several weeks 
after the completion of Experiment 1. Experiment 2 will take approximately 15 minutes 
to complete, and Experiment 3 will take approximately 15 minutes to complete. All three 
experiments will take place on the internet.  
 
In Experiment 1 you will answer some questions regarding your opinions about the legal 
system, crime, and criminals. You will also read a short crime scenario and decide 
whether the defendant in it is guilty. Experiment 2 will examine how individuals write 
about life events. You will be asked to write about past or present life events, and then 
will complete a few other short questionnaires about what you wrote. Experiment 3 will 
examine legal decision making. You will be asked to read about a case in which the 
defendant is being charged with a serious crime, following which you will determine 
whether the defendant is guilty and answer several other questions about the case. 
 
You will receive a $5 gift certificate to Amazon.com in exchange for your participation 
in Experiment 1. You will receive a $10 gift certificate to Amazon.com in exchange for 
your participation in Experiments 2 and 3.  
 
The potential benefits of the current research outweigh any cost that may accompany 
participation. Knowledge generated through these studies will help researchers better 
understand individual differences in information processing about life events, which will 
contribute to the study of social cognition. This research will also help researchers better 
understand legal decision making, which can lead to improvements in the legal system.  
 
The risks of this research are minimal.  Some participants may experience some minimal 
discomfort when writing about life events in Experiment 2. Some participants may also 
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experience some minimal discomfort when reading about the crimes described in 
Experiments 1 and 3. In addition, this research, like much other research in Psychology, 
may contain some questions that you may find sensitive or personal.   
 
If a participant does not feel comfortable answering a question during the study, the 
participant can choose not to respond. You will not be penalized for skipping any 
questions that you do not want to answer. You may skip any questions or stop completing 
any survey without penalty. The alternative to this research is non-participation. Your 
participation is voluntary. You are free to decide not to participate in this research or to 
withdraw at any time without adversely affecting your relationship with the investigators 
or the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Your refusal to participate will involve no penalty 
to you or loss of any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  
 
The results of this research may be published, but your name and identity will not be 
revealed and all of the data and information collected from you will remain anonymous. 
All data will be identified with numbers that have no links to you as a research participant 
and will be kept in a locked, secure lab in Burnett Hall at the University of Nebraska for a 
period of five years after which it will be destroyed. Nonetheless, some of the questions 
on the demographic sheet ask about, among other things, your gender, your ethnicity, and 
your age. Feel free to leave any of those items unanswered if you feel that the answers 
may reveal your identity. 
 
Megan Jones (graduate student) and Dr. Richard L. Wiener are conducting this research. 
They will be happy to answer any questions or concerns about the research. You may 
contact Ms. Jones at (402) 472-9639 or mberingerjones@gmail.com, or Dr. Wiener at 
(402) 472-1137 or rwiener2@unl.edu. To obtain more information about your rights as a 
research participant or to report any concerns about this research, please contact the 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln Institutional Review Board (IRB) for Human Research at 
(402) 472-6965. 
 
If you wish to participate in this research, please read the following statement and 
provide your electronic signature by clicking at the bottom of the webpage. It is 
suggested that you print a copy of this informed consent form for your personal records. 
 
I have read and understood the information presented above. If I have any questions 
before I begin, I may contact the researchers. Otherwise, my concerns have been 
answered to my satisfaction via this consent form. I consent to take part in this research. 
____ I agree, and I consent to take part in this research 
____ I disagree, and I do not wish to take part in this research 
Name and Phone Number of Investigators:   
Megan Jones   (402) 472-9639 
Dr. Richard Wiener  (402) 472-1137 
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Appendix G 
 
Stereotyping Measure 
 
Imagine a juvenile who has committed a crime and is now being tried as an adult in 
criminal court. Below are a series of statements concerning this individual. Please use 
your best guess and indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each 
statement below by selecting the number on the numerical scales that best expresses 
your opinion. 
 
1. This individual has committed other crimes in the past.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
2. This individual is aggressive. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
3. This individual is a danger to society.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
4. This individual uses illegal drugs.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
5. This individual is vindictive. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
6. This individual is a chronic offender.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
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7.  This individual is lazy. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
 
 
8. This individual is immoral.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
9. This individual has a previous criminal record.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
10. This individual is cruel.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
11. This individual is intelligent. (reverse scored) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
12.  This individual is a bad person. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
13. This individual has gotten into trouble just this one time. (reverse scored) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
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14. This individual is prone to violence. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
15. This individual is antisocial. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
16. This individual is hot-tempered. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
 
17. This individual has had a lot of previous contact with the police.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
18. This individual is manipulative. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
19. This individual could probably be rehabilitated. (reverse scored) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
20. This individual is immature. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
21. This individual knows the difference between right and wrong. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
22. This individual does not feel remorse for what he has done.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
23. This individual is a superpredator. (A superpredator is a serious and violent offender 
who is a threat to public safety, is cold and calculating, is competent to understand the 
court process, and has little rehabilitation potential.) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
 
24. This individual is a wayward youth. (A wayward youth is a disadvantaged youth who 
conducts mostly nonviolent offenses, has been failed by parents and the schools, has 
inferior decision-making abilities compared to adults, does not understand the court 
process, and should be rehabilitated rather than punished.) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Completely 
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Appendix H 
 
Pretrial Juror Bias Questionnaire 
 
Below are a series of statements concerning the legal system.  Please indicate the degree 
to which you agree or disagree with each statement by circling the number on the 
numerical scales that best expresses your opinion. 
 
1. If a suspect runs from police, then he probably committed the crime.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
2. A defendant should be found guilty if 11 out of 12 jurors vote guilty.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
3. Too often jurors hesitate to convict someone who is guilty out of pure sympathy.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
4. In most cases where the accused presents a strong defense, it is only because of a good 
lawyer.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
5. Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty of the crime with which 
they are charged.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
 
6. For serious crimes like murder, a defendant should be found guilty so long as there is a 
90% chance that he committed the crime.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
7. Defense lawyers don’t really care about guilt or innocence; they are just in business to 
make money.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
8. Generally, the police make an arrest only when they are sure about who committed the 
crime.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
9. Many accident claims filed against insurance companies are phony.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
10. The defendant is often a victim of his own bad reputation.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
11. Extenuating circumstances should not be considered; if a person commits a crime, 
then that person should be punished.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
12. If the defendant committed a victimless crime, like gambling or possession of 
marijuana, he should never be convicted.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
13. Defense lawyers are too willing to defend individuals they know are guilty.  
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1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
14. Police routinely lie to protect other police officers.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
15. Once a criminal, always a criminal.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
16. Lawyers will do whatever it takes, even lie, to win a case.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
17. Criminals should be caught and convicted by “any means necessary.”  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
18. A prior record of conviction is the best indicator of a person’s guilt in the present 
case.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
19. Rich individuals are almost never convicted of their crimes.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
20. If a defendant is a member of a gang, he/she is definitely guilty of the crime.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly    Strongly  
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Disagree Agree 
 
21. Minorities use the “race issue” only when they are guilty.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
22. When it is the suspect’s word against the police officer’s, I believe the police.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
23. Men are more likely to be guilty of crimes than women.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
24. The large number of African Americans currently in prison is an example of the 
innate criminality of that subgroup.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
25. A Black man on trial with a predominantly White jury will always be found guilty.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
26. Minority suspects are likely to be guilty, more often than not.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
27. If a witness refuses to take a lie detector test, it is because he/she is hiding something.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
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28. Defendants who change their story are almost always guilty.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
29. Famous people are often considered to be “above the law.”  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
30. The death penalty is cruel and inhuman.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
31. Circumstantial evidence is too weak to use in court.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
32. If the grand jury recommends that a person be brought to trial, then he probably 
committed the crime.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
33. Too many innocent people are wrongfully imprisoned.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
 
34. If a majority of the evidence, but not all of it, suggests that the defendant committed 
the crime, the jury should vote not guilty.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly  
Agree 
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Appendix I 
 
Attitudes toward Rape 
 
In this section, you will be asked a series of questions regarding your beliefs about 
sexual assault.  For these questions, please indicate the extent to which you agree or 
disagree with each statement by circling the number on the scale that you feel is 
closest to your opinion about each statement.   
 
1. A charge of rape two days after the act has occurred is probably not rape.   
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Strongly  
Agree Disagree 
 
2. It would do some women good to get raped.   
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Strongly  
Agree Disagree 
 
3. Most charges of rape are unfounded.   
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Strongly  
Agree Disagree 
 
4. A convicted rapist should be castrated or serve a life sentence in prison.   
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Strongly  
Agree Disagree 
 
5. In most cases when a woman was raped, she was asking for it.   
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Strongly  
Agree Disagree 
 
6. Rapists are motivated more by a desire for power than by a desire for sex.   
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Strongly  
Agree Disagree 
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7. In order to protect the male, it should be difficult to prove that a rape has occurred.   
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Strongly  
Agree Disagree 
 
8. In forcible rape, the victim never causes the crime.   
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Strongly  
Agree Disagree 
 
9. During a rape, a woman should do everything she can to resist.   
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Strongly  
Agree Disagree 
 
10. Most men would commit rape if they knew they could get away with it.   
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Strongly  
Agree Disagree 
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Appendix J 
Crime Scenario 
People v. Martin 
Henry Martin, the defendant, is charged with attempted sexual assault in the first 
degree for acts allegedly committed against Christina Wilson. 
According to Christina Wilson, a man standing over her bed awakened her in the middle 
of the night.  Wearing a paper mask and gloves, the intruder attacked Mrs. Wilson as she 
tried to scramble out of bed.  Wilson testified that she managed to slide away from 
Martin but he grabbed her and the two of them struggled on and off the bed for a period 
of time.  Wilson claimed that when she screamed for Martin to stop, he placed his hands 
over her mouth to silence her.  As Martin tried unsuccessfully to remove Christina’s 
pajama bottoms, Wilson heard the sound of a car pulling into the driveway. Hearing the 
car, the defendant ran fearfully out of the house and out the backdoor.  Wilson testified 
that Martin knew that her husband was out of town, and that he knew the layout of the 
home because he had done handy work for the Wilsons and had watched the house when 
the Wilsons were out of town.  Further, the Wilson’s German shepherd knew the intruder 
and did not bark at his presence.  Nonetheless, Mrs. Wilson admitted that she never 
observed the intruder’s face directly during the ordeal nor did she ever hear him speak. 
The defendant, Henry Martin told a very different story.  He admitted that he was at the 
victim’s home on the morning of question.  He denied breaking into the house or 
attempting to rape the victim.  According to Martin, the two were having a consensual 
affair and Christina invited him there because her husband was away on business.  He 
testified that prior to the day in question; he had made frequent visits to Mrs. Wilson’s 
home during the course of her husband’s absences.  Martin claimed he ran away when he 
and Christina heard the sound of a car pulling up because they believed it to be 
Christina’s husband.  Martin testified that Christina told him to leave before her husband 
saw Henry. 
The Law of the Case:  Henry Martin is guilty of attempted sexual assault in the first 
degree if he intentionally acted with conduct, which under the circumstances as he 
believed them to be, constituted a substantial step toward the commission of sexual 
assault in the first degree. Conduct is considered a substantial step only if it is strongly 
corroborative of Mr. Martin’s criminal intent. Sexual assault in the first degree is sexually 
penetrating another person without her consent. It is the state’s burden to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Mr. Martin is guilty of all elements of attempted sexual assault in 
the first degree.  
1. Is Henry Martin guilty of attempted sexual assault in the first degree? 
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a. Not guilty 
 
b. Guilty 
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Appendix K 
 
Introduction to Phase 2 of Study 2 
 
You will now be participating in the second and third experiments in the series of 
three experiments that you agreed to participate in. The Social Cognition Research 
Group is interested in a number of different types of information processing. 
Therefore, you will participate in two unrelated experiments to address several of 
the group members’ research questions.  
 
Experiment 2 will examine how individuals write about life events. You will be 
asked to write about past or present life events, and then will complete a few other 
short questionnaires about what you wrote. 
 
Experiment 3 will examine legal decision making. You will be asked to read about a 
case in which the defendant is being charged with a serious crime, following which 
you will determine whether the defendant is guilty and answer a number of other 
questions about the case. 
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Appendix L 
 
Emotion Manipulation (Anger) 
 
Life Events Questionnaire 
 
Instructions: The researchers are interested in how individuals write about life events. 
Please answer the questions below, taking the time to give complete and detailed 
responses.  
 
Question 1: What are the three to five things that make you most angry? Please write two 
to three sentences about each thing that makes you angry.  
 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
Question 2: Now we’d like you to describe in more detail the one situation that makes 
you (or has made you) most angry. This could be something you are presently 
experiencing or something from the past. Begin by writing down what you remember of 
the anger-inducing event(s) and continue by writing as detailed a description of the 
event(s) as is possible. 
 
If you can, please write your description so that someone reading this might even get 
angry just from learning about the situation. What is it like to be in this situation? Why 
does it make you so angry? 
 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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Emotion Manipulation (Sadness) 
 
Life Events Questionnaire 
 
Instructions: The researchers are interested in how individuals write about life events. 
Please answer the questions below, taking the time to give complete and detailed 
responses.  
 
Question 1: What are the three to five things that make you most sad? Please write two-
three sentences about each thing that makes you sad. 
 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
Question 2: Now we’d like you to describe in more detail the one situation that makes 
you (or has made you) most sad. This could be something you are presently experiencing 
or something from the past. Begin by writing down what you remember of the sadness-
inducing event(s) and continue by writing as detailed a description of the event(s) as is 
possible. 
 
If you can, please write your description so that someone reading this might even get sad 
just from learning about the situation. What is it like to be in this situation? Why does it 
make you so sad? 
 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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Emotion Manipulation (Fear) 
 
Life Events Questionnaire 
 
Instructions: The researchers are interested in how individuals write about life events. 
Please answer the questions below, taking the time to give complete and detailed 
responses.  
 
Question 1: What are the three to five things that make you most scared? Please write 
two to three sentences about each thing that makes you scared. 
 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
Question 2: Now we’d like you to describe in more detail the one situation that makes 
you (or has made you) most scared. This could be something you are presently 
experiencing or something from the past. Begin by writing down what you remember of 
the fear-inducing event(s) and continue by writing as detailed a description of the 
event(s) as is possible. 
 
If you can, please write your description so that someone reading this might even get 
scared just from learning about the situation. What is it like to be in this situation? Why 
does it make you so scared? 
 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Emotion Manipulation (Neutral) 
 
Life Events Questionnaire 
 
Instructions: The researchers are interested in how individuals write about life events. 
Please answer the questions below, taking the time to give complete and detailed 
responses.  
 
Question 1: What are three to five activities that you did today? Please write two to three 
sentences about each activity that you select. (Examples of activities you might write 
about include: driving to work, eating lunch, going to the gym, etc.) 
 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
Question 2: Now we’d like you to describe in more detail two of the activities that you 
just discussed. Begin by writing down a description of each activity and then figure out 
how much time you devoted to each activity. Describe in detail what you did to complete 
each activity.  
 
If you can, please write your description so that someone reading this might be able to 
reconstruct the way in which you, specifically, completed each of your activities. 
 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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Appendix M 
 
Appraisal Questionnaire 
 
Instructions: Please consider the situations and experiences you wrote about on the 
previous pages when answering the following questions. 
 
 
1. In the events that you described on the previous pages, how well did you understand 
what was happening in those situations? 
 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Extremely  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
2. In the events that you described on the previous pages, to what extent did you typically 
feel that someone other than yourself had the ability to influence what was happening?  
 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Extremely  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
3. In the events that you described on the previous pages, how uncertain were you about 
what would happen in various situations? 
 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Extremely  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
4. In the events that you described on the previous pages, to what extent did you typically 
feel that someone else was to blame for what was happening in the situation? 
 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Extremely  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
5. In the events that you described on the previous pages, how well could you typically 
predict what was going to happen next? 
 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Extremely  
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
6. In the events that you described on the previous pages, to what extent were the events 
beyond anyone’s control?  
 
Not at 
all    Somewhat    Extremely  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 
 
207 
 
Appendix N 
 
Emotion Manipulation Check 
 
Instructions:  Please rate the extent to which you feel each of the following emotions 
right now.  
 
1.  Happy 
Not at 
all    Moderately    
Extremely 
strongly 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
2.  Angry 
Not at 
all    Moderately    
Extremely 
strongly 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
3.  Disgusted 
Not at 
all    Moderately    
Extremely 
strongly 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
4.  Sad 
Not at 
all    Moderately    
Extremely 
strongly 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
5.  Fearful 
Not at 
all    Moderately    
Extremely 
strongly 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
6.  Surprised 
Not at 
all    Moderately    
Extremely 
strongly 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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Appendix O 
 
Trial Summary – 25-year-old version 
 
  
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
The following trial summary is based on an actual case. It describes a 25-
year-old adult defendant who has been charged with first-degree murder and 
is being tried in criminal court. While you read the summary, please put 
yourself in the position of a juror who is receiving this information in court. 
Please pay close attention to the information in the trial summary. At the 
conclusion of the trial summary, you will be asked to make a decision 
regarding whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. (All personally 
identifying information has been changed to protect the privacy of the 
parties involved.) 
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IN THE DOUGLAS COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF NEBRASKA 
 
THE STATE OF NEBRASKA 
 
v. 
 
AIDEN DAVIS (Defendant) 
 
The Charge:  
First-degree murder  
 
People in the Case:  
Susan Parker, victim  
Aiden Davis, defendant  
 
Witnesses:  
Andrew Parker, victim’s husband  
Dr. Peter Fielding, medical examiner  
Julia Manning, criminalist  
Officer David Bourne, Omaha city police officer  
Jennifer Murphy, senior criminalist  
Sean Phillips, defendant’s friend  
Lucas Allen, defendant’s neighbor  
Ramona McConnell, defendant’s neighbor  
Summary of Opening Statements 
 
Prosecution:  
The Prosecution explained that the evidence would show that on July 11th, 2009, 25-
year-old Aiden Davis bludgeoned Susan Parker to death during an attempted residential 
burglary. Davis had stolen credit card information from other individuals in his 
neighborhood, and on the day of the murder he was attempting to steal Susan Parker’s 
credit card information. Susan Parker’s blood was found on items in a bag belonging to 
Aiden Davis, and he had injuries on his body consistent with those that Mrs. Parker’s 
assailant could have sustained from her efforts to defend herself. The Prosecution stated 
that the trial would show that Aiden Davis is guilty of committing first-degree murder.  
 
Defense:  
The Defense explained that Aiden Davis was innocent and had been wrongly accused of 
the murder of Susan Parker. The defense stated that the evidence would show that the 
defendant’s friend, Sean Phillips, killed Susan Parker. Phillips was the mastermind 
behind the plan to steal credit card information to buy equipment for growing marijuana. 
Phillips had been to the van where the blood-stained items were found, and does not have 
an alibi for the morning of the murder. None of the forensic evidence can establish that 
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Davis was at the scene of the crime. The Defense stated that the trial would prove that 
Aiden Davis did not murder Susan Parker.  
 
Summary of Testimony 
 
Witness 1: Andrew Parker, victim’s husband  
 
Andrew Parker testified that on the morning of Saturday, July 11th, 2009, he left the 
house shortly before 8:00 a.m. to attend a meeting. Parker’s wife, Susan, was still asleep 
when he left. Mr. Parker attempted to call Susan periodically during the day but she did 
not answer the phone. He left his office late in the afternoon that day, and stated that 
when he arrived home, he was surprised to see Susan’s car was still in the garage, as she 
had plans to attend the ballet that evening. When he approached the front door he noticed 
smears on it. He opened the front door and saw Susan lying there in a pool of blood. He 
fell to the floor screaming. He called 911 from inside the house and then returned to 
Susan’s body and continued to cry and scream.  
 
Mr. Parker testified that he lives one block away from the defendant, Aiden Davis, and 
that he had seen him in passing but had never spoken with him.  
 
Witness 2: Dr. Peter Fielding, medical examiner  
 
Dr. Fielding conducted the autopsy of Susan Parker. He stated that she died as a result of 
blunt force trauma to her head. The vast majority of Mrs. Parker’s external injuries were 
abrasions (scrape-type injuries) and lacerations (crushing or tearing-type injuries) caused 
by blunt force, many on the victim’s head. While it was difficult to estimate how many 
blows Mrs. Parker suffered because of possible overlap, Fielding was able to identify 
eight distinct injuries on the right side of Mrs. Parker's head, 11 on the back of her head, 
and seven on the left side of her head. Mrs. Parker's internal injuries as a result of the 
blows to her head consisted of bleeding inside her scalp and over virtually every surface 
of the brain. 
There were also contusions, abrasions, and scratches to Mrs. Parker's shoulders, breasts, 
and upper torso, fractures to her left hand, and bruising on her right foot, which Fielding 
concluded were probably defensive injuries. The injuries to the right foot were most 
likely sustained while the victim was on the floor “trying to get anything between her and 
the force being inflicted.” 
 
Dr. Fielding surmised that Mrs. Parker would have died within minutes as opposed to 
hours after the first blows were struck to her head. Based on his examination, Fielding 
concluded that Mrs. Parker probably died sometime between 9:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. on 
July 11th.  
 
Witness 3: Julia Manning, criminalist  
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Julia Manning, a criminalist with the Douglas County Sheriff’s Department, arrived at the 
crime scene at about 9:15 p.m. on July 11th to process the crime scene and collect 
evidence. Manning observed blood on the floor and the walls near Mrs. Parker’s body. 
Manning also observed blood smears on the interior portion of the door that she opined 
were consistent with someone who was wearing a long-sleeved garment. Mrs. Parker was 
found in a short-sleeved t-shirt. Based on the location of the great majority of the blood 
evidence, Manning opined that most of the victim’s injuries were sustained while Mrs. 
Parker was low to the ground in the entryway.   
 
On the walls and on objects in the room there were numerous finger marks in blood; 
some of these contained fine linear striations, indicating they were fabric patterns rather 
than fingerprints, consistent with the attacker wearing gloves throughout the incident.  
 
Witness 4: Officer David Bourne, Omaha city police officer 
 
A forensic examination of Susan Parker’s computer showed that it was used beginning at 
8:07 a.m. on July 11th to visit several Web sites that were consistent with her interests. 
The computer was used very extensively in the first part of the morning. The last use was 
at 10:12 a.m. and there was no further activity on the computer that day up until Mrs. 
Parker’s body was discovered. 
 
Officer Bourne testified that in the defendant’s bedroom, police officers found pieces of 
paper with credit card account numbers and names of two of the defendant’s neighbors. 
These papers included a birth date and credit card security code number for one of the 
neighbors, and user names and passwords for the other neighbor’s online accounts, 
written in the defendant’s handwriting.  
 
Police officers searched an abandoned van located just down the road from the 
defendant’s residence. The van had been there for several years and was surrounded by 
vegetation. Behind the driver’s seat, officers found a relatively new looking duffle bag 
containing a black, long-sleeved shirt that appeared to have blood stains on it. The duffle 
bag also contained two black, costume-style evening gloves that extended up the 
forearms, and also appeared to contain blood stains.  
 
The duffle bag had an airline tag from December 2008 with defendant’s name on it. The 
duffle bag was identified as luggage that the defendant used on a trip to Florida in 2008.  
 
Officer Bourne acknowledged that although the bag was the defendant’s, it was possible 
that someone else could have taken the bag from the defendant’s home, placed the shirt 
and gloves inside the bag, and placed it in the van.  
 
 Witness 5: Jennifer Murphy, senior criminalist 
 
Jennifer Murphy, senior criminalist at the Douglas County Sherriff’s Department, 
conducted a DNA analysis of the evidence recovered from the abandoned van. She tested 
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the duffle bag and the items found inside the duffle bag, and determined that Susan 
Parker’s blood was on the interior of the bag and on the shirt and gloves found in the 
bag.  
 
Murphy also testified that when the defendant was arrested several days after Mrs. Parker 
was killed, he had a scratch on his nose and bruises on both arms, a red discoloration on 
his back, a yellow discoloration on his thumb, abrasions on his leg, and various red marks 
on his body. She stated that these injuries were consistent with injuries Mrs. Parker’s 
killer could have received based on the extent of the defensive wounds found on her 
body.  
 
Murphy did admit, however, that the defendant’s injuries also could have been sustained 
in a number of other ways, and that she could not state definitively that he received the 
injuries while attacking Mrs. Parker.  
 
DNA testing of Mrs. Parker’s fingernails found no DNA present other than her own.  
 
Witness 6: Sean Phillips, defendant’s friend 
 
Twenty-five-year-old Sean Phillips testified that he had been close friends with the 
defendant since the eighth grade. At the beginning of the summer in 2009, the defendant 
and Phillips began discussing a plan to grow marijuana. Phillips testified that the 
defendant came up with the idea of using stolen credit card information to pay for the 
growing equipment they needed.  
 
A week before Parker’s murder, the defendant and Phillips exchanged e-mails in which 
Phillips identified the lighting and hydroponic equipment they would need to grow 
marijuana in the defendant’s closet, and the online sites from which to order them. 
Phillips stated that the defendant had all of the stolen credit card information and was 
planning on purchasing the equipment identified by Phillips sometime that week. He 
testified that although he knew the defendant was going to use stolen credit card 
information to make the purchases, he was not involved in obtaining the credit card 
information. Phillips stated that the defendant told him that he would take care of 
obtaining everything they needed to grow marijuana, and that he just needed Phillips to 
tell him which equipment to buy.  
 
Phillips testified that he knew of the abandoned van where the defendant’s duffle bag was 
found, and that he had been to the van with the defendant on several occasions to “hang 
out.” He also stated that he often visited Davis’s house, and had seen the duffle bag in 
Davis’s closet, but said that he was unsure about whether he had seen the shirt and gloves 
before.  
 
Phillips testified that he was alone at home on the morning of the murder, and admitted 
that since he was alone no one can confirm where he was when Susan Parker was killed.  
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Witness 7: Aiden Davis, defendant 
 
The defendant, 25-year-old Aiden Davis, testified that on the day of the murder he went 
for a walk with his dog in the woods near his house from approximately 9:30 a.m. to 
10:40 a.m. He testified that on the weekends he always walks his dog at the same 
approximate time, around 9:30 a.m. On the day of the murder there was no one at the 
defendant’s house to verify when he walked his dog, but Davis did see one of his 
neighbors, Lucas Allen, when he left his house with his dog, at approximately 9:30 a.m., 
and when he returned to his house at approximately 10:40 a.m.  
 
Davis admitted that he and his friend, Sean Phillips, had decided to start growing 
marijuana. However, he testified that Phillips was the one who had suggested stealing 
credit card information to pay for the growing equipment. He stated that Phillips had 
suggested that they try to get credit card information from Davis’s neighbors because the 
neighborhood Davis lived in was “nicer” than Phillips' neighborhood and he thought the 
people living there would have more money and be more likely to have credit cards. 
 
Davis testified that he and Phillips had entered two of Davis’s neighbors’ homes together 
and obtained credit card information either from the neighbors’ computers or by writing 
down their credit card numbers directly from their credit cards in their wallets. He 
testified that Phillips often talked about what they would have to do if someone caught 
them while they were in the neighbors’ homes. Davis stated that Phillips said that he 
would do “whatever it takes” to make sure they didn’t get caught. When he 
asked Phillips what he meant, Phillips said he would “use whatever force is necessary” to 
take care of someone who got in their way.  
 
Davis testified that he didn’t know how his duffle bag got in the van. He stated that the 
last time he saw it, it was in his closet. He stated that the shirt and gloves were not his and 
that he had never seen them before.   
 
Davis testified that he sustained his injuries while walking his dog in the woods. He 
stated that in the woods near his house there is a steep incline leading down to a creek, 
and that while attempting to walk down to the creek he lost his balance and rolled down 
the incline about 20 feet. Davis stated that he hit several rocks and trees when he fell, 
which caused his injuries.   
 
Witness 8: Lucas Allen, defendant’s neighbor 
 
Lucas Allen lived across the street from the defendant. He testified that he would often 
stop and talk to the defendant when they ran into each other outside while the defendant 
was walking his dog. He testified that on the day of the murder he was outside mowing 
his lawn and doing yard work from approximately 9:15 a.m. to 10:45 a.m. At 
approximately 9:30 a.m. he saw the defendant leave his house with his dog. Allen stated 
that the defendant waved and said good morning, and that he waved back, and that the 
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defendant then began walking in the direction of the woods. Allen testified that he was 
still outside when the defendant returned to his home at about 10:40 a.m. He testified that 
the defendant was wearing shorts and a t-shirt, and appeared calm and relaxed. Allen 
testified that he had never seen the defendant frustrated or angry, that he always had a 
smile, and was kind. He had never seen him act in a violent manner. He testified that he 
never saw the defendant lose his temper or lose control.  
 
Witness 9: Ramona McConnell, defendant’s neighbor 
 
Ramona McConnell testified that she lived next door to the defendant and had known 
him for four years. McConnell has two young children, and she testified that the 
defendant would often stop and let the children play with his dog when he saw them 
outside. She stated that the defendant was always very kind, patient, and gentle with the 
children. On one occasion, her son, who was four-years-old at the time, had fallen on the 
driveway and scraped his knees and was crying. McConnell testified that the defendant 
had been passing by and rushed over to make sure the little boy was ok. She stated that 
she believed the defendant was a very caring and compassionate individual.  
 
Summary of Closing Arguments 
 
Prosecution: 
The Prosecution argued that Aiden Davis entered Susan Parker’s house on July 11th to 
steal her credit card information, and when he discovered that she was at home, he 
bludgeoned her to death. The Prosecution reminded the jury that police found stolen 
credit card information from several of Davis’s neighbors in Davis’s house, written in his 
handwriting. Forensic evidence showed that the person who killed Susan Parker wore 
gloves and a long-sleeved shirt. Both gloves and a long-sleeved shirt were found in 
Davis’s duffle bag in a van near his house, and all of the items were stained with Susan 
Parker’s blood. The injuries seen on Davis’s body shortly after Susan Parker was killed 
are consistent with injuries one would expect to see on Mrs. Parker’s assailant, because 
her wounds suggested she fought back when attacked. And finally, although Davis was 
seen leaving to walk his dog at 9:30 a.m., and was seen returning at 10:40 a.m., the 
evidence suggests that Susan Parker was killed sometime between 10:12 a.m. and 11:00 
a.m., therefore Davis could have walked the one block to arrive at Parker’s house after he 
returned to his home at 10:40 a.m. The Prosecution concluded by stating that Aiden 
Davis killed Susan Parker during the commission of a burglary, and therefore the jury 
should find Davis guilty of first-degree murder. 
 
Defense: 
The Defense stated that Aiden Davis did not murder Susan Parker. The Defense argued 
that the defendant’s friend Sean Phillips is the real culprit. Phillips was the one who 
suggested stealing credit card information from Davis’s neighbors to buy the equipment 
for growing marijuana. Phillips told the defendant that he would be willing to do 
“whatever it takes” to avoid getting caught stealing credit card information, including 
using “whatever force is necessary.” Phillips could have easily taken Davis’s duffle bag 
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from his house during one of his visits there, and used it to dispose of the gloves and shirt 
in the abandoned van, which he had been to several times. And, Phillips does not have an 
alibi for the morning of the murder. Furthermore, Davis’s DNA was not found on Susan 
Parker’s fingernails. If Davis had attacked her and she had fought back, there would 
likely be DNA on her fingernails. Also, Davis’s neighbor saw him leave his house to 
walk his dog at 9:30 a.m., and return from walking his dog at 10:40 a.m., confirming 
Davis’s testimony that during the time of the murder he was in the woods walking his 
dog. It is highly unlikely that Davis would have had time to go to Parker's house and 
commit this crime in the very short amount of time between when he returned from 
walking his dog and 11:00 a.m. The Defense reminded the jury that Davis does not have 
violent tendencies, and is well-liked by people who know him. The Defense concluded 
that Aiden Davis is innocent, and that Sean Phillips should be investigated for the murder 
of Susan Parker. 
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Trial Summary – 16-year-old version 
 
  
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
The following trial summary is based on an actual case. It describes a 16-
year-old juvenile defendant who has been charged with first-degree murder 
and is being tried as an adult in criminal court. This juvenile could have been 
tried in juvenile court, but has been transferred to adult criminal court due to 
the seriousness of the crime. While you read the summary, please put 
yourself in the position of a juror who is receiving this information in court. 
Please pay close attention to the information in the trial summary. At the 
conclusion of the trial summary, you will be asked to make a decision 
regarding whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. (All personally 
identifying information has been changed to protect the privacy of the 
parties involved.) 
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IN THE DOUGLAS COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF NEBRASKA 
 
THE STATE OF NEBRASKA 
 
v. 
 
AIDEN DAVIS (Defendant) 
 
The Charge:  
First-degree murder  
 
People in the Case:  
Susan Parker, victim  
Aiden Davis, defendant  
 
Witnesses:  
Andrew Parker, victim’s husband  
Dr. Peter Fielding, medical examiner  
Julia Manning, criminalist  
Officer David Bourne, Omaha city police officer  
Jennifer Murphy, senior criminalist  
Sean Phillips, defendant’s friend  
Lucas Allen, defendant’s neighbor  
Ramona McConnell, defendant’s neighbor  
Summary of Opening Statements 
 
Prosecution:  
The Prosecution explained that the evidence would show that on July 11th, 2009, 16-
year-old Aiden Davis bludgeoned Susan Parker to death during an attempted residential 
burglary. Davis had stolen credit card information from other individuals in his 
neighborhood, and on the day of the murder he was attempting to steal Susan Parker’s 
credit card information. Susan Parker’s blood was found on items in a bag belonging to 
Aiden Davis, and he had injuries on his body consistent with those that Mrs. Parker’s 
assailant could have sustained from her efforts to defend herself. The Prosecution stated 
that the trial would show that Aiden Davis is guilty of committing first-degree murder.  
 
Defense:  
The Defense explained that Aiden Davis was innocent and had been wrongly accused of 
the murder of Susan Parker. The defense stated that the evidence would show that the 
defendant’s friend, Sean Phillips, killed Susan Parker. Phillips was the mastermind 
behind the plan to steal credit card information to buy equipment for growing marijuana. 
Phillips had been to the van where the blood-stained items were found, and does not have 
an alibi for the morning of the murder. None of the forensic evidence can establish that 
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Davis was at the scene of the crime. The Defense stated that the trial would prove that 
Aiden Davis did not murder Susan Parker.  
 
Summary of Testimony 
 
Witness 1: Andrew Parker, victim’s husband  
 
Andrew Parker testified that on the morning of Saturday, July 11th, 2009, he left the 
house shortly before 8:00 a.m. to attend a meeting. Parker’s wife, Susan, was still asleep 
when he left. Mr. Parker attempted to call Susan periodically during the day but she did 
not answer the phone. He left his office late in the afternoon that day, and stated that 
when he arrived home, he was surprised to see Susan’s car was still in the garage, as she 
had plans to attend the ballet that evening. When he approached the front door he noticed 
smears on it. He opened the front door and saw Susan lying there in a pool of blood. He 
fell to the floor screaming. He called 911 from inside the house and then returned to 
Susan’s body and continued to cry and scream.  
 
Mr. Parker testified that he lives one block away from the defendant, Aiden Davis, and 
that he had seen him in passing but had never spoken with him.  
 
Witness 2: Dr. Peter Fielding, medical examiner  
 
Dr. Fielding conducted the autopsy of Susan Parker. He stated that she died as a result of 
blunt force trauma to her head. The vast majority of Mrs. Parker’s external injuries were 
abrasions (scrape-type injuries) and lacerations (crushing or tearing-type injuries) caused 
by blunt force, many on the victim’s head. While it was difficult to estimate how many 
blows Mrs. Parker suffered because of possible overlap, Fielding was able to identify 
eight distinct injuries on the right side of Mrs. Parker's head, 11 on the back of her head, 
and seven on the left side of her head. Mrs. Parker's internal injuries as a result of the 
blows to her head consisted of bleeding inside her scalp and over virtually every surface 
of the brain. 
There were also contusions, abrasions, and scratches to Mrs. Parker's shoulders, breasts, 
and upper torso, fractures to her left hand, and bruising on her right foot, which Fielding 
concluded were probably defensive injuries. The injuries to the right foot were most 
likely sustained while the victim was on the floor “trying to get anything between her and 
the force being inflicted.” 
 
Dr. Fielding surmised that Mrs. Parker would have died within minutes as opposed to 
hours after the first blows were struck to her head. Based on his examination, Fielding 
concluded that Mrs. Parker probably died sometime between 9:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. on 
July 11th.  
 
Witness 3: Julia Manning, criminalist  
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Julia Manning, a criminalist with the Douglas County Sheriff’s Department, arrived at the 
crime scene at about 9:15 p.m. on July 11th to process the crime scene and collect 
evidence. Manning observed blood on the floor and the walls near Mrs. Parker’s body. 
Manning also observed blood smears on the interior portion of the door that she opined 
were consistent with someone who was wearing a long-sleeved garment. Mrs. Parker was 
found in a short-sleeved t-shirt. Based on the location of the great majority of the blood 
evidence, Manning opined that most of the victim’s injuries were sustained while Mrs. 
Parker was low to the ground in the entryway.   
 
On the walls and on objects in the room there were numerous finger marks in blood; 
some of these contained fine linear striations, indicating they were fabric patterns rather 
than fingerprints, consistent with the attacker wearing gloves throughout the incident.  
 
Witness 4: Officer David Bourne, Omaha city police officer 
 
A forensic examination of Susan Parker’s computer showed that it was used beginning at 
8:07 a.m. on July 11th to visit several Web sites that were consistent with her interests. 
The computer was used very extensively in the first part of the morning. The last use was 
at 10:12 a.m. and there was no further activity on the computer that day up until Mrs. 
Parker’s body was discovered. 
 
Officer Bourne testified that in the defendant’s bedroom, police officers found pieces of 
paper with credit card account numbers and names of two of the defendant’s neighbors. 
These papers included a birth date and credit card security code number for one of the 
neighbors, and user names and passwords for the other neighbor’s online accounts, 
written in the defendant’s handwriting.  
 
Police officers searched an abandoned van located just down the road from the 
defendant’s residence. The van had been there for several years and was surrounded by 
vegetation. Behind the driver’s seat, officers found a relatively new looking duffle bag 
containing a black, long-sleeved shirt that appeared to have blood stains on it. The duffle 
bag also contained two black, costume-style evening gloves that extended up the 
forearms, and also appeared to contain blood stains.  
 
The duffle bag had an airline tag from December 2008 with defendant’s name on it. The 
duffle bag was identified as luggage that the defendant used on a trip to Florida in 2008.  
 
Officer Bourne acknowledged that although the bag was the defendant’s, it was possible 
that someone else could have taken the bag from the defendant’s home, placed the shirt 
and gloves inside the bag, and placed it in the van. 
 
Witness 5: Jennifer Murphy, senior criminalist 
 
Jennifer Murphy, senior criminalist at the Douglas County Sherriff’s Department, 
conducted a DNA analysis of the evidence recovered from the abandoned van. She tested 
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the duffle bag and the items found inside the duffle bag, and determined that Susan 
Parker’s blood was on the interior of the bag and on the shirt and gloves found in the 
bag.  
 
Murphy also testified that when the defendant was arrested several days after Mrs. Parker 
was killed, he had a scratch on his nose and bruises on both arms, a red discoloration on 
his back, a yellow discoloration on his thumb, abrasions on his leg, and various red marks 
on his body. She stated that these injuries were consistent with injuries Mrs. Parker’s 
killer could have received based on the extent of the defensive wounds found on her 
body.  
 
Murphy did admit, however, that the defendant’s injuries also could have been sustained 
in a number of other ways, and that she could not state definitively that he received the 
injuries while attacking Mrs. Parker.  
 
DNA testing of Mrs. Parker’s fingernails found no DNA present other than her own.  
 
Witness 6: Sean Phillips, defendant’s friend 
 
Sixteen-year-old Sean Phillips testified that he had been close friends with the defendant 
since the eighth grade. At the beginning of the summer in 2009, the defendant 
and Phillips began discussing a plan to grow marijuana. Phillips testified that the 
defendant came up with the idea of using stolen credit card information to pay for the 
growing equipment they needed.  
 
A week before Parker’s murder, the defendant and Phillips exchanged e-mails in which 
Phillips identified the lighting and hydroponic equipment they would need to grow 
marijuana in the defendant’s closet, and the online sites from which to order 
them. Phillips stated that the defendant had all of the stolen credit card information and 
was planning on purchasing the equipment identified by Phillips sometime that week. He 
testified that although he knew the defendant was going to use stolen credit card 
information to make the purchases, he was not involved in obtaining the credit card 
information. Phillips stated that the defendant told him that he would take care of 
obtaining everything they needed to grow marijuana, and that he just needed Phillips to 
tell him which equipment to buy.  
 
Phillips testified that he knew of the abandoned van where the defendant’s duffle bag was 
found, and that he had been to the van with the defendant on several occasions to “hang 
out.” He also stated that he often visited Davis’s house, and had seen the duffle bag in 
Davis’s closet, but said that he was unsure about whether he had seen the shirt and gloves 
before.  
 
Phillips testified that he was alone at home on the morning of the murder, and admitted 
that since he was alone no one can confirm where he was when Susan Parker was killed.  
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Witness 7: Aiden Davis, defendant 
 
The defendant, 16-year-old Aiden Davis, testified that on the day of the murder he went 
for a walk with his dog in the woods near his house from approximately 9:30 a.m. to 
10:40 a.m. He testified that on the weekends he always walks his dog at the same 
approximate time, around 9:30 a.m. On the day of the murder there was no one at the 
defendant’s house to verify when he walked his dog, but Davis did see one of his 
neighbors, Lucas Allen, when he left his house with his dog, at approximately 9:30 a.m., 
and when he returned to his house at approximately 10:40 a.m.  
 
Davis admitted that he and his friend, Sean Phillips, had decided to start growing 
marijuana. However, he testified that Phillips was the one who had suggested stealing 
credit card information to pay for the growing equipment. He stated that Phillips had 
suggested that they try to get credit card information from Davis’s neighbors because the 
neighborhood Davis lived in was “nicer” than Phillips' neighborhood and he thought the 
people living there would have more money and be more likely to have credit cards. 
 
Davis testified that he and Phillips had entered two of Davis’s neighbors’ homes together 
and obtained credit card information either from the neighbors’ computers or by writing 
down their credit card numbers directly from their credit cards in their wallets. He 
testified that Phillip often talked about what they would have to do if someone caught 
them while they were in the neighbors’ homes. Davis stated that Phillips said that he 
would do “whatever it takes” to make sure they didn’t get caught. When he 
asked Phillips what he meant, Phillips said he would “use whatever force is necessary” to 
take care of someone who got in their way.  
 
Davis testified that he didn’t know how his duffle bag got in the van. He stated that the 
last time he saw it, it was in his closet. He stated that the shirt and gloves were not his and 
that he had never seen them before.   
 
Davis testified that he sustained his injuries while walking his dog in the woods. He 
stated that in the woods near his house there is a steep incline leading down to a creek, 
and that while attempting to walk down to the creek he lost his balance and rolled down 
the incline about 20 feet. Davis stated that he hit several rocks and trees when he fell, 
which caused his injuries.   
 
Witness 8: Lucas Allen, defendant’s neighbor 
 
Lucas Allen lived across the street from the defendant. He testified that he would often 
stop and talk to the defendant when they ran into each other outside while the defendant 
was walking his dog. He testified that on the day of the murder he was outside mowing 
his lawn and doing yard work from approximately 9:15 a.m. to 10:45 a.m. At 
approximately 9:30 a.m. he saw the defendant leave his house with his dog. Allen stated 
that the defendant waved and said good morning, and that he waved back, and that the 
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defendant then began walking in the direction of the woods. Allen testified that he was 
still outside when the defendant returned to his home at about 10:40 a.m. He testified that 
the defendant was wearing shorts and a t-shirt, and appeared calm and relaxed. Allen 
testified that he had never seen the defendant frustrated or angry, that he always had a 
smile, and was kind. He had never seen him act in a violent manner. He testified that he 
never saw the defendant lose his temper or lose control.  
 
Witness 9: Ramona McConnell, defendant’s neighbor 
 
Ramona McConnell testified that she lived next door to the defendant and had known 
him for four years. McConnell has two young children, and she testified that the 
defendant would often stop and let the children play with his dog when he saw them 
outside. She stated that the defendant was always very kind, patient, and gentle with the 
children. On one occasion, her son, who was four-years-old at the time, had fallen on the 
driveway and scraped his knees and was crying. McConnell testified that the defendant 
had been passing by and rushed over to make sure the little boy was ok. She stated that 
she believed the defendant was a very caring and compassionate individual.  
 
Summary of Closing Arguments 
 
Prosecution: 
The Prosecution argued that Aiden Davis entered Susan Parker’s house on July 11th to 
steal her credit card information, and when he discovered that she was at home, he 
bludgeoned her to death. The Prosecution reminded the jury that police found stolen 
credit card information from several of Davis’s neighbors in Davis’s house, written in his 
handwriting. Forensic evidence showed that the person who killed Susan Parker wore 
gloves and a long-sleeved shirt. Both gloves and a long-sleeved shirt were found in 
Davis’s duffle bag in a van near his house, and all of the items were stained with Susan 
Parker’s blood. The injuries seen on Davis’s body shortly after Susan Parker was killed 
are consistent with injuries one would expect to see on Mrs. Parker’s assailant, because 
her wounds suggested she fought back when attacked. And finally, although Davis was 
seen leaving to walk his dog at 9:30 a.m., and was seen returning at 10:40 a.m., the 
evidence suggests that Susan Parker was killed sometime between 10:12 a.m. and 11:00 
a.m., therefore Davis could have walked the one block to arrive at Parker’s house after he 
returned to his home at 10:40 a.m. The Prosecution concluded by stating that Aiden 
Davis killed Susan Parker during the commission of a burglary, and therefore the jury 
should find Davis guilty of first-degree murder. 
 
Defense: 
The Defense stated that Aiden Davis did not murder Susan Parker. The Defense argued 
that the defendant’s friend Sean Phillips is the real culprit. Phillips was the one who 
suggested stealing credit card information from Davis’s neighbors to buy the equipment 
for growing marijuana. Phillips told the defendant that he would be willing to do 
“whatever it takes” to avoid getting caught stealing credit card information, including 
using “whatever force is necessary.” Phillips could have easily taken Davis’s duffle bag 
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from his house during one of his visits there, and used it to dispose of the gloves and shirt 
in the abandoned van, which he had been to several times. And, Phillips does not have an 
alibi for the morning of the murder. Furthermore, Davis’s DNA was not found on Susan 
Parker’s fingernails. If Davis had attacked her and she had fought back, there would 
likely be DNA on her fingernails. Also, Davis’s neighbor saw him leave his house to 
walk his dog at 9:30 a.m., and return from walking his dog at 10:40 a.m., confirming 
Davis’s testimony that during the time of the murder he was in the woods walking his 
dog. It is highly unlikely that Davis would have had time to go to Parker's house and 
commit this crime in the very short amount of time between when he returned from 
walking his dog and 11:00 a.m. The Defense reminded the jury that Davis does not have 
violent tendencies, and is well-liked by people who know him. The Defense concluded 
that Aiden Davis is innocent, and that Sean Phillips should be investigated for the murder 
of Susan Parker. 
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Appendix P 
Defendant Age Manipulation Check 
 
1.  What is the defendant’s name?  _________________________ 
 
2.  How old is the defendant?   ____ 
 
3.  How was the victim killed? 
 
a. Stabbed with a knife 
 
b. Beaten 
 
c. Shot with a gun 
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Appendix Q 
Final Verdict Questionnaire 
Instructions: The prosecution is charging the defendant with first-degree murder.  
However, if you do not believe that the defendant is guilty of this charge, but believe that 
he is guilty of a lesser charge, you may find him guilty of second-degree murder or 
manslaughter.  If you believe that the defendant is not guilty of any of the charges, please 
mark “not guilty” for each of the separate charges. It is the burden of the state to prove 
that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  The fact that the defendant was 
charged with an offense does not mean he is guilty.  The defendant is presumed to be 
innocent, unless you find him guilty.    
The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.  Reasonable 
doubt is based upon common sense and impartial consideration.  You do not have to be 
free from all doubt about the defendant’s guilt, but you must be firmly convinced of his 
guilt.   
Please read the following statutory definitions of first-degree murder, second-degree 
murder, and manslaughter, and use these definitions to answer the questions below. 
Nebraska § 28-303, First-Degree Murder:  A person commits murder in the first 
degree if he or she kills another person (1) purposely and with deliberate and 
premeditated malice, or (2) in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any sexual 
assault in the first degree, arson, robbery, kidnapping, hijacking of any public or private 
means of transportation, or burglary, or (3) by administering poison or causing the same 
to be done; or if by willful and corrupt perjury or subornation of the same he or she 
purposely procures the conviction and execution of any innocent person.  
Nebraska § 28-304, Second-Degree Murder:  A person commits murder in the second 
degree if he causes the death of a person intentionally, but without premeditation.  
Nebraska § 28-305, Manslaughter:  A person commits manslaughter if he kills another 
without malice, either upon a sudden quarrel, or causes the death of another 
unintentionally while in the commission of an unlawful act. 
 
 
 
 
Considering the information presented in the trial summary and the information 
above, please answer each question by selecting the option that best expresses your 
own view. 
 
1. Is the defendant guilty of First-Degree Murder?  
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a. Not Guilty  
 
b. Guilty 
 
2. How certain are you of the verdict that you supplied in question number 1?  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not At All 
Certain 
  Somewhat 
Certain 
  Very  
Certain 
 
 
3. Is the defendant guilty of Second-Degree Murder?  
 
a. Not Guilty  
 
b. Guilty 
 
4. How certain are you of the verdict that you supplied in question number 3?  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not At All 
Certain 
  Somewhat 
Certain 
  Very  
Certain 
 
 
5. Is the defendant guilty of Manslaughter?  
 
a. Not Guilty  
 
b. Guilty 
 
6. How certain are you of the verdict that you supplied in question number 5?  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not At All 
Certain 
  Somewhat 
Certain 
  Very  
Certain 
 
 
7. For this case, the defendant should be found guilty of one of the three charges if there 
is at least a ____% chance that he committed that crime as charged. (Fill in the blank) 
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Appendix R 
 
Demographics Questionnaire 
 
1. What is your age?        ____ years old 
 
2.  What is your gender?   ____ Male ____ Female 
 
3.  What is your ethnic origin and/or race?   
 
  _____ African American  _____ Asian American 
  _____ Caucasian   _____ Hispanic  
  _____ Latin American  _____ Native American  
  _____ Other 
 
4.  What is the highest level of formal education that you have completed?  
 
  _____ Less than high school 
  _____ High school 
  _____ Associate’s degree 
  _____ Bachelor’s degree 
  _____ Master’s degree 
  _____ Professional degree (i.e., M.D., J.D., Ph.D.) 
 
5.  Is English your primary language? 
  _____ yes _____ no 
 
6.  Have you served as a juror on:  (check one answer for each): 
 
   a state civil case?   _____ yes _____ no 
   a state criminal case?  _____ yes _____ no 
   a federal civil case?  _____ yes _____ no 
   a federal criminal case?  _____ yes _____ no 
 
7. Are you registered to vote? 
  _____ yes _____ no 
 
8. Do you have a valid driver’s license? 
  _____  yes _____ no 
 
9. Are you a citizen of the United States?   
 _____ yes _____ no 
 
10. Are you a convicted felon without civil rights?    
 _____ yes _____ no 
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11. What is your religious preference (if any)? 
  ___________________________________________________ 
 
12. What is your current work status?  (check one): 
 _____ employed full time _____ employed part time _____ unemployed 
 
13. What is your political affiliation?  (check one): 
  _____ Democrat _____ Republican _____ other _____ none 
 
14. When you read the trial summary, what did you think the race of the defendant 
was? 
 ___________________________________________________ 
 
15. What did you think the purpose of Experiment 2 was? Please explain why you 
thought this.  
 __________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
16.  What did you think the purpose of Experiment 3 was? Please explain why you 
thought this.  
 __________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix S 
 
Debriefing 
 
Thank you for participating in this study.  The purpose of this study was to examine 
whether and under what conditions mock jurors use negative stereotypes about juveniles 
tried as adults to make judgments of guilt.  Results of several studies suggest that jurors 
may judge a juvenile tried as an adult more harshly than an adult charged with the same 
crime; however, other research suggests that jurors show no bias against juveniles tried as 
adults.  The goal of this study is to clarify this issue by examining the roles of generic 
prejudice and emotion in mock jurors’ judgments of juveniles tried as adults.  
 
Generic prejudice is prejudice that is not specific to the defendant or other parties 
associated with a trial, but rather prejudice about a category of defendants or crimes.  
Jurors may judge a juvenile tried as an adult more harshly than they judge an adult 
charged with the same crime because of generic prejudice toward all juveniles who have 
been transferred to criminal court.  Furthermore, the experience of certain emotions may 
facilitate this generic prejudice.  Specific emotions have been found to have distinct 
effects on judgment and decision making as a function of the cognitive appraisals 
associated with each emotion.  Angry individuals tend to rely on stereotypes when 
making decisions, while sad and fearful people tend to process information more 
systematically.  We expect to find that angry individuals will use negative stereotypes 
about a juvenile tried as an adult to make judgments of guilt, judging him more harshly 
than an adult charged with the same crime.  However, we expect sad and fearful 
individuals to judge a juvenile tried as an adult and an adult charged with the same crime 
similarly.  
 
Once again, we thank you for your participation; we ask that you not discuss this research 
with any future participants as it may negatively influence the results of our study.  If you 
have any questions or concerns about this project, or if you would like to know the 
general results of the research upon its completion, feel free to contact Megan Jones or 
Richard Wiener at 402-472-9639. 
 
 
 
 
